Security

· 13 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.

SCORE

GRADE

FIX

REVIEW

PASS

INFO

Checks

5 PASS 3 REVIEW 5 FIX

Security Headers

Action

6 of 10 headers properly configured

FIX

6 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS header is missing

Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year.

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: DENY

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Permissions-Policy header is missing

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Content-Security-Policy header is missing

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: nginx

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year.

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Why this matters

Without HSTS, a network attacker can downgrade the very first connection to HTTP and steal the user's session.

Learn more ▾

HSTS tells browsers 'never speak HTTP to this domain again.' Without it, a network attacker (public WiFi, malicious ISP, hostile DNS) intercepts the first HTTP attempt and serves a downgraded version of your site. One header, big surface reduction.

Source: RFC 6797 / OWASP

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

Controls which browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) are allowed. Set it to restrict unused features.

Expected: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()

Why this matters

Permissions-Policy locks down browser APIs you don't use — without it, every page can request camera/mic/geolocation if XSS lands.

Learn more ▾

By default every page can request the camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, and dozens more. Permissions-Policy turns off the ones you don't need so a future bug can't quietly start using them. It's a defense-in-depth header — one line, big surface reduction.

Source: MDN / W3C

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

Content Security Policy

Action

No enforcing CSP policy found

FIX

No enforcing CSP policy found

No Content-Security-Policy header found

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

Email Security

Action

DMARC: reject

FIX

DMARC: reject

DMARC policy is reject — strongest protection

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

DMARC

Policy reject — strongest protection Record v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;rua=mailto:info@appsgolem.com;

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

Permissions-Policy

Action

No header set

FIX

No header set

No Permissions-Policy header

Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content.

No Permissions-Policy header set.

Without this header, embedded iframes can request access to sensitive device features.

Suggested header

Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()

security.txt

Action

No /.well-known/security.txt published

FIX

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

REVIEW

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

Missing Strict-Transport-Security header

HSTS tells browsers to only use HTTPS, preventing SSL stripping attacks.

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 61 days)

Got: 2026-07-07T11:14:08Z

Certificate chain has 2 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA384

Certificate covers 1 domain(s)

Got: appsgolem.com

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=appsgolem.comIssuer CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-04-08T11:14:09Z → 2026-07-07T11:14:08ZExpires in 61 days SANs appsgolem.comSignature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 5970453a6c9cafc43109f0fe7336a9231a1

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2024-03-13T00:00:00Z → 2027-03-12T23:59:59ZExpires in 310 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial aa75f1e62b8f0a220966d38bbfd4baa1

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

No security.txt found

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✓ Not found	Security Policy	—

All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.