Security - https://hol.org/guard BeaverCheck Audit

D

Security Headers

Action

4 of 10 headers properly configured

FIX

4 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS is enabled

Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options header is missing

This header prevents MIME-type sniffing, which can lead to XSS attacks. Set it to 'nosniff'.

Expected: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: SAMEORIGIN

Referrer-Policy header is missing

Controls how much referrer information is sent with requests. Set to 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' or stricter.

Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: local-network-access=(self)

Content-Security-Policy header is missing

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is set but not 'same-origin'

Got: same-origin-allow-popups Expected: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

X-Powered-By header reveals technology stack

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Got: Next.js

Server header is present without version info

Got: cloudflare

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

This header prevents MIME-type sniffing, which can lead to XSS attacks. Set it to 'nosniff'.

Expected: nosniff

Why this matters

MIME sniffing lets browsers run uploaded files as JavaScript, turning a file upload into an XSS.

Learn more ▾

Setting X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff tells browsers to trust your declared Content-Type instead of guessing. Without it, an attacker who uploads a polyglot file can sometimes get it executed as a script. One header, no downside.

Source: OWASP / MDN

Controls how much referrer information is sent with requests. Set to 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin' or stricter.

Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Why this matters

Default browser behavior leaks full URLs (including query params and tokens) to every third-party resource — set a strict policy.

Learn more ▾

Without a Referrer-Policy header, browsers send the full referring URL with images, scripts, and fonts loaded from third-party origins. URLs containing tokens, user IDs, or session params end up in third-party logs. Set `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter) to limit leakage.

Source: MDN / W3C

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp

Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Why this matters

X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.3 advertises your stack to attackers — disable it.

Learn more ▾

X-Powered-By and similar headers (X-AspNet-Version, X-Runtime) tell attackers which versions to target. Disable in your server/framework config: PHP `expose_php=Off`, ASP.NET `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false">`, Express `app.disable('x-powered-by')`.

Source: OWASP

Expected: same-origin

Why this matters

COOP is set to a less-restrictive value (same-origin-allow-popups or unsafe-none) — partial isolation only.

Learn more ▾

COOP: same-origin is the strictest level. same-origin-allow-popups allows authenticated popup windows back to your origin. unsafe-none is the legacy default (effectively off). Pick the strictest level your app's popup flows tolerate.

Source: MDN COOP

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

F

Content Security Policy

Action

No enforcing CSP policy found

FIX

No enforcing CSP policy found

No Content-Security-Policy header found

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'

Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

D

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

Action

96 inline style attribute(s) detected

FIX

96 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 96 inline style(s) is high. Affected element types include: nav, img, div, span, p. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

F

Bot Challenge Detection

Action

Scan was blocked by Cloudflare -- the rest of this report does NOT reflect the real site

FIX

Scan was blocked by Cloudflare -- the rest of this report does NOT reflect the real site

Scan returned a Cloudflare bot-protection interstitial, not the actual page

The HTML captured by the scanner is a `Cloudflare` challenge / block page. The scanner's user-agent or IP was flagged as bot traffic and the real site content was never returned. Every other section in this report (security headers, accessibility, content, SEO, performance) was computed against the few KB of interstitial HTML rather than your actual page -- those findings are NOT meaningful for this URL. Detection signal: <title>Just a moment...</title> -- Cloudflare interactive challenge Resolution paths: (1) allow-list BeaverCheck's worker IPs at the bot-protection layer, (2) configure a relaxed challenge for known scanner user-agents, or (3) accept that the public site is unscannable from third-party tools. Note that Cloudflare's "Bot Fight Mode" and "Super Bot Fight Mode" both block the scanner by default.

Got: HTTP 200, title: Just a moment...

F

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Action

0% SRI adoption (0/1 third-party resources)

FIX

0% SRI adoption (0/1 third-party resources)

SRI adoption: 0/1 third-party resources protected (0%)

Of 1 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 0 (0%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 1 examples): - https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/g/330e41bb475c/api.js?onload=khCN8&render=explicit Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.

Got: 0% (0/1)

F

Permissions-Policy Granularity

Action

0% high-risk feature coverage (0/10)

FIX

0% high-risk feature coverage (0/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 0/10 high-risk features (0%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 0/10 high-risk features. Covered: Not declared (default-allow): camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 0% (0/10)

F

Subresource Integrity

Action

0 of 1 external resources have SRI

FIX

0 of 1 external resources have SRI

External script from challenges.cloudflare.com lacks integrity attribute

Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.

Got: https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/g/330e41bb475c/api.js?onload=khCN8&render=explicit

SRI Coverage 0 / 1 of external resources have integrity hashes

Tag	Domain	Integrity
<script>	challenges.cloudflare.com	✗ Missing

C

security.txt

Action

No security.txt file found

REVIEW

No security.txt file found

security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.

Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies (modern: strict-origin-when-cross-origin; legacy browsers: no-referrer-when-downgrade)

REVIEW

Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies (modern: strict-origin-when-cross-origin; legacy browsers: no-referrer-when-downgrade)

Referrer-Policy header not set -- browser default applies

Without an explicit `Referrer-Policy` header, the browser falls back to its default policy. Modern browsers (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+) default to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, which is privacy-safe. Legacy browsers default to the leaky `no-referrer-when-downgrade`, which sends the full URL (including path + query) on cross-origin HTTPS-to-HTTPS requests. Set an explicit header to ensure consistent behavior: ``` Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin ``` This matches the modern browser default and is privacy-safe without breaking referrer-based same-origin analytics.

Got: header absent

B

Email Security

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all, DKIM

REVIEW

DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all, DKIM

DMARC policy is quarantine — good protection

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

DKIM configured (selectors: google, intercom)

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

Policy quarantine — good protection Record v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; pct=100; rf=afrf; ri=86400; sp=quarantine; aspf=s; adkim=s; rua=mailto:michael@hol.org; ruf=mailto:michael@hol.org

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B

API Surface

1 OpenAPI/Swagger spec exposed

REVIEW

1 OpenAPI/Swagger spec exposed

OpenAPI / Swagger spec exposed at /openapi.json

An openly-accessible OpenAPI / Swagger spec hands attackers the complete endpoint catalog: every path, parameter, request body, and response shape. Internal-only APIs should restrict the spec to authenticated developers; public APIs should accept the disclosure as documentation. Either is a deliberate choice -- the warning surfaces the choice rather than dictating it.

C

Permissions-Policy

Action

1 directives, 5 missing

REVIEW

1 directives, 5 missing

local-network-access=(self)

camera not restricted

Consider adding camera=() to block camera access from embedded content.

microphone not restricted

Consider adding microphone=() to block microphone access from embedded content.

geolocation not restricted

Consider adding geolocation=() to block geolocation access from embedded content.

payment not restricted

Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.

usb not restricted

Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

local-network-access=(self)

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

local-network-access Self Only

camera Not Set

microphone Not Set

geolocation Not Set

payment Not Set

usb Not Set

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is negotiated

Got: h2

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 70 days)

Got: 2026-12-02T10:04:41Z

Certificate chain has 3 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA256

Certificate covers 1 domain(s)

Got: hol.org

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=hol.orgIssuer CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USValid 2026-09-03T09:04:42Z → 2026-12-02T10:04:41ZExpires in 70 days SANs hol.orgSignature ECDSA-SHA256Serial 31dfb0c8c0727dae13955a7ab37876bb

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USIssuer CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USValid 2023-12-13T09:00:00Z → 2029-02-20T14:00:00ZExpires in 882 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USIssuer CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEValid 2023-11-15T03:43:21Z → 2028-01-28T00:00:42ZExpires in 492 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Cookie Hygiene

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

PASS

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

No cookies set

A

WAF / Bot Protection

Cloudflare

PASS

Cloudflare

Cloudflare detected

Detected via: cf-ray: a3f1b2248be4d62e-CDG

Got: Cloudflare

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 2 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 2 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

PASS

No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A

No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A+

Source Map Exposure

Source-map probe didn't run on this scan

PASS

Source-map probe didn't run on this scan

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

No security.txt found

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✓ Not found	Security Policy	—
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported

The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.

HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains)

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)