Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNS Records4 A records, 293 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 151.101.0.144, 151.101.64.144, 151.101.128.144, 151.101.192.144 |
| AAAA | 2a04:4e42::144, 2a04:4e42:400::144, 2a04:4e42:200::144, 2a04:4e42:600::144 |
| CNAME | www-gov-uk.map.fastly.net |
| NS | — |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/8 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations233 days until leaf cert expires — 2 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 16ms across 3 resolvers (spread 43ms)PASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.gov.uk
9 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.gov.uk | 200 | 9 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (1 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 35 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /*/print$
# Don't allow indexing of site search
Disallow: /search/all*
Sitemap: https://www.gov.uk/sitemap.xml
# The Meta-ExternalAgent crawler crawls the web for use cases such as training foundation AI models.
# It results in timeouts from Vertex that back up requests from users making genuine searches
User-agent: meta-externalagent
Disallow: /search/all*
# https://ahrefs.com/robot/ crawls the site frequently
User-agent: AhrefsBot
Crawl-delay: 10
# https://www.deepcrawl.com/bot/ makes lots of requests. Ideally we'd slow it
# down rather than blocking it but it doesn't mention whether or not it
# supports crawl-delay.
User-agent: deepcrawl
Disallow: /
# Complaints of 429 'Too many requests' seem to be coming from SharePoint servers
# (https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/3ea268ed-58a6-4166-ab40-d3f4fc55fef4)
# The robot doesn't recognise its User-Agent string, see the MS support article:
# https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3019711/the-sharepoint-server-crawler-ignores-directives-in-robots-txt
User-agent: MS Search 6.0 Robot
Disallow: /
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_1.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_2.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_3.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_4.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_5.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_6.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_7.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_8.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_9.xm...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_10.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_11.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_12.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_13.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_14.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_15.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_16.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_17.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_18.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_19.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_20.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_21.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_22.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_23.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_24.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_25.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_26.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_27.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_28.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_29.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_30.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_31.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_32.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_33.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_34.x...
- https://www.gov.uk/sitemaps/sitemap_35.x...
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencewww.gov.uk — via .gov.uk Registry, 13 years, 9 months oldPASS
130 days
September 24, 2026
233 days
Issued by GlobalSign nv-sa
13 years, 9 months
Registered September 24, 2012
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2a04:4e42::144
.gov.uk Registry
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice