Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations69 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records2 A records, 55 ms lookupPASS
| A | 199.16.172.204, 199.16.173.181 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns1mtw.name.com, ns3flt.name.com, ns4hmp.name.com, ns2nsw.name.com |
| MX | 10 mxny1.fogcreek.com |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 mx mx:nsp11.fogcreek.com ip4:207.99.73.234 -all |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 76 ms totalPASS
https://joelonsoftware.com
31 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.joelonsoftware.com/
46 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://joelonsoftware.com | 301 | 31 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
| 2 | https://www.joelonsoftware.com/ | 200 | 46 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 3 URLsPASS
Sitemap: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/news-sitemap.xml
User-agent: *
Disallow: /wp-admin/
Allow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php
A+Domain Intelligencejoelonsoftware.com — via Name.com, Inc., 26 years, 1 months old, hosted on WordPress.com (Automattic)PASS
351 days
June 1, 2027
69 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
26 years, 1 months
Registered July 29, 2000
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
WordPress.com (Automattic)
ASN AS2635
199.16.172.204
Name.com, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice