Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/1 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 124ms across 3 resolvers (spread 98ms)REVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations89 days until leaf cert expires — 2 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 152 ms lookupPASS
| A | 51.210.209.19 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns107.ovh.net, dns107.ovh.net |
| MX | 0 mail.appscyborg.com |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 mx -all google-site-verification=bMORBDi8u2Y71lgnW27Y5VpTrOXAFhf_9vBt1zmm2nA google-site-verification=xR2Mg34xiw9vdk7_Hl2zRnI2NehrqxJPWPZraC4kIDw ahrefs-site-verification_6ad49f67c12c450b0f761dc9d746fb0e275bd6bec9ca8927e2e3c97... |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+DNSSECSigned and validatingPASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://appscyborg.com
396 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://appscyborg.com | 200 | 396 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 1053 URLsPASS
# Path rules are repeated in BOTH groups on purpose.
#
# Under RFC 9309 a crawler obeys exactly ONE group — the most specific one
# matching its token — and ignores every other group, including "*". So a
# named group is not an addition to the "*" rules, it REPLACES them.
#
# This file previously gave each AI crawler its own "User-agent: X /
# Allow: /" group meaning "yes, you may index us". Because those groups
# carried no Disallow lines, they granted GPTBot, OAI-SearchBot,
# ClaudeBot, anthropic-ai and PerplexityBot MORE access than an ordinary
# crawler: every path listed below was open to them and closed to
# everyone else.
#
# Anything added to one group below must be added to the other.
#
# Not every private path belongs in this file. A Disallow line is
# world-readable and therefore a published index of what someone thought
# worth hiding, while being advisory and ignored by the clients that
# matter. Paths whose protection depends on not being known are kept out
# entirely and marked unindexable with an X-Robots-Tag response header
# instead.
User-agent: *
Allow: /
# Auth and user-private pages
Disallow: /login
Disallow: /register
Disallow: /logout
Disallow: /my-account
Disallow: /change-password-account
Disallow: /delete-account
Disallow: /forgot/
Disallow: /verify/
Disallow: /expired
# Payment flow and internal endpoints (pricing is indexable — it's a marketing page)
Disallow: /payment
Disallow: /api/
# AI search, citation and corpus crawlers — explicitly permitted, on the
# same terms as everyone else. One group, many tokens: this is the form
# that keeps the path rules attached to the permission.
#
# CCBot is included deliberately. It is not only a training crawler — its
# corpus is a retrieval source for several AI search systems, so blocking
# it cost citation reach to buy a training-use refusal that a robots
# directive cannot enforce anyway. llms.txt states corpus inclusion as
# permitted, so the two agree.
User-agent: GPTBot
User-agent: OAI-SearchBot
User-agent: ChatGPT-User
User-agent: ClaudeBot
User-agent: Claude-Web
User-agent: anthropic-ai
User-agent: PerplexityBot
User-agent: Perplexity-User
User-agent: Google-Extended
User-agent: Applebot-Extended
User-agent: CCBot
Allow: /
Disallow: /login
Disallow: /register
Disallow: /logout
Disallow: /my-account
Disallow: /change-password-account
Disallow: /delete-account
Disallow: /forgot/
Disallow: /verify/
Disallow: /expired
Disallow: /payment
Disallow: /api/
# Not permitted.
User-agent: cohere-ai
Disallow: /
Sitemap: https://appscyborg.com/sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceappscyborg.com — via OVH sas, 10 years, 1 months old, hosted on OVHPASS
728 days
August 23, 2028
89 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
10 years, 1 months
Registered August 23, 2016
Enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
OVH
ASN AS16276
51.210.209.19
OVH sas
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice