Security - https://nomicalc.com BeaverCheck Audit

F

Content Security Policy

Action

No enforcing CSP policy found

FIX

No enforcing CSP policy found

No Content-Security-Policy header found

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

D

Permissions-Policy Granularity

Action

30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)

FIX

30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 3/10 high-risk features (30%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 3/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation Not declared (default-allow): payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 30% (3/10)

F

Email Security

Action

DMARC: none, no SPF

FIX

DMARC: none, no SPF

DMARC policy is none — monitoring only

This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.

DMARC configured without rua= aggregate reporting

Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).

No SPF record found

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

No DKIM detected via common selectors

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

Policy none — monitoring only, does not block spoofing Record v=DMARC1; p=none;

This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.

Why this matters

DMARC p=none collects reports but doesn't actually block spoofed mail — phishing emails still reach inboxes.

Learn more ▾

DMARC's three policies are p=none (monitor only), p=quarantine (mark as spam), and p=reject (bounce). Most domains start at p=none to gather data, but stay there forever, leaving spoofers unblocked. After 30 days of clean DMARC reports, graduate to p=quarantine, then p=reject.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).

Why this matters

Informational: a Permissions-Policy directive showing feature -> allowed origins.

Source: MDN Permissions-Policy

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

C

Security Headers

Action

6 of 10 headers properly configured

REVIEW

6 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS is missing includeSubDomains

Without includeSubDomains, subdomains can still be accessed over HTTP.

Got: max-age=31536000 Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: DENY

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()

Content-Security-Policy header is missing

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: Netlify

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

Without includeSubDomains, subdomains can still be accessed over HTTP.

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Why this matters

Without includeSubDomains, a forgotten dev subdomain over HTTP can set malicious cookies that ride to the apex.

Learn more ▾

HSTS without includeSubDomains protects only the exact domain. Cookies set on a non-HSTS subdomain can ride to the apex via cookie-scope attacks. The fix is one directive append. Verify all subdomains support HTTPS first — adding includeSubDomains to a domain with HTTP-only subdomains breaks them.

Source: RFC 6797

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin

Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

B

security.txt

Vulnerability disclosure policy

REVIEW

Vulnerability disclosure policy

security.txt found

Got: https://nomicalc.com/.well-known/security.txt

security.txt: Missing required 'Contact' field

security.txt: Missing required 'Expires' field (RFC 9116)

security.txt

C

Source Map Exposure

Action

1 publicly-accessible source map(s) -- full source code leaked

REVIEW

1 publicly-accessible source map(s) -- full source code leaked

1 publicly-accessible JavaScript source map(s)

Source maps (.js.map files) reveal the original source code -- variable names, comments, file structure, and sometimes secrets that were stripped from the bundled output. They're shipped to production by mistake almost universally; the standard fix is a build-tool config flag (Webpack: `devtool: false` or `'hidden-source-map'`; Vite: `build.sourcemap: false`; Next.js: `productionBrowserSourceMaps: false`). Once removed, audit your CDN/edge cache to evict any previously-cached .map URLs. Sample accessible URLs: https://nomicalc.com/assets/index-UWFBqukz.js.map.

B

Permissions-Policy

3 directives, 2 missing

REVIEW

3 directives, 2 missing

camera=() — blocked for all origins

microphone=() — blocked for all origins

geolocation=() — blocked for all origins

payment not restricted

Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.

usb not restricted

Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

camera=() microphone=() geolocation=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

camera Blocked

microphone Blocked

geolocation Blocked

payment Not Set

usb Not Set

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 82 days)

Got: 2026-10-10T16:23:24Z

Certificate chain has 4 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA384

Certificate covers 2 domain(s)

Got: *.nomicalc.com, nomicalc.com

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=nomicalc.comIssuer CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-07-12T16:23:25Z → 2026-10-10T16:23:24ZExpires in 82 days SANs *.nomicalc.com, nomicalc.comSignature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 54a02f3e315c6a1d47040ffd50dcfb3ef44

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=YE2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=USValid 2025-09-03T00:00:00Z → 2028-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 775 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 4df3b15dd6c0784c507cd37b58e6f115

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=Root YE,O=ISRG,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2236 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 872165fc34b6e5fba8add5b3705fb53a

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=ISRG Root X2,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2236 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 6c8f1dc727c7117f7baf853ac980f9cd

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Cookie Hygiene

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

PASS

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

No cookies set

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 5 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 5 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible

PASS

No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible

No inline style attributes detected

A+

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

PASS

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

PASS

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A+

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)

PASS

Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)

Referrer-Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` -- modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin

The modern browser default (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+). Full URL Referer on same-origin; origin only on cross-origin; no Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. Privacy-safe and breaks no analytics. The recommended explicit value.

Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

security.txt is present — good practice

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✗ Exposed	Security Policy	Info
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

HSTS enabled (base policy)

HSTS missing includeSubDomains

Without includeSubDomains, HSTS only protects the exact domain.

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)