Infrastructure - https://webhousenepal.com/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21897836056&gbraid=0AAAAA-Pm8ZYJBCAKWyxKOgkq5Hhl810ni&gclid=CjwKCAiAqabXBhBUEiwAw_SQpfep-G1vDB1Itm0Wn8zXvbQ-50HgL4fB4hIyOydoAWgEbI_rQTl2ZBoCmEsQAvD

B

DNSSEC

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

REVIEW

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

DNSSEC is not deployed

The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).

B

CAA Records

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

REVIEW

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

No CAA records published

Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.

B

Reverse DNS

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

REVIEW

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

PTR for 192.250.235.30 does not match any cert SAN: s1308.sgp1.mysecurecloudhost.com

Common when behind a CDN or shared hosting (PTR points at the provider's hostname). Mismatch can also affect mail deliverability if this IP sends email -- many MTAs reject mail when forward+reverse DNS disagree.

C

IPv6 Readiness

Action

No IPv6 support

REVIEW

No IPv6 support

No IPv6 (AAAA) records found

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

No IPv6 Support

About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B

HTTP Probe Timing

Total 1031 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown

REVIEW

DNS Lookup

39 ms

TCP Connect

240 ms

TLS Handshake

242 ms

Time to First Byte

1.03 s

Total Time

1.03 s

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 39 ms TCP Connect 240 ms TLS Handshake 242 ms Server Processing 510 ms Content Transfer 1 ms

B

TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations

89 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to address

REVIEW

Certificate validity

89

days left

0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy

C

CDN & Delivery

Action

Assets on Cloudflare (host cdnjs.cloudflare.com, 5 assets); document served directly from origin

REVIEW

Assets on Cloudflare (host cdnjs.cloudflare.com, 5 assets); document served directly from origin

Document not behind existing CDN (Cloudflare serves the assets)

The page's subresources are delivered by Cloudflare (cdnjs.cloudflare.com, 5 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin. Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.

Got: cf-ray: a550b76468549bb0-CDG

Assets on Cloudflare: cdnjs.cloudflare.com (assets: 5), cache HIT

Got: cf-ray: a550b76468549bb0-CDG

Assets on a CDN, document is not: Cloudflare

Document origin not attributed

Asset hosts on a CDN

cdnjs.cloudflare.com — Cloudflare · assets: 5 · Cache Status: HIT

Other asset hosts

cookieinfoscript.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B

CDN Cache Observability

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

REVIEW

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.

B

Operational Status Page

No status page link detected

REVIEW

No status page link detected

No operational status page link detected

Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.

B

Health Check Endpoint

No conventional health endpoint found

REVIEW

No conventional health endpoint found

Health endpoints (/health, /healthz, /status, /ping, /api/health) let uptime monitors, load balancers, and orchestration systems (Kubernetes, ECS, Fly.io) verify the service is alive. Marketing sites and small services often skip them legitimately; flagged as Info, not a failure. Probe results: /api/health: 404, /health: 404, /healthz: 404, /ping: 404, /status: 404.

A+

DNS Records

1 A records, 37 ms lookup

PASS

1 A records, 37 ms lookup

Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)

Got: 192.250.235.30

Single A record — no DNS redundancy

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

No IPv6 (AAAA) records

4 nameserver(s) configured

Got: ns3.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns1.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns4.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns2.mysecurecloudhost.com

5 mail exchanger(s) configured

SPF record present in TXT

DNS resolution time: 37 ms

Got: 37 ms

A	192.250.235.30
AAAA	—
CNAME	—
NS	ns3.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns1.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns4.mysecurecloudhost.com, ns2.mysecurecloudhost.com
MX	1 ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 5 ALT1.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 5 ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 10 ALT4.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com 10 ALT3.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.com
TXT	SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:mailgun.org ~all google-site-verification=eEnGoxV-zApkmcPIyaYwu1tLmMcU_iGERG61bTaraqM
CAA	Lookup not available with standard resolver

Resolved in 37 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A+

Subdomain Takeover

No subdomain takeover risk detected

PASS

No subdomain takeover risk detected

No CNAME record present

A+

Multi-Resolver DNS Speed

Mean 36ms across 3 resolvers (spread 9ms)

PASS

Mean 36ms across 3 resolvers (spread 9ms)

Cloudflare: 32ms

Got: 32ms via 1.1.1.1:53

Google: 35ms

Got: 35ms via 8.8.8.8:53

Quad9: 41ms

Got: 41ms via 9.9.9.9:53

A+

Redirect Chain

No redirects — direct access

PASS

No redirects — direct access

Got: https://webhousenepal.com/?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=21897836056&gbraid=0AAAAA-Pm8ZYJBCAKWyxKOgkq5Hhl810ni&gclid=CjwKCAiAqabXBhBUEiwAw_SQpfep-G1vDB1Itm0Wn8zXvbQ-50HgL4fB4hIyOydoAWgEbI_rQTl2ZBoCmEsQAvD_BwE

https://webhousenepal.com/?gad_source=1&...

763 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#	URL	Status	Time	Protocol	Server
1	https://webhousenepal.com/?gad_source=1&...	200	763 ms	HTTP/1.1	LiteSpeed

A+

Crawlability

robots.txt present, sitemap with 117 URLs

PASS

robots.txt present, sitemap with 117 URLs

robots.txt is present

Got: 1912 bytes

sitemap.xml is present

sitemap.xml is valid XML

sitemap.xml contains 117 entries

robots.txt references sitemap

robots.txt 200 OK

Size 1912 B Sitemaps referenced 2 User-agents GPTBot, Claude-SearchBot, Applebot-Extended, cohere-ai, Bytespider, ClaudeBot, Claude-User, PerplexityBot, Perplexity-User, Amazonbot, meta-externalagent, CCBot, *, Google-Extended, OAI-SearchBot, ChatGPT-User Blocking No — crawling allowed

# robots.txt for https://webhousenepal.com
# Last updated: 2026-08-05

# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Default rules — applies to every crawler not named below
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
User-agent: *
Allow: /

# WHMCS client area & billing (private, no SEO value)
Disallow: /client/
Disallow: /index.php/office-management-system
Disallow: /client/*?*language=
Disallow: /client/*?a=add
Disallow: /client/*?rp=/password/reset/
Disallow: /client/*?rp=/download
Disallow: /client/*?rp=/announcements
Disallow: /client/submitticket.php

# Cart, checkout & session noise
Disallow: /cart.php
Disallow: /*?carttpl=
Disallow: /*?currency=
Disallow: /*&currency=
Disallow: /*?systpl=

# Tracking parameters — prevents duplicate-URL crawling
Disallow: /*?utm_
Disallow: /*&utm_
Disallow: /*?fbclid=
Disallow: /*?gclid=

# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# AI / answer-engine crawlers — explicitly welcome
# (same protections applied; named groups ignore the * group above)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
User-agent: GPTBot
User-agent: OAI-SearchBot
User-agent: ChatGPT-User
User-agent: ClaudeBot
User-agent: Claude-SearchBot
User-agent: Claude-User
User-agent: PerplexityBot
User-agent: Perplexity-User
User-agent: Google-Extended
User-agent: Applebot-Extended
User-agent: Amazonbot
User-agent: meta-externalagent
User-agent: Bytespider
User-agent: cohere-ai
User-agent: CCBot
Allow: /
Disallow: /client/
Disallow: /index.php/office-management-system
Disallow: /cart.php
Disallow: /*?utm_
Disallow: /*?fbclid=
Disallow: /*?gclid=

# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Sitemaps
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
Sitemap: https://webhousenepal.com/sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://webhousenepal.com/video-sitemap.xml

sitemap.xml 200 OK

Type URL Set URLs 117 entries Valid XML Yes

Sample URLs:

A+

URL Variants

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

PASS

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: non-www)

HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently

Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

301https://www.webhousenepal.com/

200https://webhousenepal.com/

Preferred variant: non-www

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://webhousenepal.com/ → https://webhousenepal.com/

Consistent

A+

Domain Intelligence

webhousenepal.com — via PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com, 8 years, 8 months old, hosted on WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB

PASS

webhousenepal.com — via PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com, 8 years, 8 months old, hosted on WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB

Domain registered until Apr 7, 2027 (5 months remaining)

DNSSEC is not enabled

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Registrar: PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com

Registrar lock is NOT enabled

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Hosting: WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB

Got: AS204800

Domain expiry

149 days

April 7, 2027

SSL certificate

89 days

Issued by Let's Encrypt

Domain age

8 years, 8 months

Registered April 7, 2018

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB

ASN AS204800

192.250.235.30

Registrar

PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com

Unlocked 4 NS records

Expiry timeline

Today

+1 year

Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)

Recommended actions

Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers

Registrar PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com

Created April 7, 2018 (8 years, 8 months ago)

Expires April 7, 2027 (5 months)

Last Updated March 31, 2026

Name Servers ns1.webhousenepal.com, ns2.webhousenepal.com, ns3.webhousenepal.com, ns4.webhousenepal.com

DNSSEC Not enabled

Hosting

IP Address 192.250.235.30

ASN AS204800 (WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB)

Provider WHG-SGP - WHG Hosting Services Ltd, GB

Data source: rdap (0.3s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more ▾

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice