Security - https://erhoeremich.de BeaverCheck Audit

D

Email Security

Action

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all

FIX

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all

DMARC policy is quarantine — good protection

DMARC configured without rua= aggregate reporting

Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

Policy quarantine — good protection Record v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s

Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).

Why this matters

Informational: a Permissions-Policy directive showing feature -> allowed origins.

Source: MDN Permissions-Policy

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

C

security.txt

Action

No security.txt file found

REVIEW

No security.txt file found

security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.

Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 1 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: div. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

C

HTML Version Disclosure

Action

1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML

REVIEW

1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML

1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML: Hugo 0.160.1

Each disclosed version enables direct CVE lookup -- an attacker who knows you run WordPress 6.4.2 (or whatever specific version) can search the CVE database for known exploits and target accordingly. Remove via your CMS config: WordPress (`remove_action('wp_head', 'wp_generator')`); Drupal (System / Reports / Status report -> Hide generator); Joomla (Global Configuration -> Hide generator); Hugo/Jekyll (delete or override the {{ .Site.Generator }} template hook). For HTML comments, audit your template files directly.

B

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

1 risky subdomain name(s) in certificate SANs

REVIEW

1 risky subdomain name(s) in certificate SANs

1 risky subdomain name(s) advertised in certificate SANs

These names are publicly visible via Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh, censys.io) -- any attacker can enumerate them in seconds. Operators are often unaware that internal/staging/admin endpoints are inadvertently advertised this way. Mitigation: use a wildcard cert that doesn't enumerate, issue per-environment certs without non-prod SANs on the prod cert, or move internal services to private DNS off the public cert.

Got: webmail.erhoeremich.de

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A+

Security Headers

9 of 10 headers properly configured

PASS

9 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS is enabled with preload

Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: DENY

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: no-referrer

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: vibrate=(), geolocation=(), midi=(), notifications=(), push=(), sync-xhr=(), microphone=(), camera=(), magnetometer=(), gyroscope=(), speaker=(), fullscreen=(), payment=(), clipboard-read=(), clipboard-write=(), display-capture=(), screen-wake-lock=(), serial=(), usb=(), web-share=(), xr-spatial-tracking=(), accelerometer=(), ambient-light-sensor=(), autoplay=(), battery=(), bluetooth=(), document-domain=(), gamepad=(), idle-detection=(), picture-in-picture=(), publickey-credentials-get=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-6nmCg8e7RCqaLOp7YaxJdvxCCbHh+5WDsY…

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: Apache

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

A+

Content Security Policy

8 of 10 CSP checks passed

PASS

8 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-6nmCg8e7RCqaLOp7YaxJdvxCCbHh+5WDsYHiuwCyG8ABx0wtqOT8s99lJZTVkosn9yp4tVRjnx1Bgbhj76Sdow==' 'sha256-NWVo5xK0Zgsvaa1kuIhWgfyGeyiRjXcDhVaezYSGcsf6sI17mmUg1vQWplCz5eMi4cL8tE4kXM0kPFeKzGTlLw==' 'sha256-UHW/wVigeVWZuwHDH2E2mCyoTnrqwV0J+cHHBXLuzyoEur+qGHyDCv/Xe9BbaeAw7yewNKnt3Y982RDpthwUcw==' 'sha256-4GBBoEi2JUYeHUindnKmDPuUcd66PLjdibgbSHMnZzEbNTtlkFCsTlGltQGdaAkY/K5OUGOxQ0RoR7/KgJVmCw==' 'sha256-PeJsWHyjfeC8uP65a69B7k3FmC7v/k50B5WktMzF/ctmbz/JVLB8z0y6CA5uC+d0BueABmqLqBfWXpxH0ZOoAQ==' 'sha256-7zGv3JcZ1D5+z3SoIzw+tVbaYQLTR3wrA/smp+YIJ2+Qqzf1VgVorpW3Ami3xDQI+fZG6xoAoQOapQ831Jgh+w==' 'sha256-N6ODWJgkB295A+3bdwU20oeHcpqjApafnv1qBN2DbeyFy5RVcIaz/IGn/IJaTtK8r+yeC2BdvcpHXi1MYSdH2Q==' 'sha256-Nq+2EExcR884WnN/kLYFBUoklocY7YC++d2n2smPx3Ox4nw+xdGmGiTM98vyXDQ3Q9nb60BR/u5h1EeC4x5B9g==' 'sha256-fIgV0Kn3m69IkyUNeEmk/p+QShxaRbNEuu66u3PMBSy+oN4LcD0YEobEaXVgb4n9P4res3EoIKWsuOPDUNLBzA==' 'sha256-KYiRbFwf73f2P6/nQ3PaajDj1OlFTSjijvXOBH5F8ddZwmTA/8+aW/9IX06O9DF2GLcUGGa3k6Xlw96tCz8Naw==' 'sha256-1XmaykHzP/08wpDd/bRnXbw1PN01SqBixKIYcecZ6NP1J/dU/WjQSPI2t/QhLpFoI8XfvcXSL6UXwF8v+oBubA==' 'sha256-yIfgDwh6n+A5K9SFh5n5OBvCfkptBOe6ivTC6Z2tAGM=' 'sha256-+ssCIhEgqViL6BU1zXLWyEJ96wcU48gu2EGDQOY02C8=' 'sha256-kB5VG6gDnnrQ3d4sfwroi8cKB27sK4B7yZL513u7fzY=' 'sha256-62nGOpXH1lDWWyELXaaUt+/d3mdiBV6EXYWvtRznanM=' 'sha256-xhi6ptLg8dTM2XBtV/SYNxtnsQEnSv5wPm9wxHSlpUI=' 'sha256-sflWHBZMej6fsBhs0vx3p8SJ1gPl4BVONnkqP6V+XPk=' 'sha256-TshLNZKifXTfvsWxLyVFWxyHaWZWB7322hH14W9keG4=' 'sha256-lIquC6FsKQ8VEfCg5bP5MFmg+WRpt/rDgpKsoe6CKIg='; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-hashes' 'sha256-2UwpC4v1Z3RtSnoLfKYY9MNBlnmkI6wwziNPkJplvF4=' 'sha256-uR2DTDUoG4KRK3PWF4zZvOcd7p7YYUED+DEXUyhSADY='; img-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; media-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; require-trusted-types-for 'script';

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'none'

No 'unsafe-inline' in script source

No 'unsafe-eval' in script source

No wildcard in script source

object-src is set to 'none'

Got: object-src 'none'

base-uri is properly restricted

Got: base-uri 'none'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'none'

form-action directive is set

Got: form-action 'none'

upgrade-insecure-requests is not set

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

Why this matters

Without upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.

Learn more ▾

Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.

Source: MDN CSP

Parsed Policy

default-src 'none'

script-src 'self''sha256-6nmCg8e7RCqaLOp7YaxJdvxCCbHh+5WDsYHiuwCyG8ABx0wtqOT8s99lJZTVkosn9yp4tVRjnx1Bgbhj76Sdow==''sha256-NWVo5xK0Zgsvaa1kuIhWgfyGeyiRjXcDhVaezYSGcsf6sI17mmUg1vQWplCz5eMi4cL8tE4kXM0kPFeKzGTlLw==''sha256-UHW/wVigeVWZuwHDH2E2mCyoTnrqwV0J+cHHBXLuzyoEur+qGHyDCv/Xe9BbaeAw7yewNKnt3Y982RDpthwUcw==''sha256-4GBBoEi2JUYeHUindnKmDPuUcd66PLjdibgbSHMnZzEbNTtlkFCsTlGltQGdaAkY/K5OUGOxQ0RoR7/KgJVmCw==''sha256-PeJsWHyjfeC8uP65a69B7k3FmC7v/k50B5WktMzF/ctmbz/JVLB8z0y6CA5uC+d0BueABmqLqBfWXpxH0ZOoAQ==''sha256-7zGv3JcZ1D5+z3SoIzw+tVbaYQLTR3wrA/smp+YIJ2+Qqzf1VgVorpW3Ami3xDQI+fZG6xoAoQOapQ831Jgh+w==''sha256-N6ODWJgkB295A+3bdwU20oeHcpqjApafnv1qBN2DbeyFy5RVcIaz/IGn/IJaTtK8r+yeC2BdvcpHXi1MYSdH2Q==''sha256-Nq+2EExcR884WnN/kLYFBUoklocY7YC++d2n2smPx3Ox4nw+xdGmGiTM98vyXDQ3Q9nb60BR/u5h1EeC4x5B9g==''sha256-fIgV0Kn3m69IkyUNeEmk/p+QShxaRbNEuu66u3PMBSy+oN4LcD0YEobEaXVgb4n9P4res3EoIKWsuOPDUNLBzA==''sha256-KYiRbFwf73f2P6/nQ3PaajDj1OlFTSjijvXOBH5F8ddZwmTA/8+aW/9IX06O9DF2GLcUGGa3k6Xlw96tCz8Naw==''sha256-1XmaykHzP/08wpDd/bRnXbw1PN01SqBixKIYcecZ6NP1J/dU/WjQSPI2t/QhLpFoI8XfvcXSL6UXwF8v+oBubA==''sha256-yIfgDwh6n+A5K9SFh5n5OBvCfkptBOe6ivTC6Z2tAGM=''sha256-+ssCIhEgqViL6BU1zXLWyEJ96wcU48gu2EGDQOY02C8=''sha256-kB5VG6gDnnrQ3d4sfwroi8cKB27sK4B7yZL513u7fzY=''sha256-62nGOpXH1lDWWyELXaaUt+/d3mdiBV6EXYWvtRznanM=''sha256-xhi6ptLg8dTM2XBtV/SYNxtnsQEnSv5wPm9wxHSlpUI=''sha256-sflWHBZMej6fsBhs0vx3p8SJ1gPl4BVONnkqP6V+XPk=''sha256-TshLNZKifXTfvsWxLyVFWxyHaWZWB7322hH14W9keG4=''sha256-lIquC6FsKQ8VEfCg5bP5MFmg+WRpt/rDgpKsoe6CKIg='

style-src 'self''unsafe-hashes''sha256-2UwpC4v1Z3RtSnoLfKYY9MNBlnmkI6wwziNPkJplvF4=''sha256-uR2DTDUoG4KRK3PWF4zZvOcd7p7YYUED+DEXUyhSADY='

img-src 'self'

font-src 'self'

media-src 'self'

object-src 'none'

frame-ancestors 'none'

base-uri 'none'

form-action 'none'

require-trusted-types-for 'script'

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is negotiated

Got: h2

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 61 days)

Got: 2027-01-12T05:56:07Z

Certificate chain has 3 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: SHA256-RSA

Certificate covers 3 domain(s)

Got: erhoeremich.de, webmail.erhoeremich.de, www.erhoeremich.de

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=erhoeremich.deIssuer CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-10-14T05:56:08Z → 2027-01-12T05:56:07ZExpires in 61 days SANs erhoeremich.de, webmail.erhoeremich.de, www.erhoeremich.deSignature SHA256-RSASerial 668ccef655c881919cf7c6e5405ebf4d0c7

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USValid 2025-09-03T00:00:00Z → 2028-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 660 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2121 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Cookie Hygiene

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

PASS

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

No cookies set

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 4 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 4 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types enforced for 'script'

PASS

Trusted Types enforced for 'script'

Trusted Types enforced via require-trusted-types-for 'script'

Got: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-6nmCg8e7RCqaLOp7YaxJdvxCCbHh+5WDsYHiuwCyG8ABx0wtqOT8s99lJZTVkosn9yp4tVRjnx1Bgbhj76Sdow==' 'sha256-NWVo5xK0Zgsvaa1kuIhWgfyGeyiRjXcDhVaezYSGcsf6sI17mmUg1vQWplCz5eMi4cL8tE4kXM0kPFeKzGTlLw==' 'sha256-UHW/wVigeVWZuwHDH2E2mCyoTnrqwV0J+cHHBXLuzyoEur+qGHyDCv/Xe9BbaeAw7yewNKnt3Y982RDpthwUcw==' 'sha256-4GBBoEi2JUYeHUindnKmDPuUcd66PLjdibgbSHMnZzEbNTtlkFCsTlGltQGdaAkY/K5OUGOxQ0RoR7/KgJVmCw==' 'sha256-PeJsWHyjfeC8uP65a69B7k3FmC7v/k50B5WktMzF/ctmbz/JVLB8z0y6CA5uC+d0BueABmqLqBfWXpxH0ZOoAQ==' 'sha256-7zGv3JcZ1D5+z3SoIzw+tVbaYQLTR3wrA/smp+YIJ2+Qqzf1VgVorpW3Ami3xDQI+fZG6xoAoQOapQ831Jgh+w==' 'sha256-N6ODWJgkB295A+3bdwU20oeHcpqjApafnv1qBN2DbeyFy5RVcIaz/IGn/IJaTtK8r+yeC2BdvcpHXi1MYSdH2Q==' 'sha256-Nq+2EExcR884WnN/kLYFBUoklocY7YC++d2n2smPx3Ox4nw+xdGmGiTM98vyXDQ3Q9nb60BR/u5h1EeC4x5B9g==' 'sha256-fIgV0Kn3m69IkyUNeEmk/p+QShxaRbNEuu66u3PMBSy+oN4LcD0YEobEaXVgb4n9P4res3EoIKWsuOPDUNLBzA==' 'sha256-KYiRbFwf73f2P6/nQ3PaajDj1OlFTSjijvXOBH5F8ddZwmTA/8+aW/9IX06O9DF2GLcUGGa3k6Xlw96tCz8Naw==' 'sha256-1XmaykHzP/08wpDd/bRnXbw1PN01SqBixKIYcecZ6NP1J/dU/WjQSPI2t/QhLpFoI8XfvcXSL6UXwF8v+oBubA==' 'sha256-yIfgDwh6n+A5K9SFh5n5OBvCfkptBOe6ivTC6Z2tAGM=' 'sha256-+ssCIhEgqViL6BU1zXLWyEJ96wcU48gu2EGDQOY02C8=' 'sha256-kB5VG6gDnnrQ3d4sfwroi8cKB27sK4B7yZL513u7fzY=' 'sha256-62nGOpXH1lDWWyELXaaUt+/d3mdiBV6EXYWvtRznanM=' 'sha256-xhi6ptLg8dTM2XBtV/SYNxtnsQEnSv5wPm9wxHSlpUI=' 'sha256-sflWHBZMej6fsBhs0vx3p8SJ1gPl4BVONnkqP6V+XPk=' 'sha256-TshLNZKifXTfvsWxLyVFWxyHaWZWB7322hH14W9keG4=' 'sha256-lIquC6FsKQ8VEfCg5bP5MFmg+WRpt/rDgpKsoe6CKIg='; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-hashes' 'sha256-2UwpC4v1Z3RtSnoLfKYY9MNBlnmkI6wwziNPkJplvF4=' 'sha256-uR2DTDUoG4KRK3PWF4zZvOcd7p7YYUED+DEXUyhSADY='; img-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; media-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; require-trusted-types-for 'script';

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

PASS

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A+

Permissions-Policy Granularity

100% high-risk feature coverage (10/10)

PASS

100% high-risk feature coverage (10/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 10/10 high-risk features (100%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 10/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer Not declared (default-allow): The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 100% (10/10)

A+

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer` (strictest -- no Referer header sent at all)

PASS

Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer` (strictest -- no Referer header sent at all)

Referrer-Policy: `no-referrer` -- strictest -- no Referer header sent at all

The strictest setting: no `Referer` header is ever sent. Maximum privacy, but breaks referrer-based analytics and any cross-origin auth flow that relies on the Referer header. Use only when the page handles no referrer-dependent flows.

Got: no-referrer

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 4 probed candidate(s)

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

No security.txt found

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✓ Not found	Security Policy	—
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A+

Permissions-Policy

31 directives, 0 missing

PASS

31 directives, 0 missing

vibrate=() — blocked for all origins

geolocation=() — blocked for all origins

midi=() — blocked for all origins

notifications=() — blocked for all origins

push=() — blocked for all origins

sync-xhr=() — blocked for all origins

microphone=() — blocked for all origins

camera=() — blocked for all origins

magnetometer=() — blocked for all origins

gyroscope=() — blocked for all origins

speaker=() — blocked for all origins

fullscreen=() — blocked for all origins

payment=() — blocked for all origins

clipboard-read=() — blocked for all origins

clipboard-write=() — blocked for all origins

display-capture=() — blocked for all origins

screen-wake-lock=() — blocked for all origins

serial=() — blocked for all origins

usb=() — blocked for all origins

web-share=() — blocked for all origins

xr-spatial-tracking=() — blocked for all origins

accelerometer=() — blocked for all origins

ambient-light-sensor=() — blocked for all origins

autoplay=() — blocked for all origins

battery=() — blocked for all origins

bluetooth=() — blocked for all origins

document-domain=() — blocked for all origins

gamepad=() — blocked for all origins

idle-detection=() — blocked for all origins

picture-in-picture=() — blocked for all origins

publickey-credentials-get=() — blocked for all origins

Raw Header

vibrate=() geolocation=() midi=() notifications=() push=() sync-xhr=() microphone=() camera=() magnetometer=() gyroscope=() speaker=() fullscreen=() payment=() clipboard-read=() clipboard-write=() display-capture=() screen-wake-lock=() serial=() usb=() web-share=() xr-spatial-tracking=() accelerometer=() ambient-light-sensor=() autoplay=() battery=() bluetooth=() document-domain=() gamepad=() idle-detection=() picture-in-picture=() publickey-credentials-get=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

vibrate Blocked

geolocation Blocked

midi Blocked

notifications Blocked

push Blocked

sync-xhr Blocked

microphone Blocked

camera Blocked

magnetometer Blocked

gyroscope Blocked

speaker Blocked

fullscreen Blocked

payment Blocked

clipboard-read Blocked

clipboard-write Blocked

display-capture Blocked

screen-wake-lock Blocked

serial Blocked

usb Blocked

web-share Blocked

xr-spatial-tracking Blocked

accelerometer Blocked

ambient-light-sensor Blocked

autoplay Blocked

battery Blocked

bluetooth Blocked

document-domain Blocked

gamepad Blocked

idle-detection Blocked

picture-in-picture Blocked

publickey-credentials-get Blocked

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains, preload)

HSTS preload enabled

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)