# BeaverCheck Audit Report — https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgpt.site **Date:** November 12, 2026 **URL:** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgpt.site **Overall Grade:** B (84/100) **Report:** https://beavercheck.com/results/badea6e4-f89e-4271-86f3-aad0fc7b0676 ## Top Findings 1. **[WARNING]** 4 render-blocking stylesheet(s) -- recommended: <=3 — Performance > CSS Performance Depth 2. **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing — Security > Security Headers 3. **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing — Security > Security Headers 4. **[WARNING]** HSTS is enabled but missing includeSubDomains — Security > Security Headers 5. **[WARNING]** Images are 1.4 MB — compress or use modern formats — Performance > Page Weight Budget --- ## Lighthouse Scores | Category | Score | |----------|-------| | Performance | 85 | | Accessibility | 100 | | Best Practices | 81 | | SEO | 100 | --- ## Security ### Security Headers (B — 70/100) *6 of 10 headers properly configured* - **[WARNING]** HSTS is enabled but missing includeSubDomains — Without includeSubDomains, subdomains can still be accessed over HTTP. - **[PASS]** X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured - **[WARNING]** X-Frame-Options header is missing — This header prevents clickjacking by controlling who can embed your page in a frame. Set it to DENY or SAMEORIGIN. - **[PASS]** Referrer-Policy is properly configured - **[PASS]** Permissions-Policy is set - **[PASS]** Content-Security-Policy is present - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing — COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'. - **[WARNING]** Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing — COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers. - **[PASS]** X-Powered-By header is not present - **[PASS]** Server header is present without version info - **[INFO]** Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown) — Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload). ### Content Security Policy (B — 75/100) *3 of 10 CSP checks passed* - **[INFO]** Raw CSP policy - **[WARNING]** default-src directive is missing — default-src provides a fallback for other directives. Set it to restrict default resource loading. - **[INFO]** No script-src or default-src to check for 'unsafe-inline' - **[INFO]** No script-src or default-src to check for 'unsafe-eval' - **[INFO]** No script-src or default-src to check for wildcard - **[PASS]** object-src is set to 'none' - **[PASS]** base-uri is properly restricted - **[PASS]** frame-ancestors directive is set - **[WARNING]** form-action directive is missing — form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking. - **[INFO]** upgrade-insecure-requests is not set — This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content. ### TLS & Certificates (A+ — 100/100) *TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed* - **[PASS]** TLS 1.3 is used - **[PASS]** Strong cipher suite is used - **[PASS]** HTTP/2 is negotiated - **[INFO]** OCSP stapling not enabled — Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server. - **[PASS]** Certificate is valid (expires in 76 days) - **[PASS]** Certificate chain has 3 certificates - **[PASS]** Certificate uses modern signature algorithm - **[PASS]** Certificate covers 1 domain(s) - **[PASS]** Certificate is issued by a trusted CA ### Cookie Security (A+ — 100/100) *1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed* - **[PASS]** Cookie '__cf_bm' has the Secure flag - **[PASS]** Cookie '__cf_bm' has the HttpOnly flag - **[PASS]** Cookie '__cf_bm' has SameSite=None ### Cookie Hygiene (A+ — 100/100) *All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks* - **[PASS]** All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks ### WAF / Bot Protection (A — 90/100) *Cloudflare* - **[PASS]** Cloudflare detected — Detected via: cf-ray: a596f1dd1f401344-CDG ### security.txt (C — 60/100) *No security.txt file found* - **[INFO]** No security.txt file found — security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field. ### Cross-Origin Tab Safety (A+ — 100/100) *No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface* - **[PASS]** No new-tab links present ### CSP Inline-Style Readiness (A+ — 100/100) *No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible* - **[PASS]** No inline style attributes detected ### Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening) (B — 95/100) *Trusted Types not enabled* - **[INFO]** Trusted Types not enabled — Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode. ### Bot Challenge Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)* - **[PASS]** No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page ### Soft-404 Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings* - **[PASS]** No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings ### Empty Page Detection (A+ — 100/100) *Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals* - **[PASS]** Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals ### Geo-Restriction Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region* - **[PASS]** No geo-restriction detected ### Maintenance Mode Detection (A+ — 100/100) *No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page* - **[PASS]** No maintenance-mode signals detected ### Subresource Integrity Adoption (A+ — 100/100) *Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable* - **[PASS]** No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI ### CORS Depth (A+ — 100/100) *No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default* - **[PASS]** No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default ### Permissions-Policy Granularity (D — 50/100) *30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)* - **[WARNING]** Permissions-Policy covers 3/10 high-risk features (30%) — The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 3/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation Not declared (default-allow): payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them. ### Referrer-Policy Strictness (A+ — 100/100) *Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)* - **[PASS]** Referrer-Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` -- modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin — The modern browser default (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+). Full URL Referer on same-origin; origin only on cross-origin; no Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. Privacy-safe and breaks no analytics. The recommended explicit value. ### Source Map Exposure (A+ — 100/100) *No source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))* - **[PASS]** No source maps accessible across 4 probed candidate(s) ### HTML Version Disclosure (A+ — 100/100) *No software-version disclosures in HTML* - **[PASS]** No software-version disclosures in HTML ### Open Redirect Surface (B — 90/100) *1 link(s) carry redirect-shaped query parameter(s)* - **[INFO]** 1 link(s) carry redirect-shaped query parameter(s) — Heuristic flag -- whether each endpoint actually permits an arbitrary redirect target depends on server-side validation. Audit the listed paths' redirect-target handling: the endpoint should either (a) restrict to a relative path, (b) restrict to an allowlisted host set, or (c) sign the target. Open redirects power phishing flows (the attacker's URL begins with your trusted domain) and bypass some SSRF-mitigation cookie scoping. Common parameter names flagged: redirect, redirect_uri, redirect_url, redirecturl, return, returnto, return_to, returnurl, return_url, next, nexturl, next_url, continue, goto, dest, destination, forward, target. ### Auth Security (B — 80/100) *3 auth-security finding(s) on the login page* - **[PASS]** Login page detected — The page contains a `type=password` input and at least one identifier field (username / email). Auth-security findings below evaluate the page's hardening posture. - **[WARNING]** Login form does not contain a recognizable CSRF token — Standard frameworks emit CSRF tokens as a hidden input named `_csrf`, `csrf_token`, `csrfmiddlewaretoken` (Django), `authenticity_token` (Rails), or `__RequestVerificationToken` (ASP.NET). None of those were found. Possibilities: (1) the form posts to an API that uses a custom header or SameSite cookie reliance for CSRF -- legitimate but not visible from this scan, (2) the form is genuinely missing CSRF protection, which would let an attacker submit logins from another origin via a hidden POST. Verify the auth flow has SOME CSRF defense. - **[INFO]** No password-reset link found on the login page — Login pages should link to a password-reset flow (typically /forgot, /reset, or a 'Forgot password?' link). Absence usually means the reset flow lives elsewhere on the site (separately reachable), but if it's truly missing, users locked out of accounts have no self-service recovery path. ### Subdomain Inventory Exposure (A+ — 100/100) *No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs* - **[PASS]** No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs --- ## Advanced Security ### Subresource Integrity (A+ — 100/100) *No external resources* - **[PASS]** No external resources to protect ### JS Library Vulnerabilities (A+ — 100/100) *No known vulnerabilities* - **[PASS]** No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected ### Information Leakage (A+ — 100/100) *No exposures* - **[INFO]** No security.txt found — Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt. - **[PASS]** No sensitive files exposed ### Email Security (F — 0/100) *no DMARC, no SPF* - **[WARNING]** No DMARC record found — Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc. starting with v=DMARC1. - **[WARNING]** No SPF record found — Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all. - **[INFO]** No DKIM detected via common selectors — DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative. - **[INFO]** MTA-STS not configured — MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts. and a policy file at https://mta-sts./.well-known/mta-sts.txt. - **[INFO]** TLS-RPT not configured — TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.. - **[INFO]** BIMI not configured — BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored. ### API Surface (A+ — 100/100) *No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))* - **[PASS]** No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s)) ### Permissions-Policy (C — 60/100) *3 directives, 2 missing* - **[INFO]** camera=(self) - **[INFO]** microphone=(self) - **[INFO]** geolocation=(self) - **[INFO]** payment not restricted — Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content. - **[INFO]** usb not restricted — Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content. ### CORS Configuration (B — 80/100) *No CORS headers* - **[PASS]** No CORS headers present — secure default --- ## Performance ### Page Weight Budget (D — 47/100) *2.3 MB transferred, 34 requests* - **[INFO]** Page weighs 6.4 MB (2.3 MB transferred) - **[WARNING]** Images are 1.4 MB — compress or use modern formats — Convert images to WebP/AVIF and resize to display dimensions to reduce transfer size. - **[INFO]** Fonts are 487 KB — consider subsetting or using system fonts — Subset fonts to include only used characters, or switch to system font stacks. - **[PASS]** 34 HTTP requests - **[INFO]** Estimated 0.49 g CO2 per page load ### Third-Party Impact (A+ — 100/100) *No third-party resources* - **[PASS]** No third-party resources detected ### Text Compression (A+ — 100/100) *All text resources are compressed* - **[PASS]** All text resources are compressed ### Image Optimization (A — 90/100) *2 images, 0 KB saveable* - **[PASS]** All images are well-optimized ### JS Execution Cost (C — 60/100) *1881ms total JS execution* - **[WARNING]** Unattributable: 797ms CPU time - **[WARNING]** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgp...: 431ms CPU time - **[WARNING]** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgp...: 366ms CPU time - **[WARNING]** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgp...: 286ms CPU time ### Font Loading (A+ — 100/100) *2 fonts (487 KB)* - **[INFO]** 2 font(s) use font-display: swap (FOUT risk but functional) ### JS Bundles (B — 80/100) *21 scripts, 51 KB unused* - **[WARNING]** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgp...: 30 KB unused (48%) — Consider code splitting or tree shaking to reduce unused code. - **[WARNING]** https://masar-is9-accounting.ramlhlwlalamal.chatgp...: 21 KB unused (37%) — Consider code splitting or tree shaking to reduce unused code. - **[INFO]** Total unused JavaScript: 51 KB ### Resource Caching (A+ — 100/100) *All resources properly cached* - **[PASS]** No caching issues found ### Critical Rendering Path (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected ### Resource Hints (A+ — 100/100) *No optimization needed* - **[PASS]** No resource hint issues ### HTTP/3 (QUIC) (B — 75/100) *HTTP/3 not advertised* - **[INFO]** HTTP/3 (QUIC) is not advertised — HTTP/3 isn't advertised via Alt-Svc and the worker didn't negotiate h3. HTTP/3 reduces handshake latency (1-RTT instead of 2-3 RTTs) and is more resilient on lossy connections. Most modern CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Google Cloud CDN) support HTTP/3 with a single config switch -- consider enabling for mobile-heavy workloads. ### Document Compression (B — 80/100) *Document response uses gzip; brotli would be ~20% smaller* - **[INFO]** Main HTML response uses gzip (brotli would be ~20% smaller) — All current browsers support brotli. Most CDNs (Cloudflare, Fastly, AWS CloudFront, Vercel, Netlify) can switch from gzip to brotli with a single config flag. Origin servers (nginx, Apache) need a brotli module compiled in -- nginx-brotli or Apache mod_brotli. ### Asset Compression *No text asset hosts to measure* - **[INFO]** No third-party or subdomain host served enough text assets to measure — Asset compression is measured per host, from one HEAD request against a sampled resource. Pages that serve all their JS and CSS from the document's own origin are covered by the document compression check instead. ### LCP Image Preload (A+ — 100/100) *LCP preload audit not available* - **[PASS]** LCP image preload audit not available for this scan ### Main HTML Cache-Control (A+ — 100/100) *Main HTML uses no-store -- correct for sensitive/dynamic content* - **[PASS]** Main HTML uses no-store -- correct for sensitive/dynamic content ### Server-Timing Observability (B — 85/100) *No Server-Timing header found* - **[INFO]** No Server-Timing header found — Server-Timing exposes backend timing breakdowns to browser DevTools (e.g., `db: 45ms; render: 120ms; cache: 2ms`). Useful for diagnosing slow pages without backend log access. Most modern frameworks (Next.js, Cloudflare Workers, Fastly) emit it automatically; absence on a managed platform usually means telemetry headers are stripped at the edge. ### Server Response Intelligence (A+ — 95/100) *2 server-response signal(s) detected* - **[PASS]** `Vary` header declared: RSC, Next-Router-State-Tree, Next-Router-Prefetch, Next-Router-Segment-Prefetch,... — The page declares a `Vary` header, telling downstream caches which request headers the response varies on. Critical for content-negotiated responses (compression, language, cookies, device class). - **[INFO]** No `ETag` or `Last-Modified` -- conditional GET not supported — Without either header, browsers can't issue conditional GETs and refresh always re-downloads the full response body even when nothing changed. Add `ETag: ""` (or `Last-Modified: `) on cacheable responses; the server returns 304 Not Modified when the client's cached copy is still valid, saving bandwidth. ### Page Weight Inventory (C — 60/100) *34 resources · 2.3 MB · 51 KB savings available* - **[WARNING]** Page weight 2.3 MB exceeds 1 MB target by 1.3 MB - **[INFO]** ~51 KB of savings available - **[INFO]** 3 resources over 200KB ### Render-Blocking Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking resources detected* - **[PASS]** No render-blocking resources detected in ### Third-Party Resources (A+ — 100/100) *No third-party resources detected* ### JavaScript Blocking (A+ — 100/100) *No render-blocking JS or document.write usage detected* - **[PASS]** No JavaScript blocking issues detected ### CSS Performance Depth (A — 88/100) *1 CSS depth issue(s) detected* - **[WARNING]** 4 render-blocking stylesheet(s) -- recommended: <=3 — Each `` without a non-blocking `media` attribute holds up the first paint. Browsers download all of them before painting any content. Consolidate into 1-2 critical-path stylesheets; defer non-critical CSS via `` or via the loadCSS pattern; inline above-the-fold CSS in `