Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations87 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records1 A records, 31 ms lookupPASS
| A | 192.0.66.120 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | connie.ns.cloudflare.com, quincy.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | 10 mailstream-central.mxrecord.mx 20 mailstream-east.mxrecord.io 20 mailstream-west.mxrecord.io |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:aspmx.pardot.... google-site-verification=eSR2uhtZOH8IQNyZLghud676gqyK1ZxL4TpAV6MhLGs pardot399522=6498f75c2806e552b6763bfdb2c47c1d5013956a144de9620a63878de13688c6 google-site-verification=aquO3PPZgzK6tj0GFwhc7SpSAUxa4SpsvyBmmcOslDU MS=8D725880A8C0B234701D662888E698D62E7D8E99 MS=ms15648588 google-site-verification=ib-ODvbZqezRzglwuAR0cL2y9DZo3BlFFTeqy-IXq0o google-site-verification=frAsAyJxWe-yJwCWZjOpwyMfA2j62-oWf6dLHoF8cYY spf2.0/pra include:_spf.google.com include:_spf.salesforce.com include:aspmx.par... apple-domain-verification=TyWA5YhXgveBr8MG |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://grist.org
5 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://grist.org | 200 | 5 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 80 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: */republish/
# START YOAST BLOCK
# ---------------------------
User-agent: *
Disallow:
Sitemap: https://grist.org/sitemap_index.xml
Sitemap: https://grist.org/grist-50/sitemap_index.xml
Sitemap: https://grist.org/fix/sitemap_index.xml
Sitemap: https://uprootproject.org/sitemap_index.xml
# ---------------------------
# END YOAST BLOCK
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap2.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap3.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap4.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap5.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap6.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap7.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap8.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap9.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap10.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap11.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap12.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap13.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap14.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap15.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap16.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap17.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap18.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap19.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap20.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap21.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap22.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap23.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap24.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap25.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap26.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap27.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap28.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap29.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap30.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap31.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap32.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap33.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap34.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap35.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap36.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap37.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap38.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap39.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap40.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap41.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap42.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap43.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap44.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap45.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap46.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap47.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap48.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap49.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap50.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap51.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap52.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap53.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap54.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap55.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap56.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap57.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap58.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap59.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap60.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap61.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap62.xml
- https://grist.org/post-sitemap63.xml
- https://grist.org/page-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/gristspecialproject-si...
- https://grist.org/guide-post-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/newsletter-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/newsletter-sitemap2.xm...
- https://grist.org/gristburningissue-site...
- https://grist.org/parched-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/looking-forward-sitema...
- https://grist.org/record-high-sitemap.xm...
- https://grist.org/state-of-emergency-sit...
- https://grist.org/web-story-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/category-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/content_type-sitemap.x...
- https://grist.org/series-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/location-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/guide-sitemap.xml
- https://grist.org/author-sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencegrist.org — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 26 years old, hosted on WordPress.com (Automattic)PASS
35 days
August 16, 2026
87 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
26 years
Registered August 16, 2000
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
WordPress.com (Automattic)
ASN AS2635
192.0.66.120
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Renew the domain or enable auto-renewal to prevent accidental expiry
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice