Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DHTTP Probe TimingActionTotal 2658 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownFIX
Connection waterfall
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/12 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BRedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 1487 ms totalREVIEW
https://www.climeup.ai
193 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.climeup.ai/en
1294 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.climeup.ai | 307 | 193 ms | HTTP/1.1 | |
| 2 | https://www.climeup.ai/en | 200 | 1294 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
CCrawlabilityActionrobots.txt present, sitemap with 2 URLsREVIEW
Disallow: / for all user-agents prevents search engines from indexing any page. This will remove the site from search results.
Disallow: / in robots.txt blocks every search crawler — the site becomes invisible in organic search.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Common deployment mistake: a staging robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Disallow: /` ships to prod. The site falls out of search results within days. Verify your robots.txt is the production-intended version. If this is intentional (private site), no action needed.
Source: Google Search Central
User-Agent: *
Disallow: /
Sitemap: /sitemap.xml
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations244 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
ADNS Records4 A records, 40 ms lookupPASS
| A | 3.162.38.53, 3.162.38.39, 3.162.38.55, 3.162.38.94 |
| AAAA | 2600:9000:262a:c800:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:600:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:1400:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:4a00:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:c00:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:1000:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:3c00:1c:3846:5c0:93a1, 2600:9000:262a:4000:1c:3846:5c0:93a1 |
| CNAME | dnhpcr08caryv.cloudfront.net |
| NS | ns-958.awsdns-55.net, ns-155.awsdns-19.com, ns-1454.awsdns-53.org, ns-2014.awsdns-59.co.uk |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Subdomain TakeoverCNAME points at managed service(s) — verify configurationPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 28ms across 3 resolvers (spread 16ms)PASS
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (16 ms)PASS
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceclimeup.ai — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 4 years, 3 months old, hosted on AWSPASS
2099 days
April 10, 2032
244 days
Issued by Amazon
4 years, 3 months
Registered April 10, 2022
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
3.33.251.168
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice