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Security

· 33 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
80
GRADE
B
FIX
6
REVIEW
9
PASS
18
INFO
0
Checks
33
18 PASS 9 REVIEW 6 FIX
F
Content Security Policy
Action
No enforcing CSP policy found
FIX
No enforcing CSP policy found
Critical::
No Content-Security-Policy header found
CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.
Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'
Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

D
Cross-Origin Tab Safety
Action
145 of 145 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener
FIX
145 of 145 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopener
Warning::
145 link(s) open in a new tab without rel=noopener
Without rel="noopener", the destination tab can navigate the original tab via window.opener -- a reverse-tabnabbing phishing primitive. Modern browsers default to noopener since Chrome 88 / Firefox 79 / Safari 12.1, but explicit rel="noopener noreferrer" remains the documented best practice for older browsers, in-app webviews, and security scanners.
D
CSP Inline-Style Readiness
Action
90 inline style attribute(s) detected
FIX
90 inline style attribute(s) detected
Warning::
90 inline style attribute(s) detected
Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 90 inline style(s) is high. Affected element types include: h3, div, ul, li, form. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.
D
Permissions-Policy Granularity
Action
30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)
FIX
30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)
Warning::
Permissions-Policy covers 3/10 high-risk features (30%)
The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 3/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation Not declared (default-allow): payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.
Got: 30% (3/10)
D
Referrer-Policy Strictness
Action
Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer-when-downgrade` (leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS)
FIX
Referrer-Policy is `no-referrer-when-downgrade` (leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS)
Warning::
Referrer-Policy: `no-referrer-when-downgrade` -- leaky -- legacy default that sends full URL cross-origin on HTTPS-to-HTTPS
The legacy browser default (Chrome <85, Firefox <87). Sends the full URL (path + query) Referer on cross-origin requests as long as the protocol doesn't downgrade. This means session IDs, tracking tokens, search queries, etc. embedded in URLs leak to every third-party HTTPS origin the page links to or embeds. Switch to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`.
Got: no-referrer-when-downgrade
D
Subresource Integrity
Action
4 of 13 external resources have SRI
FIX
4 of 13 external resources have SRI
Warning::
External link from fonts.googleapis.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Roboto:ital,wght@0,100..900;1,100..900&display=swap
Info::
link from cdn.jsdelivr.net has SRI protection
Info::
link from cdnjs.cloudflare.com has SRI protection
Warning::
External link from cdn.jsdelivr.net lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/swiper/swiper-bundle.min.css
Warning::
External link from cdn.jsdelivr.net lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@fancyapps/ui@4.0/dist/fancybox.css
Info::
script from www.gstatic.com has SRI protection
Warning::
External script from www.google.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js
Warning::
External link from fonts.googleapis.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=PT+Sans:ital,wght@0,400;0,700;1,400;1,700&family=Source+Code+Pro:ital,wght@0,200..900;1,200..900&family=Source+Sans+3:ital,wght@0,200..900;1,200..900&display=swap
Warning::
External script from www.googletagmanager.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtag/js?id=AW-18005007681
Warning::
External script from ajax.googleapis.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.12.4/jquery.min.js
Info::
script from cdn.jsdelivr.net has SRI protection
Warning::
External script from cdn.jsdelivr.net lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/swiper/swiper-bundle.min.js
Warning::
External script from cdn.jsdelivr.net lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@fancyapps/ui@4.0/dist/fancybox.umd.js
SRI Coverage 4 / 13 of external resources have integrity hashes
TagDomainIntegrity
<link>fonts.googleapis.com✗ Missing
<link>cdn.jsdelivr.net✓ Protected
<link>cdnjs.cloudflare.com✓ Protected
<link>cdn.jsdelivr.net✗ Missing
<link>cdn.jsdelivr.net✗ Missing
<script>www.gstatic.com✓ Protected
<script>www.google.com✗ Missing
<link>fonts.googleapis.com✗ Missing
<script>www.googletagmanager.com✗ Missing
<script>ajax.googleapis.com✗ Missing
<script>cdn.jsdelivr.net✓ Protected
<script>cdn.jsdelivr.net✗ Missing
<script>cdn.jsdelivr.net✗ Missing
B
Security Headers
7 of 10 headers properly configured
REVIEW
7 of 10 headers properly configured
Info::
HSTS is enabled with preload
Got: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload
Info::
X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured
Got: nosniff
Info::
X-Frame-Options is properly configured
Got: SAMEORIGIN
Info::
Referrer-Policy is properly configured
Got: no-referrer-when-downgrade
Info::
Permissions-Policy is set
Got: geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()
Critical::
Content-Security-Policy header is missing
CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.
Expected: default-src 'self'
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing
COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.
Expected: same-origin
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
Expected: require-corp
Info::
X-Powered-By header is not present
Info::
Server header is present without version info
Got: Apache
Info::
Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Got: unknown

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'
Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin
Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp
Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

B
Cookie Security
1 cookies analyzed, 1 checks passed
REVIEW
1 cookies analyzed, 1 checks passed
Critical::
Cookie 'cookiesession1' is missing the Secure flag
Without the Secure flag, this cookie can be sent over unencrypted HTTP, exposing it to interception.
Info::
Cookie 'cookiesession1' has the HttpOnly flag
Warning::
Cookie 'cookiesession1' has no SameSite attribute
Without an explicit SameSite attribute, browser default behavior varies. Set SameSite=Lax or Strict.
1 cookies analyzed 1 critical 1 warnings
NameSecureHttpOnlySameSiteSizeIssues
cookiesession1✗✓—46 B2
B
WAF / Bot Protection
No WAF detected via response headers
REVIEW
No WAF detected via response headers
Info::
No WAF detected
Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.
C
security.txt
Action
No security.txt file found
REVIEW
No security.txt file found
Info::
No security.txt file found
security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.
Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B
Subresource Integrity Adoption
30% SRI adoption (4/13 third-party resources)
REVIEW
30% SRI adoption (4/13 third-party resources)
Info::
SRI adoption: 4/13 third-party resources protected (30%)
Of 13 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 4 (30%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 5 examples): - https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Roboto:ital,wght@0,100..900;1,100..900&display=swap - https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/swiper/swiper-bundle.min.css - https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/@fancyapps/ui@4.0/dist/fancybox.css - https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js - https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=PT+Sans:ital,wght@0,400;0,700;1,400;1,700&family=Source+Code+Pro:ital,wght@0,200..900;1,200..900&family=Source+Sans+3:ital,wght@0,200..900;1,200..900&display=swap Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.
Got: 30% (4/13)
C
HTML Version Disclosure
Action
1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML
REVIEW
1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML
Warning::
1 software version(s) disclosed in HTML: Elementor 3.33.4; features: additional_custom_breakpoints; settings: css_print_method-internal, google_font-enabled, font_display-auto
Each disclosed version enables direct CVE lookup -- an attacker who knows you run WordPress 6.4.2 (or whatever specific version) can search the CVE database for known exploits and target accordingly. Remove via your CMS config: WordPress (`remove_action('wp_head', 'wp_generator')`); Drupal (System / Reports / Status report -> Hide generator); Joomla (Global Configuration -> Hide generator); Hugo/Jekyll (delete or override the {{ .Site.Generator }} template hook). For HTML comments, audit your template files directly.
B
Permissions-Policy
3 directives, 2 missing
REVIEW
3 directives, 2 missing
Info::
geolocation=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
microphone=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
camera=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
payment not restricted
Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.
Info::
usb not restricted
Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

geolocation=() microphone=() camera=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set
geolocation Blocked
microphone Blocked
camera Blocked
payment Not Set
usb Not Set
C
CORS Configuration
Action
Origin: *
REVIEW
Origin: *
Info::
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — unrestricted
Any website can read this resource's response. Appropriate for public APIs but not for user-specific content.
Info::
Origin reflection not testable with a single request
Some servers reflect the request Origin header. This requires manual testing with a crafted Origin header.
CORS Configuration Permissive
Allow-Origin *Allow-Methods GET, POST, OPTIONS

Any website can read responses from this resource.

HeaderValueStatus
Access-Control-Allow-Origin*⚠
Access-Control-Allow-MethodsGET, POST, OPTIONS✓
Access-Control-Allow-HeadersContent-Type, Authorization✓

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
C
Known vulnerability matches
Action
9 known vulnerability match(es) against detected tech
REVIEW

Known Vulnerabilities

LibraryVersionSeveritySummaryFixed In
jQuery1.12.4mediumparseHTML() executes scripts in event handlers2.2.0
jQuery1.12.4medium3rd party CORS request may execute3.0.0-beta1
jQuery1.12.4mediumjQuery before 3.4.0, as used in Drupal, Backdrop CMS, and other products, mishandles jQuery.extend(true, {}, ...) because of Object.prototype pollution3.4.0
jQuery1.12.4mediumRegex in its jQuery.htmlPrefilter sometimes may introduce XSS3.5.0
jQuery1.12.4mediumpassing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.3.5.0
Bootstrap3.4.1mediumBootstrap Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability for data-* attributes3.4.2
Bootstrap3.4.1mediumImproper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Bootstrap allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). This issue affects Bootstrap version 3.4.1. At time of publication, there is no publicly available patched version.3.4.2
Bootstrap3.4.1lowBootstrap before 4.0.0 is end-of-life and no longer maintained.3.999.999
jQuery1.12.4lowjQuery 1.x and 2.x are End-of-Life and no longer receiving security updates2.999.999
A+
TLS & Certificates
TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed
PASS
TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed
Info::
TLS 1.3 is used
Got: TLS 1.3
Info::
Strong cipher suite is used
Got: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Info::
HTTP/2 is not negotiated
HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.
Got: http/1.1
Info::
OCSP stapling not enabled
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Info::
Certificate is valid (expires in 37 days)
Got: 2026-12-07T04:04:03Z
Info::
Certificate chain has 3 certificates
Info::
Certificate uses modern signature algorithm
Got: SHA256-RSA
Info::
Certificate covers 2 domain(s)
Got: sau.int, www.sau.int
Info::
Certificate is issued by a trusted CA
Got: CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Cipher Suite
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
HTTP Version
http/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate
Subject CN=sau.intIssuer CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-09-08T04:04:04Z → 2026-12-07T04:04:03ZExpires in 37 days SANs sau.int, www.sau.intSignature SHA256-RSASerial 5543f4aa34a2583da09a93661ea4468658b
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=YR1,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USValid 2025-09-03T00:00:00Z → 2028-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 673 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial a20253f15f2691c05dc1ce13b9bcca4e
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2134 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f
A+
Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)
No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A
PASS
No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A
Info::
No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A
A+
Bot Challenge Detection
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
PASS
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
Info::
No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page
A+
Soft-404 Detection
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
PASS
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
Info::
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
A+
Empty Page Detection
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
PASS
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
Info::
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
A+
Geo-Restriction Detection
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
PASS
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
Info::
No geo-restriction detected
A+
Maintenance Mode Detection
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
PASS
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
Info::
No maintenance-mode signals detected
A
CORS Depth
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
PASS
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
Info::
CORS allows any origin (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
Any website can fetch this URL via JavaScript and read the response body. Acceptable for genuinely public APIs (e.g. CDN-served static assets). Risky if the URL returns user-specific or session-derived data, since other origins can scrape it via the user's browser without needing credentials. Narrow Allow-Origin to a specific origin allow-list when the response is sensitive.
Got: Allow-Origin: *
A+
Source Map Exposure
No source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))
PASS
No source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))
Info::
No source maps accessible across 4 probed candidate(s)
A+
Open Redirect Surface
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
PASS
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
Info::
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
A+
Auth Security
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
PASS
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
Info::
Page does not appear to be a login form
A+
Subdomain Inventory Exposure
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
PASS
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
Info::
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
A+
JS Library Vulnerabilities
No known vulnerabilities
PASS
No known vulnerabilities
Info::
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+
Information Leakage
No exposures
PASS
No exposures
Info::
No security.txt found
Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.
Info::
No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

PathStatusCategoryRisk
/.git/HEAD✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.git/config✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.svn/entries✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.env✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.local✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.production✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/wp-config.php✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.htaccess✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/phpinfo.php✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-status✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-info✓ Not foundDebug—
/.well-known/security.txt✓ Not foundSecurity Policy—
/package.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/composer.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile.lock✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/requirements.txt✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/pom.xml✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/.gitlab-ci.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
/.travis.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
A
Email Security
DMARC: quarantine, SPF: -all, DKIM, BIMI
PASS
DMARC: quarantine, SPF: -all, DKIM, BIMI
Info::
DMARC policy is quarantine — good protection
Info::
SPF ends in -all (hard fail) — strongest setting
Info::
DKIM configured (selectors: google)
Info::
MTA-STS not configured
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Info::
TLS-RPT not configured
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Info::
BIMI configured and DMARC enforced — logo will display
DMARC
Policy quarantine — good protection Record v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@sau.int; ruf=mailto:dmarc@sau.int

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

A+
API Surface
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
PASS
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
Info::
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))
A
Transport Security
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
PASS
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
Info::
HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised
HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.
Info::
HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains, preload)
Info::
HSTS preload enabled
Info::
TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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