Security
· 18 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.DCSP Inline-Style ReadinessAction803 inline style attribute(s) detectedFIX
FSubresource IntegrityAction0 of 8 external resources have SRIFIX
| Tag | Domain | Integrity |
|---|---|---|
| <script> | www.clarity.ms | ✗ Missing |
| <script> | pdp.gokwik.co | ✗ Missing |
| <script> | cdn.shopify.com | ✗ Missing |
| <script> | cdn.shopify.com | ✗ Missing |
| <link> | cdn.shopify.com | ✗ Missing |
| <link> | cdn.shopify.com | ✗ Missing |
| <link> | cdnjs.cloudflare.com | ✗ Missing |
| <link> | cdn.shopify.com | ✗ Missing |
FEmail SecurityActionDMARC: noneFIX
This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.
DMARC p=none collects reports but doesn't actually block spoofed mail — phishing emails still reach inboxes.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DMARC's three policies are p=none (monitor only), p=quarantine (mark as spam), and p=reject (bounce). Most domains start at p=none to gather data, but stay there forever, leaving spoofers unblocked. After 30 days of clean DMARC reports, graduate to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
Source: DMARC.org / NIST
DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.
No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.
Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.
Learn more ▾ ▴
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.
Source: RFC 8461
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.
Learn more ▾ ▴
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.
Source: RFC 8460
DPermissions-PolicyActionNo header setFIX
No Permissions-Policy header set.
Without this header, embedded iframes can request access to sensitive device features.
Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()
CSecurity HeadersAction5 of 10 headers properly configuredREVIEW
A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).
max-age=31536000; includeSubDomainsShort HSTS max-age leaves a downgrade-attack window every time the cache expires — set ≥ 1 year.
Learn more ▾ ▴
max-age below 31536000 (1 year) is below industry recommendation. The browser forgets the HSTS policy and re-exposes first-visit downgrade attacks. Set to 63072000 (2 years) and add `includeSubDomains; preload` to qualify for the HSTS preload list.
Source: RFC 6797 / hstspreload.org
Controls how much referrer information is sent with requests. Set to 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' or stricter.
strict-origin-when-cross-originDefault browser behavior leaks full URLs (including query params and tokens) to every third-party resource — set a strict policy.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Without a Referrer-Policy header, browsers send the full referring URL with images, scripts, and fonts loaded from third-party origins. URLs containing tokens, user IDs, or session params end up in third-party logs. Set `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter) to limit leakage.
Source: MDN / W3C
Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.
geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()Permissions-Policy locks down browser APIs you don't use — without it, every page can request camera/mic/geolocation if XSS lands.
Learn more ▾ ▴
By default every page can request the camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, and dozens more. Permissions-Policy turns off the ones you don't need so a future bug can't quietly start using them. It's a defense-in-depth header — one line, big surface reduction.
Source: MDN / W3C
COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.
same-originCOOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.
Source: MDN / web.dev
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
require-corpCOEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.
Source: MDN / web.dev
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.
Learn more ▾ ▴
The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.
Source: hstspreload.org
BContent Security Policy3 of 10 CSP checks passedREVIEW
default-src provides a fallback for other directives. Set it to restrict default resource loading.
default-src 'self'Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.
Without base-uri, attackers can inject a <base> tag to hijack relative URLs. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.
base-uri 'self'Missing base-uri in CSP leaves a base-tag injection attack path open even on otherwise strict policies.
Learn more ▾ ▴
A common omission: developers add CSP for script-src and frame-ancestors but forget base-uri. The result is a CSP that looks strict but lets an attacker rewrite every URL on the page via <base href>. Add `base-uri 'self'` to close the gap.
Source: MDN CSP
form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.
form-action 'self'Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.
Parsed Policy
Csecurity.txtActionNo security.txt file foundREVIEW
security.txt
No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt
CCross-Origin Tab SafetyAction1 of 3 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopenerREVIEW
BTrusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)Trusted Types not enabledREVIEW
BOpen Redirect Surface1 link(s) carry redirect-shaped query parameter(s)REVIEW
BCORS ConfigurationNo CORS headersREVIEW
No CORS headers detected.
Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.
Origin reflection test
Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:
curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A+TLS & CertificatesTLS 1.3, 7 checks passedPASS
HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.
HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.
Learn more ▾ ▴
HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.
Source: MDN Web Docs
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.
Learn more ▾ ▴
OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).
Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide
Certificate Chain
AWAF / Bot ProtectionCloudflarePASS
A+Subdomain Inventory ExposureNo risky subdomain names in certificate SANsPASS
A+JS Library VulnerabilitiesNo known vulnerabilitiesPASS
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.
A+Information LeakageNo exposuresPASS
No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.
| Path | Status | Category | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| /.git/HEAD | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.git/config | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.svn/entries | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.env | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.local | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.production | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /wp-config.php | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.htaccess | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /phpinfo.php | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-status | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-info | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /.well-known/security.txt | ✓ Not found | Security Policy | — |