Security
· 33 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.DCross-Origin Tab SafetyAction14 of 14 new-tab link(s) missing rel=noopenerFIX
DPermissions-Policy GranularityAction10% high-risk feature coverage (1/10)FIX
BWAF / Bot ProtectionNo WAF detected via response headersREVIEW
Csecurity.txtActionNo security.txt file foundREVIEW
security.txt
No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt
CCSP Inline-Style ReadinessAction50 inline style attribute(s) detectedREVIEW
BTrusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)Trusted Types not enabledREVIEW
CHTML Version DisclosureAction1 software version(s) disclosed in HTMLREVIEW
CEmail SecurityActionDMARC: none, SPF: -all, DKIMREVIEW
This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.
DMARC p=none collects reports but doesn't actually block spoofed mail — phishing emails still reach inboxes.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DMARC's three policies are p=none (monitor only), p=quarantine (mark as spam), and p=reject (bounce). Most domains start at p=none to gather data, but stay there forever, leaving spoofers unblocked. After 30 days of clean DMARC reports, graduate to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
Source: DMARC.org / NIST
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.
Learn more ▾ ▴
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.
Source: RFC 8461
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.
Learn more ▾ ▴
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.
Source: RFC 8460
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.
BPermissions-Policy2 directives, 4 missingREVIEW
Raw Header
Feature Permissions
CKnown vulnerability matchesAction12 known vulnerability match(es) against detected techREVIEW
Known Vulnerabilities
| Library | Version | Severity | Summary | Fixed In |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | XSS is possible in the data-target attribute. | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | XSS in collapse data-parent attribute | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | XSS in data-target property of scrollspy | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | XSS in data-container property of tooltip | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | In Bootstrap before 3.4.0, XSS is possible in the tooltip data-viewport attribute. | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | In Bootstrap before 3.4.0, XSS is possible in the affix configuration target property. | 3.4.0 |
| jQuery | 3.3.1 | medium | jQuery before 3.4.0, as used in Drupal, Backdrop CMS, and other products, mishandles jQuery.extend(true, {}, ...) because of Object.prototype pollution | 3.4.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | XSS in data-template, data-content and data-title properties of tooltip/popover | 3.4.1 |
| jQuery | 3.3.1 | medium | Regex in its jQuery.htmlPrefilter sometimes may introduce XSS | 3.5.0 |
| jQuery | 3.3.1 | medium | passing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code. | 3.5.0 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | medium | Bootstrap Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability for data-* attributes | 3.4.1 |
| Bootstrap | 3.3.7 | low | Bootstrap before 4.0.0 is end-of-life and no longer maintained. | 3.999.999 |
ASecurity Headers8 of 10 headers properly configuredPASS
DENY or SAMEORIGINAn unrecognized X-Frame-Options value falls back to browser default behavior — clickjacking protection silently disabled.
Learn more ▾ ▴
X-Frame-Options accepts only DENY, SAMEORIGIN, or ALLOW-FROM (deprecated). Anything else (including typos like SAMEORIGN, or modern CSP-style frame-ancestors values shoved in by mistake) is ignored. The header LOOKS protective but isn't. Use `X-Frame-Options: DENY` plus `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` for defense in depth.
Source: MDN X-Frame-Options
The Server header discloses the software version, aiding attackers in targeting known vulnerabilities. Remove the version number.
Server: nginx/1.18.0 tells attackers exactly which CVEs to test — strip the version string.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Server version disclosure helps attackers select exploits matching your stack. Configure your server to omit the version (nginx: `server_tokens off;`, Apache: `ServerTokens Prod`). Doesn't fix vulnerabilities but removes the easy reconnaissance step.
Source: OWASP
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.
Learn more ▾ ▴
The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.
Source: hstspreload.org
A+Content Security Policy8 of 10 CSP checks passedPASS
This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.
upgrade-insecure-requestsWithout upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.
Source: MDN CSP
Parsed Policy
A+TLS & CertificatesTLS 1.3, 7 checks passedPASS
HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.
HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.
Learn more ▾ ▴
HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.
Source: MDN Web Docs
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.
Learn more ▾ ▴
OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).
Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide
Certificate Chain
A+Bot Challenge DetectionScan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)PASS
A+Soft-404 DetectionNo soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headingsPASS
A+Empty Page DetectionPage has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signalsPASS
A+Geo-Restriction DetectionNo geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed regionPASS
A+Maintenance Mode DetectionNo maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal pagePASS
A+Subresource Integrity AdoptionPage has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicablePASS
ACORS Depth1 CORS depth signal(s) detectedPASS
A+Referrer-Policy StrictnessReferrer-Policy is `strict-origin` (strict -- only origin sent, never on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade)PASS
A+Source Map ExposureNo source maps accessible (probed 4 candidate URL(s))PASS
A+Open Redirect SurfaceNo redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM linksPASS
A+Auth SecurityPage is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/APASS
A+Subdomain Inventory ExposureNo risky subdomain names in certificate SANsPASS
A+Subresource IntegrityNo external resourcesPASS
A+JS Library VulnerabilitiesNo known vulnerabilitiesPASS
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.
A+Information LeakageNo exposuresPASS
No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.
| Path | Status | Category | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| /.git/HEAD | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.git/config | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.svn/entries | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.env | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.local | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.production | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /wp-config.php | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.htaccess | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /phpinfo.php | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-status | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-info | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /.well-known/security.txt | ✓ Not found | Security Policy | — |
| /package.json | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /composer.json | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /Gemfile | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /Gemfile.lock | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /requirements.txt | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /pom.xml | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /.gitlab-ci.yml | ✓ Not found | ci-config | — |
| /.travis.yml | ✓ Not found | ci-config | — |
A+API SurfaceNo API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))PASS
ACORS ConfigurationOrigin: pop-i.dePASS
| Header | Value | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Access-Control-Allow-Origin | pop-i.de | ✓ |
Origin reflection test
Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:
curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control