Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BRedirect Chain2 redirect(s), 174 ms totalREVIEW
https://transparency.org
39 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.transparency.org/
62 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.transparency.org/en/
73 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://transparency.org | 308 | 39 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Vercel |
| 2 | https://www.transparency.org/ | 301 | 62 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 3 | https://www.transparency.org/en/ | 200 | 73 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
Each redirect adds latency. Try to minimize the chain to 1 hop.
Redirect chain — each hop adds latency; combine into one redirect where possible.
Source: Google Search Central / web.dev
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations83 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN & DeliveryVercelREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 6 ms lookupPASS
| A | 76.76.21.21 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | dns1.comlaude-dns.com, dns2.comlaude-dns.net, dns3.comlaude-dns.co.uk, dns4.comlaude-dns.eu |
| MX | 0 transparency-org.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| TXT | facebook-domain-verification=p7ep7h2o9hcx1a26rchlbwbkfraf5h google-site-verification=IfYCMmWw-6jD6LhI0Q12-EoiFgkjPFRSjl0wn8DyP4Y google-site-verification=r25ri6luDo5pEArlLQzgySZ-cLXX8bhplryoKzkn7Uw pardot853323=af4b8a5b44c38f38056a0f0b45674483bd20fff4c6c33d0f5a2e04cac79a7eda pardot860503=7b0039eca0c581e4b30e4fe86c9f6a713a440c99557c732b6c34e717358d3eee google-site-verification=H7cUggoDnI37U5pJmhNmbPo4hUNYh8JIitwu4sy14vY SPF v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:aspmx.pardot.com include:_spf.... google-site-verification=TRbDHokzV4x8KUEAH5yBBCvj03B4FnPguIf2tn6-qq4 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
ACrawlabilityno robots.txt, sitemap with 59 URLsPASS
robots.txt is optional but recommended. It tells search engine crawlers which pages to index.
No robots.txt — crawlers fetch /robots.txt and get 404; not breaking but means default crawl behavior with no directives or sitemap reference.
Learn more ▾ ▴
A minimal robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Allow: / / Sitemap: https://example.com/sitemap.xml` covers the basics. Without it, crawlers behave fine but lose the sitemap signal and can't be selectively blocked from crawl-traps.
Source: robotstxt.org
No robots.txt found
This is fine for most sites — a missing robots.txt allows all crawling by default.
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
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- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
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- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
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- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
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- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
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- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
- https://www.transparency.org/en/sitemaps...
AURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Use 301 (permanent) instead of 302 (temporary)
A+Domain Intelligencetransparency.org — via Nom-iq Ltd. dba COM LAUDE, 26 years, 7 months old, hosted on AWSPASS
212 days
January 11, 2027
83 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
26 years, 7 months
Registered January 11, 2000
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
76.76.21.21
Nom-iq Ltd. dba COM LAUDE
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice