Security - https://nu11cyber.com BeaverCheck Audit

B

Content Security Policy

8 of 10 CSP checks passed

REVIEW

8 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://images.dmca.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://github.com https://*.githubusercontent.com https://images.dmca.com https://beavercheck.com; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://static.cloudflareinsights.com; frame-ancestors 'self'; frame-src 'none'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'self'

'unsafe-inline' found in script source

'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.

Got: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://images.dmca.com https://static.cloudflareinsights.com

No 'unsafe-eval' in script source

No wildcard in script source

object-src is set to 'none'

Got: object-src 'none'

base-uri is properly restricted

Got: base-uri 'self'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'self'

form-action directive is set

Got: form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests is enabled

'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.

Why this matters

Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.

Learn more ▾

unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.

Source: OWASP CSP / MDN

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'

script-src 'self''unsafe-inline'https://images.dmca.comhttps://static.cloudflareinsights.com

style-src 'self''unsafe-inline'

img-src 'self'data:blob:https://github.comhttps://*.githubusercontent.comhttps://images.dmca.comhttps://beavercheck.com

font-src 'self'

connect-src 'self'https://static.cloudflareinsights.com

frame-ancestors 'self'

frame-src 'none'

object-src 'none'

base-uri 'self'

form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests

B

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

1 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 1 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: a. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

B

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types not enabled

REVIEW

Trusted Types not enabled

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

B

Email Security

DMARC: reject, SPF: ~all, DKIM

REVIEW

DMARC: reject, SPF: ~all, DKIM

DMARC policy is reject — strongest protection

SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

DKIM configured (selectors: key2, everlytickey2, mail, fm1, key, k1, default, selector1, smtp, klaviyo2, k2, s1, klaviyo1, zoho, dkim, mlsend1, mailgun, fm3, mxvault, selector2, pm, fm2, key1, mta, protonmail3, s2048, protonmail, scph1019, mandrill, ed25519, s2, s1024, amazonses, scph0316, google, mlsend2, intercom, everlytickey1, sendgrid, smtpapi, protonmail2, scph0817)

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

Policy reject — strongest protection Record v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; rua=mailto:29e8d00869734f529c8aa5422fc21430@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net;

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A

Security Headers

9 of 10 headers properly configured

PASS

9 of 10 headers properly configured

HSTS max-age is too short (0s, should be ≥ 31536000s)

A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Got: max-age=0; includeSubDomains; preload Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: SAMEORIGIN

Referrer-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://images.dmca.com ht…

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy is set

Got: credentialless

X-Powered-By header is not present

Server header is present without version info

Got: cloudflare

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: unknown

A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains

Why this matters

Short HSTS max-age leaves a downgrade-attack window every time the cache expires — set ≥ 1 year.

Learn more ▾

max-age below 31536000 (1 year) is below industry recommendation. The browser forgets the HSTS policy and re-exposes first-visit downgrade attacks. Set to 63072000 (2 years) and add `includeSubDomains; preload` to qualify for the HSTS preload list.

Source: RFC 6797 / hstspreload.org

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 88 days)

Got: 2026-08-26T04:24:54Z

Certificate chain has 2 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: ECDSA-SHA384

Certificate covers 2 domain(s)

Got: *.nu11cyber.com, nu11cyber.com

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=nu11cyber.comIssuer CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-05-28T04:24:55Z → 2026-08-26T04:24:54ZExpires in 88 days SANs *.nu11cyber.com, nu11cyber.comSignature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 691ae9aa38bb0f73ebb9f3262f815a5cdb7

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=E7,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2024-03-13T00:00:00Z → 2027-03-12T23:59:59ZExpires in 287 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial aa75f1e62b8f0a220966d38bbfd4baa1

A+

Cookie Security

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

PASS

1 cookies analyzed, 3 checks passed

Cookie 'sl-session' has the Secure flag

Cookie 'sl-session' has the HttpOnly flag

Cookie 'sl-session' has SameSite=None

1 cookies analyzed

Name	Secure	HttpOnly	SameSite	Size	Issues
sl-session	✓	✓	None	34 B	—

A+

Cookie Hygiene

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

PASS

All 1 cookie(s) pass hygiene checks

A

WAF / Bot Protection

Cloudflare

PASS

Cloudflare

Cloudflare detected

Detected via: cf-ray: a032d6a0de26697c-CDG

Got: Cloudflare

A+

security.txt

Vulnerability disclosure policy

PASS

Vulnerability disclosure policy

security.txt found

Got: https://nu11cyber.com/.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

Contact: mailto:contact@nu11cyber.com

Expires: 2027-05-28T00:00:00.000Z

Policy: https://nu11cyber.com/.well-known/security.txt

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface

PASS

No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface

No new-tab links present

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Empty Page Detection

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

PASS

Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Subresource Integrity Adoption

100% SRI adoption (2/2 third-party resources)

PASS

100% SRI adoption (2/2 third-party resources)

SRI adoption: 2/2 third-party resources protected (100%)

Of 2 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 2 (100%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.

Got: 100% (2/2)

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A

Permissions-Policy Granularity

70% high-risk feature coverage (7/10)

PASS

70% high-risk feature coverage (7/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 7/10 high-risk features (70%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 7/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb, accelerometer, gyroscope Not declared (default-allow): serial, midi, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 70% (7/10)

A+

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Referrer-Policy is `same-origin` (strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests)

PASS

Referrer-Policy is `same-origin` (strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests)

Referrer-Policy: `same-origin` -- strict -- Referer sent only on same-origin requests

Full URL Referer header on same-origin requests; no Referer at all on cross-origin. Strong privacy posture; same-origin analytics still work.

Got: same-origin

A+

Source Map Exposure

No source maps accessible (probed 1 candidate URL(s))

PASS

No source maps accessible (probed 1 candidate URL(s))

No source maps accessible across 1 probed candidate(s)

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

2 of 2 external resources have SRI

PASS

2 of 2 external resources have SRI

script from images.dmca.com has SRI protection

script from static.cloudflareinsights.com has SRI protection

SRI Coverage 2 / 2 of external resources have integrity hashes

Tag	Domain	Integrity
<script>	images.dmca.com	✓ Protected
<script>	static.cloudflareinsights.com	✓ Protected

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

security.txt is present — good practice

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✗ Exposed	Security Policy	Info
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A+

Permissions-Policy

7 directives, 0 missing

PASS

7 directives, 0 missing

camera=() — blocked for all origins

microphone=() — blocked for all origins

geolocation=() — blocked for all origins

payment=() — blocked for all origins

usb=() — blocked for all origins

accelerometer=() — blocked for all origins

gyroscope=() — blocked for all origins

Raw Header

camera=() microphone=() geolocation=() payment=() usb=() accelerometer=() gyroscope=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

camera Blocked

microphone Blocked

geolocation Blocked

payment Blocked

usb Blocked

accelerometer Blocked

gyroscope Blocked

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported

The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.

HSTS max-age is short: 0 days

HSTS max-age should be at least 1 year (31536000 seconds).

Got: max-age=0 (expected 31536000)

HSTS preload enabled

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)