Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
BHTTP Probe TimingTotal 969 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations197 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
ADNS Records2 A records, 934 ms lookupPASS
| A | 45.60.171.78, 45.60.151.78 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | lrci-ib-e04.isd.lacounty.gov, lrci-ib-e03.isd.lacounty.gov, dci-ib-e02.isd.lacounty.gov, dci-ib-e01.isd.lacounty.gov |
| MX | 10 mxa-002da105.gslb.pphosted.com 10 mxb-002da105.gslb.pphosted.com |
| TXT | gTtEyCVZDyP70oqPvofaFS9d6iu1J61TZvEQGVErfMZ9ral+f1t0+wIjwMfAv1X7DgRisqaTt9CsWtGl... SPF v=spf1 include:spf1.lacounty.gov include:spf2.lacounty.gov include:spf3.lacounty... globalsign-domain-verification=e397dfdea71940bfcc168554ba58c56b cq51vtki48g3gg89a8m3iqtahb safebreach-domain-verification=b37ac52f-ead0-423c-9290-49c2ed5c9950 ZOOM_verify_UYvq32Qz4RZJreNeBIWWe2 globalsign-domain-verification=F6AF70082288C457C8718D51E646E139 smartsheet-site-validation=zNN3XlhKB6fuWuawWrjjsJUjOd-eL2IA 3kkt9dl1lm9dpqg0anohpkhd1p google-site-verification=tuVDuiauWz_dg9qSfA2uJYR7-cmtn0N-TqqRYiGVeXo globalsign-domain-verification=61610AE053F5E6DD54AFE43690953B3F u91d4bv33oe357rd3dd2tfmlg7 google-site-verification=9kN9Zk8w373BEUyZIU3L13w9CdFSa9tjbCRDJ8BE-K0 dtm-domain-verification=EZK9JlcSDZpAcENe0c2PMTpXy5jPWFQS2aWcquRDIx0 y68hJCZte7k9KiGVINQZlGXUVfsfEbrEwyu+RUVuI+lUzzuOd2bDA4py8I/fg2F1SPewbKE51ihkDInJ... vqqdr8qdqisnfe3r15m7n8menr ca1k5lb7uvsu53kgqnmdij1irn globalsign-domain-verification=9643E80AE21E8133955704677CD4EF1B MS=ms34739264 7c5e7npjg7hnhbveulf62v7mlq a2l3v2m98762g8oehjmp4qgi8r _globalsign-domain-verification=z_J4aZzeMftlFWu9iuiaJhUs_a6nQ5h4Fhn81D-aIa apple-domain-verification=glgsRV4NAcXO2Kpb globalsign-domain-verification=4e6d98b3e3ec0bf844d114976e50bec8 globalsign-domain-verification=3BF47C6BEE012B669CDA7F94B35A0F0B globalsign-domain-verification=DE36FF66FE3CBAF41D4D4630B1E813C2 l6c6fi1it9c83mfgqu57n34hte globalsign-domain-verification=F89755881A99C6E89F3BFA710089ABDC |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://lacounty.gov
387 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://lacounty.gov | 200 | 387 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 9 URLsPASS
Add a 'Sitemap:' directive to robots.txt so search engines can discover your sitemap.
robots.txt omits Sitemap: directive — crawlers must fetch /sitemap.xml by convention; reliable but missing the explicit hint.
Source: sitemaps.org
User-agent: *
Disallow: /wp-admin/*/
Disallow: /wp-content/plugins/
Disallow: /wp-login.php/
Disallow: /wp-content/ai1wm-backups/
User-agent: MJ12bot
Disallow: /
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-posts-po...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-posts-pa...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-posts-aj...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-posts-po...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-taxonomi...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-taxonomi...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-taxonomi...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-taxonomi...
- https://lacounty.gov/wp-sitemap-users-1....
A+Domain Intelligencelacounty.gov — via get.gov, 20 years, 3 months old, hosted on INCAPSULA - Incapsula Inc, USPASS
296 days
April 7, 2027
197 days
Issued by Sectigo Limited
20 years, 3 months
Registered May 4, 2006
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
INCAPSULA - Incapsula Inc, US
ASN AS19551
45.60.151.78
get.gov
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice