# BeaverCheck Audit Report — https://fitalsport.ir **Date:** November 10, 2026 **URL:** https://fitalsport.ir **Overall Grade:** B (84/100) **Report:** https://beavercheck.com/results/9777bf43-6eb5-4cce-afaf-5bc359511f32 ## Top Findings 1. **[CRITICAL]** Content-Security-Policy header is missing — Security > Security Headers 2. **[CRITICAL]** HSTS header is missing — Security > Security Headers 3. **[CRITICAL]** 1 image-only link(s) without alt text — Accessibility > Link & Button Quality 4. **[CRITICAL]** 4 link(s) with no accessible text — Accessibility > Link & Button Quality 5. **[CRITICAL]** 6 image(s) missing alt attribute — Accessibility > Alt Text Quality --- ## Lighthouse Scores | Category | Score | |----------|-------| | Performance | 73 | | Accessibility | 88 | | Best Practices | 100 | | SEO | 85 | --- ## Security ### Security Headers (F — 10/100) *2 of 10 headers properly configured* - **[CRITICAL]** HSTS header is missing — Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year. - **[WARNING]** X-Content-Type-Options header is missing — This header prevents MIME-type sniffing, which can lead to XSS attacks. Set it to 'nosniff'. - **[WARNING]** X-Frame-Options header is missing — This header prevents clickjacking by controlling who can embed your page in a frame. Set it to DENY or SAMEORIGIN. - **[WARNING]** Referrer-Policy header is missing — Controls how much referrer information is sent with requests. Set to 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' or stricter. - **[WARNING]** Permissions-Policy header is missing — Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features. - **[CRITICAL]** Content-Security-Policy header is missing — CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis. - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing — COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'. - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing — COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers. - **[PASS]** X-Powered-By header is not present - **[PASS]** Server header is present without version info - **[INFO]** Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown) — Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload). ### Content Security Policy (F — 0/100) *No enforcing CSP policy found* - **[CRITICAL]** No Content-Security-Policy header found — CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading. ### TLS & Certificates (A+ — 100/100) *TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed* - **[PASS]** TLS 1.3 is used - **[PASS]** Strong cipher suite is used - **[PASS]** HTTP/2 is negotiated - **[INFO]** OCSP stapling not enabled — Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server. - **[PASS]** Certificate is valid (expires in 67 days) - **[PASS]** Certificate chain has 3 certificates - **[PASS]** Certificate uses modern signature algorithm - **[PASS]** Certificate covers 4 domain(s) - **[PASS]** Certificate is issued by a trusted CA ### Cookie Security (A+ — 100/100) *No cookies set — no cookie security risks* - **[PASS]** No cookies set — no cookie security risks ### Cookie Hygiene (A+ — 100/100) *No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A* - **[PASS]** No cookies set ### WAF / Bot Protection (B — 75/100) *No WAF detected via response headers* - **[INFO]** No WAF detected — Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva. ### security.txt (C — 60/100) *No security.txt file found* - **[INFO]** No security.txt file found — security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field. ### Cross-Origin Tab Safety (D — 60/100) *4 of 4 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener* - **[WARNING]** 4 link(s) open in a new tab without rel=noopener — Without rel="noopener", the destination tab can navigate the original tab via window.opener -- a reverse-tabnabbing phishing primitive. Modern browsers default to noopener since Chrome 88 / Firefox 79 / Safari 12.1, but explicit rel="noopener noreferrer" remains the documented best practice for older browsers, in-app webviews, and security scanners. ### CSP Inline-Style Readiness (D — 60/100) *55 inline style attribute(s) detected* - **[WARNING]** 55 inline style attribute(s) detected — Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 55 inline style(s) is high. Affected element types include: a, div, img, span, p. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win. ### Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening) (A+ — 100/100) *No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A* - **[PASS]** No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A ### Bot Challenge Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)* - **[PASS]** No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page ### Soft-404 Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings* - **[PASS]** No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings ### Empty Page Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals* - **[PASS]** Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals ### Geo-Restriction Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region* - **[PASS]** No geo-restriction detected ### Maintenance Mode Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page* - **[PASS]** No maintenance-mode signals detected ### Subresource Integrity Adoption (A+ — 100/100) *Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable* - **[PASS]** No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI ### CORS Depth (A+ — 100/100) *No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default* - **[PASS]** No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default ### Permissions-Policy Granularity (C — 60/100) *No Permissions-Policy header set -- powerful features (camera / microphone / geolocation / payment / USB) default to allow-on-same-origin* - **[WARNING]** Permissions-Policy header not set -- features default to allow-on-same-origin — Without a `Permissions-Policy` (or legacy `Feature-Policy`) header, every powerful browser feature defaults to its spec default policy (typically `self`). A third-party iframe injected via XSS or a misconfigured embed can still request access to the user's camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, USB devices, etc. Explicitly deny features the page doesn't need: ``` Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=() ``` Features the page legitimately uses can stay enabled with `feature=(self)`. ### Referrer-Policy Strictness (B — 75/100) *Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies (modern: strict-origin-when-cross-origin; legacy browsers: no-referrer-when-downgrade)* - **[INFO]** Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies — Without an explicit `Referrer-Policy` header, the browser falls back to its default policy. Modern browsers (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+) default to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, which is privacy-safe. Legacy browsers default to the leaky `no-referrer-when-downgrade`, which sends the full URL (including path + query) on cross-origin HTTPS-to-HTTPS requests. Set an explicit header to ensure consistent behavior: ``` Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin ``` This matches the modern browser default and is privacy-safe without breaking referrer-based same-origin analytics. ### Source Map Exposure (A+ — 100/100) *No source maps accessible (probed 7 candidate URL(s))* - **[PASS]** No source maps accessible across 7 probed candidate(s) ### HTML Version Disclosure (D — 60/100) *4 software version(s) disclosed in HTML* - **[WARNING]** 4 software version(s) disclosed in HTML: Elementor 4.3.5; features: additional_custom_breakpoints; settings: css_print_method-external, google_font-disabled, font_display-swap, WP Rocket 3.23.5.1, WooCommerce 11.2.1, WordPress 7.1.4 — Each disclosed version enables direct CVE lookup -- an attacker who knows you run WordPress 6.4.2 (or whatever specific version) can search the CVE database for known exploits and target accordingly. Remove via your CMS config: WordPress (`remove_action('wp_head', 'wp_generator')`); Drupal (System / Reports / Status report -> Hide generator); Joomla (Global Configuration -> Hide generator); Hugo/Jekyll (delete or override the {{ .Site.Generator }} template hook). For HTML comments, audit your template files directly. ### Open Redirect Surface (A+ — 100/100) *No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links* - **[PASS]** No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links ### Auth Security (B — 80/100) *3 auth-security finding(s) on the login page* - **[PASS]** Login page detected — The page contains a `type=password` input and at least one identifier field (username / email). Auth-security findings below evaluate the page's hardening posture. - **[WARNING]** Login form does not contain a recognizable CSRF token — Standard frameworks emit CSRF tokens as a hidden input named `_csrf`, `csrf_token`, `csrfmiddlewaretoken` (Django), `authenticity_token` (Rails), or `__RequestVerificationToken` (ASP.NET). None of those were found. Possibilities: (1) the form posts to an API that uses a custom header or SameSite cookie reliance for CSRF -- legitimate but not visible from this scan, (2) the form is genuinely missing CSRF protection, which would let an attacker submit logins from another origin via a hidden POST. Verify the auth flow has SOME CSRF defense. - **[INFO]** No password-reset link found on the login page — Login pages should link to a password-reset flow (typically /forgot, /reset, or a 'Forgot password?' link). Absence usually means the reset flow lives elsewhere on the site (separately reachable), but if it's truly missing, users locked out of accounts have no self-service recovery path. ### Subdomain Inventory Exposure (A+ — 100/100) *No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs* - **[PASS]** No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs --- ## Advanced Security ### Subresource Integrity (A+ — 100/100) *No external resources* - **[PASS]** No external resources to protect ### JS Library Vulnerabilities (A+ — 100/100) *No known vulnerabilities* - **[PASS]** No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected ### Information Leakage (A+ — 100/100) *No exposures* - **[INFO]** No security.txt found — Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt. - **[PASS]** No sensitive files exposed ### Email Security (F — 12/100) *no DMARC, SPF: ~all* - **[WARNING]** No DMARC record found — Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc. starting with v=DMARC1. - **[INFO]** SPF ends in ~all (soft fail) — Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify). - **[INFO]** No DKIM detected via common selectors — DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative. - **[INFO]** MTA-STS not configured — MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts. and a policy file at https://mta-sts./.well-known/mta-sts.txt. - **[INFO]** TLS-RPT not configured — TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.. - **[INFO]** BIMI not configured — BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored. ### API Surface (A+ — 100/100) *No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))* - **[PASS]** No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s)) ### Permissions-Policy (D — 40/100) *No header set* - **[WARNING]** No Permissions-Policy header — Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content. ### CORS Configuration (B — 80/100) *No CORS headers* - **[PASS]** No CORS headers present — secure default --- ## Performance ### Page Weight Budget (A — 90/100) *883 KB transferred, 111 requests* - **[PASS]** Page weighs 1.8 MB (883 KB transferred) - **[INFO]** Fonts are 238 KB — consider subsetting or using system fonts — Subset fonts to include only used characters, or switch to system font stacks. - **[WARNING]** 111 HTTP requests — consider bundling or reducing — Each request adds latency. Bundle small files, use sprites, or eliminate unnecessary requests. - **[INFO]** Estimated 0.18 g CO2 per page load ### Third-Party Impact (A+ — 100/100) *No third-party resources* - **[PASS]** No third-party resources detected ### Text Compression (A+ — 100/100) *All text resources are compressed* - **[PASS]** All text resources are compressed ### Image Optimization (A — 90/100) *8 images, 0 KB saveable* - **[PASS]** All images are well-optimized ### JS Execution Cost (C — 60/100) *1619ms total JS execution* - **[WARNING]** https://fitalsport.ir/: 1265ms CPU time - **[WARNING]** Unattributable: 354ms CPU time ### Font Loading (A+ — 100/100) *5 fonts (238 KB)* - **[INFO]** 5 font(s) use font-display: swap (FOUT risk but functional) ### JS Bundles (A+ — 100/100) *2 scripts, 0 KB unused* ### Resource Caching (A+ — 100/100) *All resources properly cached* - **[PASS]** No caching issues found ### Critical Rendering Path (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected ### Resource Hints (A+ — 100/100) *2 hints, 0 missing preconnects* - **[PASS]** Page uses 2 resource hint(s) ### HTTP/3 (QUIC) (B — 75/100) *HTTP/3 not advertised* - **[INFO]** HTTP/3 (QUIC) is not advertised — HTTP/3 isn't advertised via Alt-Svc and the worker didn't negotiate h3. HTTP/3 reduces handshake latency (1-RTT instead of 2-3 RTTs) and is more resilient on lossy connections. Most modern CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Google Cloud CDN) support HTTP/3 with a single config switch -- consider enabling for mobile-heavy workloads. ### Document Compression (B — 80/100) *Document response uses gzip; brotli would be ~20% smaller* - **[INFO]** Main HTML response uses gzip (brotli would be ~20% smaller) — All current browsers support brotli. Most CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Vercel, Netlify) can switch from gzip to brotli with a single config flag. Origin servers (nginx, Apache) need a brotli module compiled in -- nginx-brotli or Apache mod_brotli. ### Asset Compression *No text asset hosts to measure* - **[INFO]** No third-party or subdomain host served enough text assets to measure — Asset compression is measured per host, from one HEAD request against a sampled resource. Pages that serve all their JS and CSS from the document's own origin are covered by the document compression check instead. ### LCP Image Preload (A+ — 100/100) *LCP preload audit not available* - **[PASS]** LCP image preload audit not available for this scan ### Main HTML Cache-Control (A+ — 100/100) *Main HTML max-age=0 (≤ 5min) is appropriate* - **[PASS]** Main HTML max-age=0 (≤ 5min) is appropriate ### Server-Timing Observability (B — 85/100) *No Server-Timing header found* - **[INFO]** No Server-Timing header found — Server-Timing exposes backend timing breakdowns to browser DevTools (e.g., `db: 45ms; render: 120ms; cache: 2ms`). Useful for diagnosing slow pages without backend log access. Most modern frameworks (Next.js, Cloudflare Workers, Fastly) emit it automatically; absence on a managed platform usually means telemetry headers are stripped at the edge. ### Server Response Intelligence (A+ — 100/100) *2 server-response signal(s) detected* - **[PASS]** `Vary` header declared: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent — The page declares a `Vary` header, telling downstream caches which request headers the response varies on. Critical for content-negotiated responses (compression, language, cookies, device class). - **[PASS]** `Last-Modified` present -- timestamp-based conditional GET supported — Consider also setting `ETag` for stronger revalidation -- ETags are content hashes that don't suffer from clock-skew or DST issues. Last-Modified alone is functional for conditional GETs and not a bug. ### Page Weight Inventory (A+ — 100/100) *111 resources · 883 KB · 0 KB savings available* - **[PASS]** Within 1MB page-weight target - **[INFO]** 2 third-party resources (0% of weight) ### Render-Blocking Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources detected* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected in ### Third-Party Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No third-party resources detected* ### JavaScript Blocking (A — 94/100) *1 JS blocking issue(s) detected* - **[WARNING]** 1 render-blocking