Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.FIPv6 ReadinessActionIPv6 records exist but unreachableFIX
Having AAAA records but an unreachable server is worse than no AAAA — clients may experience delays before falling back to IPv4.
Advertising IPv6 (AAAA records) without a reachable server means IPv6-preferring clients silently fail every connection.
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Modern browsers prefer IPv6 if AAAA exists (Happy Eyeballs algorithm). If the IPv6 server isn't reachable, browsers fall back to IPv4 — but with seconds of added latency per request. Either fix IPv6 reachability or remove the AAAA records.
Source: RFC 8305 (Happy Eyeballs)
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNS Records6 A records, 35 ms lookupREVIEW
| A | 74.125.137.139, 74.125.137.100, 74.125.137.138, 74.125.137.101, 74.125.137.113, 74.125.137.102 |
| AAAA | 2607:f8b0:4005:803::200e |
| CNAME | www3.l.google.com |
| NS | — |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
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RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations61 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 110 ms totalPASS
https://chrome.google.com
59 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.google.com/chrome/
51 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://chrome.google.com | 301 | 59 ms | HTTP/1.1 | sffe |
| 2 | https://www.google.com/chrome/ | 200 | 51 ms | HTTP/1.1 | sffe |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 30 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /webstore/search
Disallow: /webstore/static/*/wall/js/*
Sitemap: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/sitemap
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
- https://chromewebstore.google.com/sitema...
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencegoogle.com — via MarkMonitor Inc., 29 years old, hosted on Google CloudPASS
759 days
September 14, 2028
61 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
29 years
Registered September 15, 1997
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Google Cloud
ASN AS15169
142.251.46.238
MarkMonitor Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice