Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.FCrawlabilityActionrobots.txt present, sitemap with 0 URLsFIX
Disallow: / for all user-agents prevents search engines from indexing any page. This will remove the site from search results.
Disallow: / in robots.txt blocks every search crawler — the site becomes invisible in organic search.
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Common deployment mistake: a staging robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Disallow: /` ships to prod. The site falls out of search results within days. Verify your robots.txt is the production-intended version. If this is intentional (private site), no action needed.
Source: Google Search Central
Search engines may not be able to parse the sitemap. Fix XML validation errors.
An unparseable sitemap is silently ignored by Google — the URLs it advertises are never queued for crawl.
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Google's sitemap parser is strict about XML validity. A single unescaped `&` or unclosed tag invalidates the whole file. Run your sitemap through a validator (Search Console's Sitemaps report flags it) and fix the offending entry. Most generators escape correctly; mistakes usually come from manually-written entries.
Source: sitemaps.org / Google Search Central
An empty sitemap provides no value. Add <url> entries for your pages.
An empty sitemap signals 'no content to index' to Google — actively harmful versus having no sitemap at all.
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Google compares URLs in the sitemap against URLs it has crawled. An empty sitemap on a site with thousands of pages signals abandonment. Either populate it correctly (most CMSes auto-generate) or delete the file and let Google crawl normally.
Source: Google Search Central / sitemaps.org
Add a 'Sitemap:' directive to robots.txt so search engines can discover your sitemap.
robots.txt omits Sitemap: directive — crawlers must fetch /sitemap.xml by convention; reliable but missing the explicit hint.
Source: sitemaps.org
User-agent: *
Allow: /$
Allow: /accept*
Allow: /send*
Allow: /%F0%9F%8C%90/
Allow: /catalog*
Allow: /product*
Disallow: /
DTLS Certificate Expiry & RecommendationsAction8 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressFIX
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Renew certificate — 8 days remaining
- Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to be added to the Chrome preload list
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNS Records1 A records, 31 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 157.240.202.60 |
| AAAA | 2a03:2880:f27b:1cf:face:b00c:0:167 |
| CNAME | mmx-ds.cdn.whatsapp.net |
| NS | — |
| MX | — |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 a ~all |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
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Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
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RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://web.whatsapp.com
160 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://web.whatsapp.com | 200 | 160 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (16 ms)PASS
A+Domain Intelligencewhatsapp.com — via RegistrarSafe, LLC, 17 years, 10 months oldPASS
3005 days
September 4, 2034
8 days
Issued by DigiCert Inc
17 years, 10 months
Registered September 4, 2008
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2a03:2880:f27b:1cf:face:b00c:0:167
RegistrarSafe, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Renew the TLS certificate or verify auto-renewal is working
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
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DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
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Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice