Security - https://www.gov.uk BeaverCheck Audit

F

Email Security

Action

no DMARC, no SPF

FIX

no DMARC, no SPF

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

No SPF record found

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Why this matters

Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.

Learn more ▾

DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B

Security Headers

7 of 10 headers properly configured

REVIEW

7 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS is missing includeSubDomains

Without includeSubDomains, subdomains can still be accessed over HTTP.

Got: max-age=31536000; preload Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: SAMEORIGIN

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: interest-cohort=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'none'; script-src 'self' www.google-analytics.com …

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: nginx

Domain is in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: preloaded)

Got: preloaded

Without includeSubDomains, subdomains can still be accessed over HTTP.

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Why this matters

Without includeSubDomains, a forgotten dev subdomain over HTTP can set malicious cookies that ride to the apex.

Learn more ▾

HSTS without includeSubDomains protects only the exact domain. Cookies set on a non-HSTS subdomain can ride to the apex via cookie-scope attacks. The fix is one directive append. Verify all subdomains support HTTPS first — adding includeSubDomains to a domain with HTTP-only subdomains breaks them.

Source: RFC 6797

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

B

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

4 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

4 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 4 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: div, span. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

B

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types not enabled

REVIEW

Trusted Types not enabled

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

C

Permissions-Policy

Action

1 directives, 5 missing

REVIEW

1 directives, 5 missing

interest-cohort=() — blocked for all origins

camera not restricted

Consider adding camera=() to block camera access from embedded content.

microphone not restricted

Consider adding microphone=() to block microphone access from embedded content.

geolocation not restricted

Consider adding geolocation=() to block geolocation access from embedded content.

payment not restricted

Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.

usb not restricted

Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

interest-cohort=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

interest-cohort Blocked

camera Not Set

microphone Not Set

geolocation Not Set

payment Not Set

usb Not Set

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A

Content Security Policy

7 of 10 CSP checks passed

PASS

7 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'self'; base-uri 'none'; script-src 'self' www.google-analytics.com ssl.google-analytics.com stats.g.doubleclick.net www.googletagmanager.com www.region1.google-analytics.com region1.google-analytics.com www.google.co.uk analytics.google.com *.analytics.google.com www.google.com www.gstatic.com *.ytimg.com www.youtube.com www.youtube-nocookie.com 'nonce-MKTjIbVNKNNgkkmfkuf2Ew=='; style-src 'self' www.gstatic.com; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' *.publishing.service.gov.uk www.gov.uk *.dev.gov.uk www.google-analytics.com ssl.google-analytics.com stats.g.doubleclick.net www.googletagmanager.com www.region1.google-analytics.com region1.google-analytics.com www.google.co.uk analytics.google.com *.analytics.google.com www.google.com lux.speedcurve.com; object-src 'none'; frame-src 'self' *.publishing.service.gov.uk www.gov.uk *.dev.gov.uk www.youtube.com www.youtube-nocookie.com; frame-ancestors 'self' *.publishing.service.gov.uk www.gov.uk *.dev.gov.uk; report-uri https://csp-reporter.publishing.service.gov.uk/report; img-src 'self' *.publishing.service.gov.uk www.gov.uk *.dev.gov.uk www.google-analytics.com ssl.google-analytics.com stats.g.doubleclick.net www.googletagmanager.com www.region1.google-analytics.com region1.google-analytics.com www.google.co.uk analytics.google.com *.analytics.google.com www.google.com lux.speedcurve.com assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk https://img.youtube.com https://i.ytimg.com https://api.os.uk data:

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'self'

No 'unsafe-inline' in script source

No 'unsafe-eval' in script source

No wildcard in script source

object-src is set to 'none'

Got: object-src 'none'

base-uri is properly restricted

Got: base-uri 'none'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'self' *.publishing.service.gov.uk www.gov.uk *.dev.gov.uk

form-action directive is missing

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests is not set

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

Why this matters

Without upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.

Learn more ▾

Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.

Source: MDN CSP

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'

base-uri 'none'

script-src 'self'www.google-analytics.comssl.google-analytics.comstats.g.doubleclick.netwww.googletagmanager.comwww.region1.google-analytics.comregion1.google-analytics.comwww.google.co.ukanalytics.google.com*.analytics.google.comwww.google.comwww.gstatic.com*.ytimg.comwww.youtube.comwww.youtube-nocookie.com'nonce-MKTjIbVNKNNgkkmfkuf2Ew=='

style-src 'self'www.gstatic.com

font-src 'self'

connect-src 'self'*.publishing.service.gov.ukwww.gov.uk*.dev.gov.ukwww.google-analytics.comssl.google-analytics.comstats.g.doubleclick.netwww.googletagmanager.comwww.region1.google-analytics.comregion1.google-analytics.comwww.google.co.ukanalytics.google.com*.analytics.google.comwww.google.comlux.speedcurve.com

object-src 'none'

frame-src 'self'*.publishing.service.gov.ukwww.gov.uk*.dev.gov.ukwww.youtube.comwww.youtube-nocookie.com

frame-ancestors 'self'*.publishing.service.gov.ukwww.gov.uk*.dev.gov.uk

report-uri https://csp-reporter.publishing.service.gov.uk/report

img-src 'self'*.publishing.service.gov.ukwww.gov.uk*.dev.gov.ukwww.google-analytics.comssl.google-analytics.comstats.g.doubleclick.netwww.googletagmanager.comwww.region1.google-analytics.comregion1.google-analytics.comwww.google.co.ukanalytics.google.com*.analytics.google.comwww.google.comlux.speedcurve.comassets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.ukhttps://img.youtube.comhttps://i.ytimg.comhttps://api.os.ukdata:

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling enabled

Certificate is valid (expires in 233 days)

Got: 2026-12-28T22:06:14Z

Certificate chain has 2 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: SHA256-RSA

Certificate covers 13 domain(s)

Got: www.gov.uk, *.businesslink.gov.uk, *.direct.gov.uk, *.publishing.service.gov.uk, *.cabinet-office.gov.uk, assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk, service.gov.uk, data.gov.uk, dfid.gov.uk, cabinet-office.gov.uk, api.gov.uk, www.data.gov.uk, gov.uk

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BE

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=www.gov.uk,O=Government Digital Service,L=London,ST=Greater London,C=GBIssuer CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEValid 2025-11-26T22:06:15Z → 2026-12-28T22:06:14ZExpires in 233 days SANs www.gov.uk, *.businesslink.gov.uk, *.direct.gov.uk, *.publishing.service.gov.uk, *.cabinet-office.gov.uk, assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk, service.gov.uk, data.gov.uk, dfid.gov.uk, cabinet-office.gov.uk, api.gov.uk, www.data.gov.uk, gov.ukSignature SHA256-RSASerial 4247d6d08e7f58c125b85716

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEIssuer CN=GlobalSign,OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R3,O=GlobalSignValid 2018-11-21T00:00:00Z → 2028-11-21T00:00:00ZExpires in 926 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 1ee5f221dfc623bd4333a8557

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Cookie Hygiene

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

PASS

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

No cookies set

A+

security.txt

Vulnerability disclosure policy

PASS

Vulnerability disclosure policy

security.txt found

Got: https://www.gov.uk/.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

Contact: https://hackerone.com/44c348eb-e030-4273-b445-d4a2f6f83ba8/embedded_submissions/new, https://www.gov.uk/contact/govuk

Expires: 2026-08-04 03:04:40+00:00

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 5 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 5 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 5 probed candidate(s)

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

security.txt is present — good practice

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✗ Exposed	Security Policy	Info
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A+

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported

The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.

HSTS enabled (preload)

HSTS missing includeSubDomains

Without includeSubDomains, HSTS only protects the exact domain.

HSTS preload enabled

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)