Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations56 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to be added to the Chrome preload list
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records1 A records, 34 ms lookupPASS
| A | 23.185.0.3 |
| AAAA | 2620:12a:8000::3, 2620:12a:8001::3 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns-139.awsdns-17.com, ns-1235.awsdns-26.org, ns-1800.awsdns-33.co.uk, ns-1011.awsdns-62.net |
| MX | 0 taxfoundation-org.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| TXT | 267C363244 SPF v=spf1 a mx ptr include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.dynect.net includ... 00dj0000001rzlyea2 apple-domain-verification=mPbx7o8ujRHkicTi google-site-verification=bN-7qDjNP_IqgiV4HXKgX5rNze_vXtger_0tG4y-k3c MS=ms36814630 include:spf-us.emailsignatures365.com atlassian-domain-verification=ykDElOfDhkD0ZZ+GGs7eC8ZoaZitugLS9Qzo8MI6hG6UJ/v5KR... canva-site-verification=8AznUPvo56Es8O6TY8JF2w |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://taxfoundation.org
9 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://taxfoundation.org | 200 | 9 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (0 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 29 URLsPASS
# LLM Bots - Allow with moderate crawl delay
User-agent: GPTBot
Crawl-delay: 5
User-agent: CCBot
Crawl-delay: 5
User-agent: anthropic-ai
Crawl-delay: 5
User-agent: Claude-Web
Crawl-delay: 5
User-agent: ChatGPT-User
Crawl-delay: 5
# SEO Crawler Bots - Moderate crawl delay
User-agent: AhrefsBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: SemrushBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: MJ12bot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: DotBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: BLEXBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: YandexBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: PetalBot
Crawl-delay: 10
# Generic Scrapers - Higher crawl delay
User-agent: Scrapy
Crawl-delay: 30
# START YOAST BLOCK
# ---------------------------
User-agent: *
Disallow: /?s=
Disallow: /page/*/?s=
Disallow: /search/
Disallow: /wp-json/
Disallow: /?rest_route=
Sitemap: https://taxfoundation.org/sitemap_index.xml
# ---------------------------
# END YOAST BLOCK
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap.x...
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap2....
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap3....
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap4....
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap5....
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap6....
- https://taxfoundation.org/post-sitemap7....
- https://taxfoundation.org/page-sitemap.x...
- https://taxfoundation.org/all-data-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/all-data-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/event-sitemap....
- https://taxfoundation.org/glossary-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/oped-sitemap.x...
- https://taxfoundation.org/podcast-sitema...
- https://taxfoundation.org/primer-sitemap...
- https://taxfoundation.org/all-research-s...
- https://taxfoundation.org/all-research-s...
- https://taxfoundation.org/stci-sitemap.x...
- https://taxfoundation.org/staff-sitemap....
- https://taxfoundation.org/testimony-site...
- https://taxfoundation.org/videos-sitemap...
- https://taxfoundation.org/awsm_job_openi...
- https://taxfoundation.org/post_tag-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/datamaps-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/location-sitem...
- https://taxfoundation.org/series-sitemap...
- https://taxfoundation.org/topics-sitemap...
- https://taxfoundation.org/job-category-s...
- https://taxfoundation.org/job-location-s...
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencetaxfoundation.org — via Amazon Registrar, Inc., 30 years, 7 months oldPASS
985 days
February 25, 2029
56 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
30 years, 7 months
Registered February 24, 1996
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2620:12a:8000::3
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice