Security - https://www.gesundheitswelt.de BeaverCheck Audit

D

Security Headers

Action

5 of 10 headers properly configured

FIX

5 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS max-age is too short (15768000s, should be ≥ 31536000s)

A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Got: max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: SAMEORIGIN

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: no-referrer-when-downgrade

Permissions-Policy header is missing

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Content-Security-Policy header is missing

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: cloudflare

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Why this matters

Short HSTS max-age leaves a downgrade-attack window every time the cache expires — set ≥ 1 year.

Learn more ▾

max-age below 31536000 (1 year) is below industry recommendation. The browser forgets the HSTS policy and re-exposes first-visit downgrade attacks. Set to 63072000 (2 years) and add `includeSubDomains; preload` to qualify for the HSTS preload list.

Source: RFC 6797 / hstspreload.org

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Why this matters

Permissions-Policy locks down browser APIs you don't use — without it, every page can request camera/mic/geolocation if XSS lands.

Learn more ▾

By default every page can request the camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, and dozens more. Permissions-Policy turns off the ones you don't need so a future bug can't quietly start using them. It's a defense-in-depth header — one line, big surface reduction.

Source: MDN / W3C

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

F

Content Security Policy

Action

No enforcing CSP policy found

FIX

No enforcing CSP policy found

No Content-Security-Policy header found

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

D

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

Action

45 of 48 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener

FIX

45 of 48 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener

45 link(s) open in a new tab without rel=noopener

Without rel="noopener", the destination tab can navigate the original tab via window.opener -- a reverse-tabnabbing phishing primitive. Modern browsers default to noopener since Chrome 88 / Firefox 79 / Safari 12.1, but explicit rel="noopener noreferrer" remains the documented best practice for older browsers, in-app webviews, and security scanners.

D

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

Action

89 inline style attribute(s) detected

FIX

89 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 89 inline style(s) is high. Affected element types include: html, body, div, iframe, img. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

F

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Action

0% SRI adoption (0/3 third-party resources)

FIX

0% SRI adoption (0/3 third-party resources)

SRI adoption: 0/3 third-party resources protected (0%)

Of 3 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 0 (0%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 3 examples): - https://www.gstatic.com/_/translate_http/_/ss/k=translate_http.tr.zZZZhVqDDCw.L.W.O/am=BBA4/d=0/rs=AN8SPfoccYc_h-zeKMQux1N0I7taUB-_tA/m=el_main_css - https://translate.googleapis.com/_/translate_http/_/js/k=translate_http.tr.en_US.euNjicV0nFs.O/am=AAAAAg/d=1/exm=el_conf/ed=1/rs=AN8SPfpFWxo-7poS9mRXJBhnu6MUyuArbg/m=el_main - //translate.google.com/translate_a/element.js?cb=initializeGoogleTranslateElement Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.

Got: 0% (0/3)

D

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Action

Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer-when-downgrade` (leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS)

FIX

Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer-when-downgrade` (leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS)

Referrer-Policy: `no-referrer-when-downgrade` -- leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS

The legacy browser default (Chrome <85, Firefox <87). Sends the full URL (path + query) Referer on cross-origin requests as long as the protocol doesn't downgrade. This means session IDs, tracking tokens, search queries, etc. embedded in URLs leak to every third-party HTTPS origin the page links to or embeds. Switch to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.

Got: no-referrer-when-downgrade

F

Subresource Integrity

Action

0 of 3 external resources have SRI

FIX

0 of 3 external resources have SRI

External link from www.gstatic.com lacks integrity attribute

Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.

Got: https://www.gstatic.com/_/translate_http/_/ss/k=translate_http.tr.zZZZhVqDDCw.L.W.O/am=BBA4/d=0/rs=AN8SPfoccYc_h-zeKMQux1N0I7taUB-_tA/m=el_main_css

External script from translate.googleapis.com lacks integrity attribute

Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.

Got: https://translate.googleapis.com/_/translate_http/_/js/k=translate_http.tr.en_US.euNjicV0nFs.O/am=AAAAAg/d=1/exm=el_conf/ed=1/rs=AN8SPfpFWxo-7poS9mRXJBhnu6MUyuArbg/m=el_main

External script from translate.google.com lacks integrity attribute

Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.

Got: //translate.google.com/translate_a/element.js?cb=initializeGoogleTranslateElement

SRI Coverage 0 / 3 of external resources have integrity hashes

Tag	Domain	Integrity
<link>	www.gstatic.com	✗ Missing
<script>	translate.googleapis.com	✗ Missing
<script>	translate.google.com	✗ Missing

F

Email Security

Action

no DMARC, SPF: ~all

FIX

no DMARC, SPF: ~all

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Why this matters

Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.

Learn more ▾

DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

D

Permissions-Policy

Action

No header set

FIX

No header set

No Permissions-Policy header

Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content.

No Permissions-Policy header set.

Without this header, embedded iframes can request access to sensitive device features.

Suggested header

Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()

C

security.txt

Action

No security.txt file found

REVIEW

No security.txt file found

security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.

Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

C

Permissions-Policy Granularity

Action

No Permissions-Policy header set -- powerful features (camera / microphone / geolocation / payment / USB) default to allow-on-same-origin

REVIEW

No Permissions-Policy header set -- powerful features (camera / microphone / geolocation / payment / USB) default to allow-on-same-origin

Permissions-Policy header not set -- features default to allow-on-same-origin

Without a `Permissions-Policy` (or legacy `Feature-Policy`) header, every powerful browser feature defaults to its spec default policy (typically `self`). A third-party iframe injected via XSS or a misconfigured embed can still request access to the user's camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, USB devices, etc. Explicitly deny features the page doesn't need: ``` Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=() ``` Features the page legitimately uses can stay enabled with `feature=(self)`.

Got: header absent

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling enabled

Certificate is valid (expires in 75 days)

Got: 2026-07-25T10:41:21Z

Certificate chain has 3 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA256

Certificate covers 1 domain(s)

Got: www.gesundheitswelt.de

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=www.gesundheitswelt.deIssuer CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USValid 2026-04-26T09:41:23Z → 2026-07-25T10:41:21ZExpires in 75 days SANs www.gesundheitswelt.deSignature ECDSA-SHA256Serial 7f3a2a0e486515380e9d21ab236f1068

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USIssuer CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USValid 2023-12-13T09:00:00Z → 2029-02-20T14:00:00ZExpires in 1016 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USIssuer CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEValid 2023-11-15T03:43:21Z → 2028-01-28T00:00:42ZExpires in 626 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

A+

Cookie Security

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

PASS

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

Cookie '__cf_bm' has the Secure flag

Cookie '__cf_bm' has the HttpOnly flag

Cookie '__cf_bm' has SameSite=None

1 cookies analyzed

Name	Secure	HttpOnly	SameSite	Size	Issues
__cf_bm	✓	✓	None	177 B	—

A+

Cookie Hygiene

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

PASS

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

A

WAF / Bot Protection

Cloudflare

PASS

Cloudflare

Cloudflare detected

Detected via: cf-ray: 9f9eb88f9d48f457-SJC

Got: Cloudflare

A+

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

PASS

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 10 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 10 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 10 probed candidate(s)

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

No security.txt found

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✓ Not found	Security Policy	—
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported

The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.

HSTS max-age is short: 182 days

HSTS max-age should be at least 1 year (31536000 seconds).

Got: max-age=15768000 (expected 31536000)

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)