# BeaverCheck Audit Report — https://nnnig.com **Date:** October 23, 2026 **URL:** https://nnnig.com **Overall Grade:** B (83/100) **Report:** https://beavercheck.com/results/ae5339a0-d9f1-41a1-aa0f-289b166a120e ## Top Findings 1. **[CRITICAL]** Content-Security-Policy header is missing — Security > Security Headers 2. **[CRITICAL]** HSTS header is missing — Security > Security Headers 3. **[CRITICAL]** 1 button(s) with no accessible text — Accessibility > Link & Button Quality 4. **[CRITICAL]** 1 control(s) without accessible label — Accessibility > Form Accessibility 5. **[CRITICAL]** 2 image(s) missing alt attribute — Accessibility > Alt Text Quality --- ## Lighthouse Scores | Category | Score | |----------|-------| | Performance | 65 | | Accessibility | 88 | | Best Practices | 100 | | SEO | 100 | --- ## Security ### Security Headers (F — 5/100) *1 of 10 headers properly configured* - **[CRITICAL]** HSTS header is missing — Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year. - **[WARNING]** X-Content-Type-Options header is missing — This header prevents MIME-type sniffing, which can lead to XSS attacks. Set it to 'nosniff'. - **[WARNING]** X-Frame-Options header is missing — This header prevents clickjacking by controlling who can embed your page in a frame. Set it to DENY or SAMEORIGIN. - **[WARNING]** Referrer-Policy header is missing — Controls how much referrer information is sent with requests. Set to 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' or stricter. - **[WARNING]** Permissions-Policy header is missing — Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features. - **[CRITICAL]** Content-Security-Policy header is missing — CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis. - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing — COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'. - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing — COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers. - **[PASS]** X-Powered-By header is not present - **[WARNING]** Server header reveals version information — The Server header discloses the software version, aiding attackers in targeting known vulnerabilities. Remove the version number. - **[INFO]** Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown) — Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload). ### Content Security Policy (F — 0/100) *No enforcing CSP policy found* - **[CRITICAL]** No Content-Security-Policy header found — CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading. ### TLS & Certificates (A+ — 100/100) *TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed* - **[PASS]** TLS 1.3 is used - **[PASS]** Strong cipher suite is used - **[PASS]** HTTP/2 is negotiated - **[INFO]** OCSP stapling not enabled — Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server. - **[PASS]** Certificate is valid (expires in 33 days) - **[PASS]** Certificate chain has 3 certificates - **[PASS]** Certificate uses modern signature algorithm - **[PASS]** Certificate covers 8 domain(s) - **[PASS]** Certificate is issued by a trusted CA ### Cookie Security (A+ — 100/100) *No cookies set — no cookie security risks* - **[PASS]** No cookies set — no cookie security risks ### Cookie Hygiene (A+ — 100/100) *No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A* - **[PASS]** No cookies set ### WAF / Bot Protection (B — 75/100) *No WAF detected via response headers* - **[INFO]** No WAF detected — Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva. ### security.txt (C — 60/100) *No security.txt file found* - **[INFO]** No security.txt file found — security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field. ### Cross-Origin Tab Safety (D — 60/100) *11 of 13 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener* - **[WARNING]** 11 link(s) open in a new tab without rel=noopener — Without rel="noopener", the destination tab can navigate the original tab via window.opener -- a reverse-tabnabbing phishing primitive. Modern browsers default to noopener since Chrome 88 / Firefox 79 / Safari 12.1, but explicit rel="noopener noreferrer" remains the documented best practice for older browsers, in-app webviews, and security scanners. ### CSP Inline-Style Readiness (C — 75/100) *20 inline style attribute(s) detected* - **[WARNING]** 20 inline style attribute(s) detected — Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 20 inline style(s) is moderate. Affected element types include: div, p, span, iframe, h2. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win. ### Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening) (A+ — 100/100) *No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A* - **[PASS]** No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A ### Bot Challenge Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)* - **[PASS]** No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page ### Soft-404 Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings* - **[PASS]** No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings ### Empty Page Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals* - **[PASS]** Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals ### Geo-Restriction Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region* - **[PASS]** No geo-restriction detected ### Maintenance Mode Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page* - **[PASS]** No maintenance-mode signals detected ### Subresource Integrity Adoption (A+ — 100/100) *Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable* - **[PASS]** No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI ### CORS Depth (A+ — 100/100) *No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default* - **[PASS]** No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default ### Permissions-Policy Granularity (C — 60/100) *No Permissions-Policy header set -- powerful features (camera / microphone / geolocation / payment / USB) default to allow-on-same-origin* - **[WARNING]** Permissions-Policy header not set -- features default to allow-on-same-origin — Without a `Permissions-Policy` (or legacy `Feature-Policy`) header, every powerful browser feature defaults to its spec default policy (typically `self`). A third-party iframe injected via XSS or a misconfigured embed can still request access to the user's camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, USB devices, etc. Explicitly deny features the page doesn't need: ``` Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=() ``` Features the page legitimately uses can stay enabled with `feature=(self)`. ### Referrer-Policy Strictness (B — 75/100) *Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies (modern: strict-origin-when-cross-origin; legacy browsers: no-referrer-when-downgrade)* - **[INFO]** Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies — Without an explicit `Referrer-Policy` header, the browser falls back to its default policy. Modern browsers (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+) default to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, which is privacy-safe. Legacy browsers default to the leaky `no-referrer-when-downgrade`, which sends the full URL (including path + query) on cross-origin HTTPS-to-HTTPS requests. Set an explicit header to ensure consistent behavior: ``` Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin ``` This matches the modern browser default and is privacy-safe without breaking referrer-based same-origin analytics. ### Source Map Exposure (A+ — 100/100) *Source-map probe didn't run on this scan* - **[PASS]** Source-map probe didn't run on this scan ### HTML Version Disclosure (D — 60/100) *3 software version(s) disclosed in HTML* - **[WARNING]** 3 software version(s) disclosed in HTML: Elementor 4.3.2; features: additional_custom_breakpoints; settings: css_print_method-external, google_font-enabled, font_display-auto, Site Kit by Google 1.186.0, WordPress 7.1.3 — Each disclosed version enables direct CVE lookup -- an attacker who knows you run WordPress 6.4.2 (or whatever specific version) can search the CVE database for known exploits and target accordingly. Remove via your CMS config: WordPress (`remove_action('wp_head', 'wp_generator')`); Drupal (System / Reports / Status report -> Hide generator); Joomla (Global Configuration -> Hide generator); Hugo/Jekyll (delete or override the {{ .Site.Generator }} template hook). For HTML comments, audit your template files directly. ### Open Redirect Surface (A+ — 100/100) *No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links* - **[PASS]** No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links ### Auth Security (A+ — 100/100) *Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A* - **[PASS]** Page does not appear to be a login form ### Subdomain Inventory Exposure (B — 90/100) *1 risky subdomain name(s) in certificate SANs* - **[INFO]** 1 risky subdomain name(s) advertised in certificate SANs — These names are publicly visible via Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh, censys.io) -- any attacker can enumerate them in seconds. Operators are often unaware that internal/staging/admin endpoints are inadvertently advertised this way. Mitigation: use a wildcard cert that doesn't enumerate, issue per-environment certs without non-prod SANs on the prod cert, or move internal services to private DNS off the public cert. --- ## Advanced Security ### Subresource Integrity (A+ — 100/100) *No external resources* - **[PASS]** No external resources to protect ### JS Library Vulnerabilities (A+ — 100/100) *No known vulnerabilities* - **[PASS]** No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected ### Information Leakage (A+ — 100/100) *No exposures* - **[INFO]** No security.txt found — Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt. - **[PASS]** No sensitive files exposed ### Email Security (D — 49/100) *DMARC: none, SPF: ~all, DKIM* - **[WARNING]** DMARC policy is none — monitoring only — This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports. - **[INFO]** DMARC configured without rua= aggregate reporting — Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@ (or a managed inbox at a reporting service). - **[INFO]** SPF ends in ~all (soft fail) — Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify). - **[PASS]** DKIM configured (selectors: google) - **[INFO]** MTA-STS not configured — MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts. and a policy file at https://mta-sts./.well-known/mta-sts.txt. - **[INFO]** TLS-RPT not configured — TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.. - **[INFO]** BIMI not configured — BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored. ### API Surface (A+ — 100/100) *No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))* - **[PASS]** No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s)) ### Permissions-Policy (D — 40/100) *No header set* - **[WARNING]** No Permissions-Policy header — Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content. ### CORS Configuration (B — 80/100) *No CORS headers* - **[PASS]** No CORS headers present — secure default --- ## Performance ### Page Weight Budget (C — 56/100) *2.0 MB transferred, 72 requests* - **[INFO]** Page weighs 3.3 MB (2.0 MB transferred) - **[INFO]** Fonts are 563 KB — consider subsetting or using system fonts — Subset fonts to include only used characters, or switch to system font stacks. - **[INFO]** 72 HTTP requests - **[INFO]** Estimated 0.42 g CO2 per page load ### Third-Party Impact (A+ — 100/100) *9% third-party, 0 ms blocking* - **[INFO]** Third-party code accounts for 9% of page weight (185.0 KiB of 2.0 MiB) - **[PASS]** Third-party blocking time is low (0 ms) ### Text Compression (A+ — 100/100) *All text resources are compressed* - **[PASS]** All text resources are compressed ### Image Optimization (A+ — 95/100) *12 images, 0 KB saveable* - **[PASS]** All images are well-optimized ### JS Execution Cost (C — 60/100) *1542ms total JS execution* - **[WARNING]** https://nnnig.com/: 1190ms CPU time - **[WARNING]** Unattributable: 351ms CPU time ### Font Loading (A+ — 100/100) *17 fonts (563 KB)* - **[INFO]** 17 font(s) use font-display: swap (FOUT risk but functional) ### JS Bundles (A+ — 100/100) *32 scripts, 0 KB unused* ### Resource Caching (A+ — 100/100) *All resources properly cached* - **[PASS]** No caching issues found ### Critical Rendering Path (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected ### Resource Hints (A+ — 95/100) *11 hints, 0 missing preconnects* - **[INFO]** 1 URL(s) appear in multiple hints — The same href shouldn't appear in multiple hint rels -- one wins, the others are wasted markup and may confuse cache behavior. Sample: https://nnnig.com/wp-content/uploads/al_opt_content/IMAGE/nnnig.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Mcdonalds-Aerial-front-page-slider.jpg.bv.webp (preload+preload+preload+preload+preload). - **[PASS]** Page uses 11 resource hint(s) ### HTTP/3 (QUIC) (B — 75/100) *HTTP/3 not advertised* - **[INFO]** HTTP/3 (QUIC) is not advertised — HTTP/3 isn't advertised via Alt-Svc and the worker didn't negotiate h3. HTTP/3 reduces handshake latency (1-RTT instead of 2-3 RTTs) and is more resilient on lossy connections. Most modern CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Google Cloud CDN) support HTTP/3 with a single config switch -- consider enabling for mobile-heavy workloads. ### Document Compression (B — 80/100) *Document response uses gzip; brotli would be ~20% smaller* - **[INFO]** Main HTML response uses gzip (brotli would be ~20% smaller) — All current browsers support brotli. Most CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Vercel, Netlify) can switch from gzip to brotli with a single config flag. Origin servers (nginx, Apache) need a brotli module compiled in -- nginx-brotli or Apache mod_brotli. ### Asset Compression *No text asset hosts to measure* - **[INFO]** No third-party or subdomain host served enough text assets to measure — Asset compression is measured per host, from one HEAD request against a sampled resource. Pages that serve all their JS and CSS from the document's own origin are covered by the document compression check instead. ### LCP Image Preload (A+ — 100/100) *LCP preload audit not available* - **[PASS]** LCP image preload audit not available for this scan ### Main HTML Cache-Control (C — 70/100) *Main HTML max-age=2592000 (~43200min) is aggressive* - **[WARNING]** Main HTML cached for 43200 minutes -- risks stale auth / SPA state — Long max-age on the main HTML document means users may see outdated auth state, SPA shells, or A/B variants until the cache expires. Consider Cache-Control: no-cache (or max-age=300) for HTML and let your hashed assets (JS/CSS/images) carry the long cache instead. ### Server-Timing Observability (B — 85/100) *No Server-Timing header found* - **[INFO]** No Server-Timing header found — Server-Timing exposes backend timing breakdowns to browser DevTools (e.g., `db: 45ms; render: 120ms; cache: 2ms`). Useful for diagnosing slow pages without backend log access. Most modern frameworks (Next.js, Cloudflare Workers, Fastly) emit it automatically; absence on a managed platform usually means telemetry headers are stripped at the edge. ### Server Response Intelligence (A+ — 100/100) *2 server-response signal(s) detected* - **[PASS]** `Vary` header declared: Accept-Encoding — The page declares a `Vary` header, telling downstream caches which request headers the response varies on. Critical for content-negotiated responses (compression, language, cookies, device class). - **[PASS]** `Last-Modified` present -- timestamp-based conditional GET supported — Consider also setting `ETag` for stronger revalidation -- ETags are content hashes that don't suffer from clock-skew or DST issues. Last-Modified alone is functional for conditional GETs and not a bug. ### Page Weight Inventory (C — 60/100) *72 resources · 2.0 MB · 0 KB savings available* - **[WARNING]** Page weight 2.0 MB exceeds 1 MB target by 1.0 MB - **[INFO]** 16 third-party resources (9% of weight) - **[INFO]** 2 resources over 200KB ### Render-Blocking Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources detected* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected in ### Third-Party Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No third-party resources detected* ### JavaScript Blocking (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking JS or document.write usage detected* - **[PASS]** No JavaScript blocking issues detected ### CSS Performance Depth (B — 78/100) *2 CSS depth issue(s) detected* - **[WARNING]** 5 render-blocking stylesheet(s) -- recommended: <=3 — Each `` without a non-blocking `media` attribute holds up the first paint. Browsers download all of them before painting any content. Consolidate into 1-2 critical-path stylesheets; defer non-critical CSS via `` or via the loadCSS pattern; inline above-the-fold CSS in `