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Security

· 32 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
84
GRADE
B
FIX
4
REVIEW
5
PASS
23
INFO
0
Checks
32
23 PASS 5 REVIEW 4 FIX
F
Bot Challenge Detection
Action
Scan was blocked by Cloudflare -- the rest of this report does NOT reflect the real site
FIX
Scan was blocked by Cloudflare -- the rest of this report does NOT reflect the real site
Critical::
Scan returned a Cloudflare bot-protection interstitial, not the actual page
The HTML captured by the scanner is a `Cloudflare` challenge / block page. The scanner's user-agent or IP was flagged as bot traffic and the real site content was never returned. Every other section in this report (security headers, accessibility, content, SEO, performance) was computed against the few KB of interstitial HTML rather than your actual page -- those findings are NOT meaningful for this URL. Detection signal: <title>Just a moment...</title> -- Cloudflare interactive challenge Resolution paths: (1) allow-list BeaverCheck's worker IPs at the bot-protection layer, (2) configure a relaxed challenge for known scanner user-agents, or (3) accept that the public site is unscannable from third-party tools. Note that Cloudflare's "Bot Fight Mode" and "Super Bot Fight Mode" both block the scanner by default.
Got: HTTP 403, title: Just a moment...
F
Subresource Integrity Adoption
Action
0% SRI adoption (0/1 third-party resources)
FIX
0% SRI adoption (0/1 third-party resources)
Warning::
SRI adoption: 0/1 third-party resources protected (0%)
Of 1 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 0 (0%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 1 examples): - https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/b/883a1f27d85f/api.js?onload=rLIi5&render=explicit Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.
Got: 0% (0/1)
F
Subresource Integrity
Action
0 of 1 external resources have SRI
FIX
0 of 1 external resources have SRI
Warning::
External script from challenges.cloudflare.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/b/883a1f27d85f/api.js?onload=rLIi5&render=explicit
SRI Coverage 0 / 1 of external resources have integrity hashes
TagDomainIntegrity
<script>challenges.cloudflare.com Missing
F
Email Security
Action
no DMARC, no SPF
FIX
no DMARC, no SPF
Warning::
No DMARC record found
Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.
Warning::
No SPF record found
Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.
Info::
No DKIM detected via common selectors
DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.
Info::
MTA-STS not configured
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Info::
TLS-RPT not configured
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Info::
BIMI not configured
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
DMARC

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Why this matters

Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.

Learn more

DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B
Security Headers
9 of 10 headers properly configured
REVIEW
9 of 10 headers properly configured
Critical::
HSTS header is missing
Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year.
Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Info::
X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured
Got: nosniff
Info::
X-Frame-Options is properly configured
Got: SAMEORIGIN
Info::
Referrer-Policy is properly configured
Got: same-origin
Info::
Permissions-Policy is set
Got: accelerometer=(),browsing-topics=(),camera=(),clipboard-read=(),clipboard-write=(),geolocation=(),gyroscope=(),hid=(),interest-cohort=(),magnetometer=(),microphone=(),payment=(),publickey-credentials-get=(),screen-wake-lock=(),serial=(),sync-xhr=(),usb=(),xr-spatial-tracking=(self)
Info::
Content-Security-Policy is present
Got: default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-GyXSjokMESfGHxL4OzEfun' 'unsafe-eval' http…
Info::
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured
Got: same-origin
Info::
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy is set
Got: require-corp
Info::
X-Powered-By header is not present
Info::
Server header is present without version info
Got: cloudflare
Info::
Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Got: unknown

Strict-Transport-Security forces browsers to use HTTPS, preventing downgrade attacks. Add the header with a max-age of at least 1 year.

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Why this matters

Without HSTS, a network attacker can downgrade the very first connection to HTTP and steal the user's session.

Learn more

HSTS tells browsers 'never speak HTTP to this domain again.' Without it, a network attacker (public WiFi, malicious ISP, hostile DNS) intercepts the first HTTP attempt and serves a downgraded version of your site. One header, big surface reduction.

Source: RFC 6797 / OWASP

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

C
Content Security Policy
Action
6 of 10 CSP checks passed
REVIEW
6 of 10 CSP checks passed
Info::
Raw CSP policy
Got: default-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-GyXSjokMESfGHxL4OzEfun' 'unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; script-src-attr 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; connect-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com; frame-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; child-src 'self' https://challenges.cloudflare.com blob:; worker-src blob:; form-action http: https:; base-uri 'self'
Info::
default-src directive is set
Got: default-src 'none'
Info::
No 'unsafe-inline' in script source
Critical::
'unsafe-eval' found in script source
'unsafe-eval' allows eval() and similar functions, enabling code injection. Remove it.
Got: script-src 'nonce-GyXSjokMESfGHxL4OzEfun' 'unsafe-eval' https://challenges.cloudflare.com
Info::
No wildcard in script source
Info::
object-src falls back to default-src
Info::
base-uri is properly restricted
Got: base-uri 'self'
Warning::
frame-ancestors directive is missing
frame-ancestors controls who can embed your page, preventing clickjacking. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.
Expected: frame-ancestors 'self'
Info::
form-action directive is set
Got: form-action http: https:
Info::
upgrade-insecure-requests is not set
This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.
Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests

'unsafe-eval' allows eval() and similar functions, enabling code injection. Remove it.

Why this matters

Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.

Learn more

unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.

Source: OWASP CSP / MDN

frame-ancestors controls who can embed your page, preventing clickjacking. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.

Expected: frame-ancestors 'self'
Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

This directive upgrades HTTP resources to HTTPS automatically, preventing mixed content.

Expected: upgrade-insecure-requests
Why this matters

Without upgrade-insecure-requests, any HTTP subresource link survives as a mixed-content warning instead of auto-upgrading.

Learn more

Adding `upgrade-insecure-requests` to your CSP turns every http:// subresource fetch into https:// at the browser layer. One-line defense against accidental mixed content from legacy links or third-party widgets.

Source: MDN CSP

Parsed Policy

default-src 'none'
script-src 'nonce-GyXSjokMESfGHxL4OzEfun''unsafe-eval'https://challenges.cloudflare.com
script-src-attr 'none'
style-src 'unsafe-inline'
img-src 'self'https://challenges.cloudflare.com
connect-src 'self'https://challenges.cloudflare.com
frame-src 'self'https://challenges.cloudflare.comblob:
child-src 'self'https://challenges.cloudflare.comblob:
worker-src blob:
form-action http:https:
base-uri 'self'
C
security.txt
Action
No security.txt file found
REVIEW
No security.txt file found
Info::
No security.txt file found
security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.
Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B
Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)
Trusted Types not enabled
REVIEW
Trusted Types not enabled
Info::
Trusted Types not enabled
Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.
B
CORS Configuration
No CORS headers
REVIEW
No CORS headers
Info::
No CORS headers present — secure default
CORS Configuration Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A+
TLS & Certificates
TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed
PASS
TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed
Info::
TLS 1.3 is used
Got: TLS 1.3
Info::
Strong cipher suite is used
Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Info::
HTTP/2 is not negotiated
HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.
Got: http/1.1
Info::
OCSP stapling not enabled
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Info::
Certificate is valid (expires in 72 days)
Got: 2026-07-24T03:23:54Z
Info::
Certificate chain has 2 certificates
Info::
Certificate uses modern signature algorithm
Got: ECDSA-SHA384
Info::
Certificate covers 2 domain(s)
Got: *.qingtiankejishop.cyou, qingtiankejishop.cyou
Info::
Certificate is issued by a trusted CA
Got: CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Cipher Suite
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
HTTP Version
HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate
Subject CN=qingtiankejishop.cyouIssuer CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-04-25T03:23:55Z → 2026-07-24T03:23:54ZExpires in 72 days SANs *.qingtiankejishop.cyou, qingtiankejishop.cyouSignature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 65984d6bd83af0bff29de839553818d3ccb
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=E8,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2024-03-13T00:00:00Z → 2027-03-12T23:59:59ZExpires in 304 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 63959363c24e7082715918bfc3d7ed56
A+
Cookie Security
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
PASS
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
Info::
No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A
WAF / Bot Protection
Cloudflare WAF (active mitigation)
PASS
Cloudflare WAF (active mitigation)
Info::
Cloudflare WAF (active mitigation) detected
Detected via: cf-ray: 9fa8acf30d6849ca-CDG; cf-mitigated: challenge
Got: Cloudflare WAF (active mitigation)
A+
Cross-Origin Tab Safety
All 2 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
PASS
All 2 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
Info::
All 2 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
A+
CSP Inline-Style Readiness
No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible
PASS
No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible
Info::
No inline style attributes detected
A+
Soft-404 Detection
HTTP status is non-2xx -- soft-404 check is N/A
PASS
HTTP status is non-2xx -- soft-404 check is N/A
Info::
HTTP status is non-2xx -- soft-404 check is N/A
A+
Empty Page Detection
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
PASS
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
Info::
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
A+
Geo-Restriction Detection
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
PASS
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
Info::
No geo-restriction detected
A+
Maintenance Mode Detection
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
PASS
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
Info::
No maintenance-mode signals detected
A+
CORS Depth
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
PASS
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
Info::
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
A
Permissions-Policy Granularity
90% high-risk feature coverage (9/10)
PASS
90% high-risk feature coverage (9/10)
Info::
Permissions-Policy covers 9/10 high-risk features (90%)
The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 9/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb, serial, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer Not declared (default-allow): midi The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.
Got: 90% (9/10)
A+
Referrer-Policy Strictness
Referrer-Policy is `same-origin` (strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests)
PASS
Referrer-Policy is `same-origin` (strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests)
Info::
Referrer-Policy: `same-origin` -- strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests
Full URL Referer header on same-origin requests; no Referer at all on cross-origin. Strong privacy posture; same-origin analytics still work.
Got: same-origin
A+
Source Map Exposure
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
PASS
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
Info::
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
A+
HTML Version Disclosure
No software-version disclosures in HTML
PASS
No software-version disclosures in HTML
Info::
No software-version disclosures in HTML
A+
Open Redirect Surface
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
PASS
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
Info::
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
A+
Auth Security
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
PASS
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
Info::
Page does not appear to be a login form
A+
Subdomain Inventory Exposure
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
PASS
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
Info::
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
A+
JS Library Vulnerabilities
No known vulnerabilities
PASS
No known vulnerabilities
Info::
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+
Information Leakage
No exposures
PASS
No exposures
Info::
No security.txt found
Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.
Info::
No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

PathStatusCategoryRisk
/.git/HEAD Not foundVersion Control
/.git/config Not foundVersion Control
/.svn/entries Not foundVersion Control
/.env Not foundConfiguration
/.env.local Not foundConfiguration
/.env.production Not foundConfiguration
/wp-config.php Not foundConfiguration
/.htaccess Not foundConfiguration
/phpinfo.php Not foundDebug
/server-status Not foundDebug
/server-info Not foundDebug
/.well-known/security.txt Not foundSecurity Policy
/package.json Not founddependency-manifest
/composer.json Not founddependency-manifest
/Gemfile Not founddependency-manifest
/Gemfile.lock Not founddependency-manifest
/requirements.txt Not founddependency-manifest
/pom.xml Not founddependency-manifest
/.gitlab-ci.yml Not foundci-config
/.travis.yml Not foundci-config
A+
API Surface
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
PASS
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
Info::
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))
A+
Permissions-Policy
18 directives, 0 missing
PASS
18 directives, 0 missing
Info::
accelerometer=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
browsing-topics=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
camera=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
clipboard-read=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
clipboard-write=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
geolocation=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
gyroscope=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
hid=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
interest-cohort=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
magnetometer=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
microphone=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
payment=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
publickey-credentials-get=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
screen-wake-lock=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
serial=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
sync-xhr=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
usb=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
xr-spatial-tracking=(self)

Raw Header

accelerometer=() browsing-topics=() camera=() clipboard-read=() clipboard-write=() geolocation=() gyroscope=() hid=() interest-cohort=() magnetometer=() microphone=() payment=() publickey-credentials-get=() screen-wake-lock=() serial=() sync-xhr=() usb=() xr-spatial-tracking=(self)

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set
accelerometer Blocked
browsing-topics Blocked
camera Blocked
clipboard-read Blocked
clipboard-write Blocked
geolocation Blocked
gyroscope Blocked
hid Blocked
interest-cohort Blocked
magnetometer Blocked
microphone Blocked
payment Blocked
publickey-credentials-get Blocked
screen-wake-lock Blocked
serial Blocked
sync-xhr Blocked
usb Blocked
xr-spatial-tracking Self Only
A
Transport Security
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
PASS
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
Info::
HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported
The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.
Warning::
Missing Strict-Transport-Security header
HSTS tells browsers to only use HTTPS, preventing SSL stripping attacks.
Info::
TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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