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Infrastructure

· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
90
GRADE
A
FIX
0
REVIEW
6
PASS
11
INFO
0
Probed from Madrid, Spain
200 OK
Checks
17
11 PASS 6 REVIEW
B
DNSSEC
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
REVIEW
Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)
Info::
DNSSEC is not deployed
The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).
B
Reverse DNS
0/1 IPs match cert SAN
REVIEW
0/1 IPs match cert SAN
Info::
PTR for 140.82.121.3 does not match any cert SAN: lb-140-82-121-3-fra.github.com
Common when behind a CDN or shared hosting (PTR points at the provider's hostname). Mismatch can also affect mail deliverability if this IP sends email -- many MTAs reject mail when forward+reverse DNS disagree.
C
IPv6 Readiness
Action
No IPv6 support
REVIEW
No IPv6 support
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records found
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No IPv6 Support
About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B
TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations
34 days until leaf cert expires — 2 issues to address
REVIEW

Certificate validity

34
days left
0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

  • Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
  • Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
C
CDN & Delivery
Action
Assets on Fastly (host github.githubassets.com, 66 assets); document served directly from origin
REVIEW
Assets on Fastly (host github.githubassets.com, 66 assets); document served directly from origin
Warning::
Document not behind existing CDN (Fastly serves the assets)
The page's subresources are delivered by Fastly (github.githubassets.com, 66 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin. Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.
Got: x-fastly-request-id: 297757a263c883149807608883676a781e971a74
Info::
Assets on Fastly: github.githubassets.com (assets: 66), cache HIT, HIT
Got: x-fastly-request-id: 297757a263c883149807608883676a781e971a74
Info::
Assets on Fastly: avatars.githubusercontent.com (assets: 3), cache HIT
Got: x-fastly-request-id: e886d1f02b6d59ac7836749ab67ea9fc3f909d4d
Warning: Assets on a CDN, document is not: Fastly
Document origin not attributed

Asset hosts on a CDN

  • github.githubassets.com — Fastly · assets: 66 · Cache Status: HIT, HIT
  • avatars.githubusercontent.com — Fastly · assets: 3 · Cache Status: HIT

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B
CDN Cache Observability
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
REVIEW
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Info::
No CDN cache-status headers in the response
Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.
A+
DNS Records
1 A records, 38 ms lookup
PASS
1 A records, 38 ms lookup
Info::
Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)
Got: 140.82.121.3
Info::
Single A record — no DNS redundancy
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Info::
No IPv6 (AAAA) records
Info::
8 nameserver(s) configured
Got: dns1.p08.nsone.net, dns2.p08.nsone.net, ns-421.awsdns-52.com, ns-1707.awsdns-21.co.uk, ns-1283.awsdns-32.org, dns4.p08.nsone.net, ns-520.awsdns-01.net, dns3.p08.nsone.net
Info::
1 mail exchanger(s) configured
Info::
SPF record present in TXT
Info::
DNS resolution time: 38 ms
Got: 38 ms
A140.82.121.3
AAAA—
CNAME—
NSdns1.p08.nsone.net, dns2.p08.nsone.net, ns-421.awsdns-52.com, ns-1707.awsdns-21.co.uk, ns-1283.awsdns-32.org, dns4.p08.nsone.net, ns-520.awsdns-01.net, dns3.p08.nsone.net
MX
0 github-com.mail.protection.outlook.com
TXT
00Dd0000000hHE0=1TBKg000000TN2r
TAILSCALE-xOzoDvFUzZr5YYVCQFuD
loom-site-verification=f3787154f1154b7880e720a511ea664d
adobe-idp-site-verification=b92c9e999aef825edc36e0a3d847d2dbad5b2fc0e05c79ddd7a1...
apple-domain-verification=RyQhdzTl6Z6x8ZP4
SPF v=spf1 ip4:192.30.252.0/22 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:_netblocks...
MS=ms58704441
anthropic-domain-verification-4az7qn=if8YWuRRqwLycGJDooumzHtxm
stripe-verification=f88ef17321660a01bab1660454192e014defa29ba7b8de9633c69d6b4912...
shopify-verification-code=t1YPwcmvnxZyBycaCpk1MPyWoFs72o
krisp-domain-verification=ZlyiK7XLhnaoUQb2hpak1PLY7dFkl1WE
openai-domain-verification=dv-3nh33eQwdkotMIAzLrIDVZo1
serval-domain-verification-ydryhj=qbkiEakpwEpTvHh5fIiCqtaue
calendly-site-verification=at0DQARi7IZvJtXQAWhMqpmIzpvoBNF7aam5VKKxP
atlassian-domain-verification=jjgw98AKv2aeoYFxiL/VFaoyPkn3undEssTRuMg6C/3Fp/iqhk...
miro-verification=d2e174fdb00c71e0bcf58f8e58c3da2dd80dcfa9
cursor-domain-verification-gtfwmt=1rfLOtiTngX5QSxD5HvNKTvm3
MS=ms44452932
google-site-verification=82Le34Flgtd15ojYhHlGF_6g72muSjamlMVThBOJpks
jamf-site-verification=XtaPNIYghF_e_xRDI8CjgQ
docusign=087098e3-3d46-47b7-9b4e-8a23028154cd
MS=6BF03E6AF5CB689E315FB6199603BABF2C88D805
google-site-verification=UTM-3akMgubp6tQtgEuAkYNYLyYAvpTnnSrDMWoDR3o
facebook-domain-verification=39xu4jzl7roi7x0n93ldkxjiaarx50
CAALookup not available with standard resolver
Resolved in 38 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A+
Subdomain Takeover
No subdomain takeover risk detected
PASS
No subdomain takeover risk detected
Info::
No CNAME record present
A
CAA Records
issue: digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com | issuewild: digicert.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com
PASS
issue: digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com | issuewild: digicert.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com
Info::
CAA issue tag present — authorized CA(s): digicert.com, globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, sectigo.com
Info::
No CAA iodef tag — won't be notified of failed issuance attempts
Add `0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"` to receive notifications when a CA refuses issuance because it doesn't match your CAA policy. Useful signal for detecting issuance attempts by unauthorized CAs.
A+
Multi-Resolver DNS Speed
Mean 19ms across 3 resolvers (spread 40ms)
PASS
Mean 19ms across 3 resolvers (spread 40ms)
Info::
Quad9: 1ms
Got: 1ms via 9.9.9.9:53
Info::
Cloudflare: 17ms
Got: 17ms via 1.1.1.1:53
Info::
Google: 41ms
Got: 41ms via 8.8.8.8:53
A+
Redirect Chain
No redirects — direct access
PASS
No redirects — direct access
Info::
No redirects — direct access
Got: https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine

https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Autom...

80 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#URLStatusTimeProtocolServer
1https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Autom...20080 msHTTP/1.1github.com
A+
Crawlability
robots.txt present, sitemap with 376 URLs
PASS
robots.txt present, sitemap with 376 URLs
Info::
robots.txt is present
Got: 10240 bytes
Info::
sitemap.xml is present
Info::
sitemap.xml is valid XML
Info::
sitemap.xml contains 376 entries
Info::
robots.txt references sitemap
robots.txt 200 OK
Size 10240 B Sitemaps referenced 1 User-agents anthropic-ai, Bytespider, AdsBot-Google, AdsBot-Google-Mobile, bingbot, adidxbot, GPTBot, PerplexityBot, BingPreview, baidu, *, OAI-SearchBot, ClaudeBot Blocking No — crawling allowed
# If you would like to crawl GitHub contact us via https://support.github.com?tags=dotcom-robots
# We also provide an extensive API: https://docs.github.com
Sitemap: https://github.com/sitemap_marketing.xml

User-agent: GPTBot
User-agent: OAI-SearchBot
User-agent: ClaudeBot
User-agent: anthropic-ai
User-agent: PerplexityBot
Crawl-delay: 1
Allow: /*?tab=achievements&achievement=*
Allow: /marketplace/*?tab=readme$
Allow: /marketplace/*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /account-login
Disallow: /copilot/
Disallow: /copilot/c/
Disallow: /ekansa/Open-Context-Data
Disallow: /ekansa/opencontext-*
Disallow: /Explodingstuff/
Disallow: /gist/
Disallow: /search/advanced
Disallow: /search$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data.json$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data.json?*
Disallow: /*/archive/
Disallow: /*/blame/
Disallow: /*/cache/
Disallow: /*/raw/
Disallow: /*/tree/
Disallow: */tarball/
Disallow: */zipball/
Disallow: /.git/
Disallow: */.git/
Disallow: /*.git$
Disallow: /*.atom$
Disallow: /*report-abuse?report=*
Disallow: /*/*/commits/
Disallow: /marketplace/*/*?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/*/*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/*?*?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/*?*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/actions?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/actions?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/free-trials?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/free-trials?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/manage?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/manage?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/models?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/models?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/new?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/new?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/publishers?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/publishers?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/recently-added?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/recently-added?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /biztools$
Disallow: /biztools?*
Disallow: /biztools/*
Disallow: /businesses$
Disallow: /businesses?*
Disallow: /businesses/*
Disallow: /enterprises$
Disallow: /enterprises?*
Disallow: /enterprises/*
Disallow: /organizations$
Disallow: /organizations?*
Disallow: /organizations/*
Disallow: /settings$
Disallow: /settings?*
Disallow: /settings/*
Disallow: /stafftools$
Disallow: /stafftools?*
Disallow: /stafftools/*
Disallow: /users/*/billing$
Disallow: /users/*/billing?*
Disallow: /users/*/billing/*
Disallow: /writing$
Disallow: /writing?*
Disallow: /writing/*
Disallow: /*/*/branches$
Disallow: /*/*/branches?*
Disallow: /*/*/branches/*
Disallow: /*/*/comments$
Disallow: /*/*/comments?*
Disallow: /*/*/comments/*
Disallow: /*/*/compare$
Disallow: /*/*/compare?*
Disallow: /*/*/compare/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list/*
Disallow: /*/*/download$
Disallow: /*/*/download?*
Disallow: /*/*/download/*
Disallow: /*/*/forks$
Disallow: /*/*/forks?*
Disallow: /*/*/forks/*
Disallow: /*/*/graphs$
Disallow: /*/*/graphs?*
Disallow: /*/*/graphs/*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new$
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new?*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new/*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search$
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search?*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search/*
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new$
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new?*
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new/*
Disallow: /*/*/network$
Disallow: /*/*/network?*
Disallow: /*/*/network/*
Disallow: /*/*/projects$
Disallow: /*/*/projects?*
Disallow: /*/*/projects/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary/*
Disallow: /*/*/revisions$
Disallow: /*/*/revisions?*
Disallow: /*/*/revisions/*
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers$
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers?*
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers/*
Disallow: /*/*/tags$
Disallow: /*/*/tags?*
Disallow: /*/*/tags/*
Disallow: /*/*/watchers$
Disallow: /*/*/watchers?*
Disallow: /*/*/watchers/*
Disallow: /*?source=*
Disallow: /*&source=*
Disallow: /*?ref_cta=*
Disallow: /*&ref_cta=*
Disallow: /*?plan=*
Disallow: /*&plan=*
Disallow: /*?return_to=*
Disallow: /*&return_to=*
Disallow: /*?ref_loc=*
Disallow: /*&ref_loc=*
Disallow: /*?setup_organization=*
Disallow: /*&setup_organization=*
Disallow: /*?source_repo=*
Disallow: /*&source_repo=*
Disallow: /*?ref_page=*
Disallow: /*&ref_page=*
Disallow: /*?referrer=*
Disallow: /*&referrer=*
Disallow: /*?report=*
Disallow: /*&report=*
Disallow: /*?author=*
Disallow: /*&author=*
Disallow: /*?since=*
Disallow: /*&since=*
Disallow: /*?until=*
Disallow: /*&until=*
Disallow: /*?tab=*
Disallow: /*&tab=*
Disallow: /*?q=*
Disallow: /*&q=*

User-agent: Bytespider
Disallow: /

User-agent: AdsBot-Google
User-agent: AdsBot-Google-Mobile
Disallow: /account-login
Disallow: /copilot/
Disallow: /copilot/c/
Disallow: /ekansa/Open-Context-Data
Disallow: /ekansa/opencontext-*
Disallow: /Explodingstuff/
Disallow: /gist/
Disallow: /search/advanced
Disallow: /search$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data.json$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data.json?*
Disallow: /*/archive/
Disallow: /*/blame/
Disallow: /*/cache/
Disallow: /*/raw/
Disallow: /*/tree/
Disallow: */tarball/
Disallow: */zipball/
Disallow: /.git/
Disallow: */.git/
Disallow: /*.git$
Disallow: /*.atom$
Disallow: /*report-abuse?report=*
Disallow: /*/*/commits/
Disallow: /marketplace/*/*?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/*/*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/*?*?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/*?*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/actions?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/actions?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/free-trials?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/free-trials?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/manage?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/manage?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/models?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/models?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/new?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/new?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/publishers?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/publishers?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /marketplace/recently-added?tab=readme$
Disallow: /marketplace/recently-added?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /biztools$
Disallow: /biztools?*
Disallow: /biztools/*
Disallow: /businesses$
Disallow: /businesses?*
Disallow: /businesses/*
Disallow: /enterprises$
Disallow: /enterprises?*
Disallow: /enterprises/*
Disallow: /organizations$
Disallow: /organizations?*
Disallow: /organizations/*
Disallow: /settings$
Disallow: /settings?*
Disallow: /settings/*
Disallow: /stafftools$
Disallow: /stafftools?*
Disallow: /stafftools/*
Disallow: /users/*/billing$
Disallow: /users/*/billing?*
Disallow: /users/*/billing/*
Disallow: /writing$
Disallow: /writing?*
Disallow: /writing/*
Disallow: /*/*/branches$
Disallow: /*/*/branches?*
Disallow: /*/*/branches/*
Disallow: /*/*/comments$
Disallow: /*/*/comments?*
Disallow: /*/*/comments/*
Disallow: /*/*/compare$
Disallow: /*/*/compare?*
Disallow: /*/*/compare/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors_list/*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list$
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list?*
Disallow: /*/*/contributors-list/*
Disallow: /*/*/download$
Disallow: /*/*/download?*
Disallow: /*/*/download/*
Disallow: /*/*/forks$
Disallow: /*/*/forks?*
Disallow: /*/*/forks/*
Disallow: /*/*/graphs$
Disallow: /*/*/graphs?*
Disallow: /*/*/graphs/*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new$
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new?*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/new/*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search$
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search?*
Disallow: /*/*/issues/search/*
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new$
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new?*
Disallow: /*/*/milestones/new/*
Disallow: /*/*/network$
Disallow: /*/*/network?*
Disallow: /*/*/network/*
Disallow: /*/*/projects$
Disallow: /*/*/projects?*
Disallow: /*/*/projects/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse-new/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_committer_data/*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary$
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary?*
Disallow: /*/*/pulse_diffstat_summary/*
Disallow: /*/*/revisions$
Disallow: /*/*/revisions?*
Disallow: /*/*/revisions/*
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers$
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers?*
Disallow: /*/*/stargazers/*
Disallow: /*/*/tags$
Disallow: /*/*/tags?*
Disallow: /*/*/tags/*
Disallow: /*/*/watchers$
Disallow: /*/*/watchers?*
Disallow: /*/*/watchers/*
Disallow: /*?source=*
Disallow: /*&source=*
Disallow: /*?ref_cta=*
Disallow: /*&ref_cta=*
Disallow: /*?plan=*
Disallow: /*&plan=*
Disallow: /*?return_to=*
Disallow: /*&return_to=*
Disallow: /*?ref_loc=*
Disallow: /*&ref_loc=*
Disallow: /*?setup_organization=*
Disallow: /*&setup_organization=*
Disallow: /*?source_repo=*
Disallow: /*&source_repo=*
Disallow: /*?ref_page=*
Disallow: /*&ref_page=*
Disallow: /*?referrer=*
Disallow: /*&referrer=*
Disallow: /*?report=*
Disallow: /*&report=*
Disallow: /*?author=*
Disallow: /*&author=*
Disallow: /*?since=*
Disallow: /*&since=*
Disallow: /*?until=*
Disallow: /*&until=*
Disallow: /*?tab=*
Disallow: /*&tab=*
Disallow: /*?q=*
Disallow: /*&q=*

User-agent: bingbot
User-agent: adidxbot
User-agent: BingPreview
Disallow: /ekansa/Open-Context-Data
Disallow: /ekansa/opencontext-*
Disallow: /account-login
Disallow: */tarball/
Disallow: */zipball/
Disallow: /Explodingstuff/
Disallow: /copilot/
Disallow: /copilot/c/

User-agent: baidu
crawl-delay: 1

User-agent: *
Allow: /*?tab=achievements&achievement=*
Allow: /marketplace/*?tab=readme$
Allow: /marketplace/*?tab=transparency$
Disallow: /account-login
Disallow: /copilot/
Disallow: /copilot/c/
Disallow: /ekansa/Open-Context-Data
Disallow: /ekansa/opencontext-*
Disallow: /Explodingstuff/
Disallow: /gist/
Disallow: /search/advanced
Disallow: /s
A
URL Variants
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
PASS
www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS
Info::
www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: non-www)
Warning::
Trailing slash inconsistency — both versions serve content
Got: Both with/without trailing slash return 200 Expected: One variant 301-redirects to the other
Info::
HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently
Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

301https://www.github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine
200https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine

Preferred variant: non-www

Trailing Slash

200https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine/
200https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine

Inconsistent — duplicate content risk

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine → https://github.com/abidullahafridi/Automation-Engine

Consistent

A+
Domain Intelligence
github.com — via MarkMonitor Inc., 19 years, 3 months old, hosted on GitHub Pages
PASS
github.com — via MarkMonitor Inc., 19 years, 3 months old, hosted on GitHub Pages
Info::
Domain registered until Oct 9, 2028 (1 years, 11 months remaining)
Info::
DNSSEC is not enabled
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Info::
Registrar: MarkMonitor Inc.
Warning::
Registrar lock is NOT enabled
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Info::
Hosting: GitHub Pages
Got: AS36459
Domain expiry

714 days

October 9, 2028

SSL certificate

34 days

Issued by Sectigo Limited

Domain age

19 years, 3 months

Registered October 9, 2007

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

GitHub Pages

ASN AS36459

140.82.121.4

Registrar

MarkMonitor Inc.

Unlocked 8 NS records
Expiry timeline
Today
+1 year
Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)
Recommended actions
  • Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
  • Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Registrar MarkMonitor Inc.
Created October 9, 2007 (19 years, 3 months ago)
Expires October 9, 2028 (1 years, 11 months)
Last Updated September 7, 2026
Name Servers dns1.p08.nsone.net, dns2.p08.nsone.net, dns3.p08.nsone.net, dns4.p08.nsone.net, ns-1283.awsdns-32.org, ns-1707.awsdns-21.co.uk, ns-421.awsdns-52.com, ns-520.awsdns-01.net
DNSSEC Not enabled
Hosting
IP Address 140.82.121.4
ASN AS36459 (GITHUB - GitHub, Inc., US)
Provider GitHub Pages
Data source: rdap (1.4s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more ▾

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

A
HTTP Probe Timing
Total 621 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown
PASS
DNS Lookup DNS Lookup — time to resolve the domain name to an IP address.
35 ms
TCP Connect TCP Connect — time to establish a TCP connection to the server.
24 ms
TLS Handshake TLS Handshake — time to complete the HTTPS encryption handshake.
28 ms
Time to First Byte Time to First Byte — how long the server takes to respond with the first byte of data.
573 ms
Total Time Total request time from DNS lookup through full response.
621 ms

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 35 ms TCP Connect 24 ms TLS Handshake 28 ms Server Processing 485 ms Content Transfer 49 ms
A+
Operational Status Page
Status page detected via anchor text
PASS
Status page detected via anchor text
Info::
Status page link found: https://www.githubstatus.com/
Got: https://www.githubstatus.com/
A+
Health Check Endpoint
Health endpoint at https://github.com/health (HTTP 200)
PASS
Health endpoint at https://github.com/health (HTTP 200)
Info::
Public health endpoint at https://github.com/health
Got: https://github.com/health
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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