Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BRedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 1252 ms totalREVIEW
https://weblababruzzo.com
1092 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.weblababruzzo.com/
160 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://weblababruzzo.com | 301 | 1092 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx/1.22.1 |
| 2 | https://www.weblababruzzo.com/ | 200 | 160 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx/1.22.1 |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BHTTP Probe TimingTotal 1044 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations39 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
CCDN & DeliveryActionAssets on Cloudflare (host cdn-cookieyes.com, 5 assets); document served directly from originREVIEW
Asset hosts on a CDN
- cdn-cookieyes.com — Cloudflare · assets: 5 · Cache Status: HIT
Other asset hosts
- www.weblababruzzo.com — assets: 39 · not attributed
- s.w.org — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 57 ms lookupPASS
| A | 217.64.195.24 |
| AAAA | 2001:4b78:1001::1:1101 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns2.th.seeweb.it, ns1.th.seeweb.it |
| MX | 10 m-111b.th.seeweb.it 20 smtp-avas-th.seeweb.it |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.th.seeweb.it ?all |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 46ms across 3 resolvers (spread 23ms)PASS
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (39 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 5 URLsPASS
# START YOAST BLOCK
# ---------------------------
User-agent: *
Disallow:
Sitemap: https://www.weblababruzzo.com/sitemap_index.xml
# ---------------------------
# END YOAST BLOCK
A+Domain Intelligenceweblababruzzo.com — via Register SPA, 3 years, 7 months oldPASS
164 days
April 22, 2027
39 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
3 years, 7 months
Registered April 22, 2023
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2001:4b78:1001::1:1101
Register SPA
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice