Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations73 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Prefer TLS 1.3 — TLS 1.2 is acceptable but TLS 1.3 removes RSA key exchange and improves latency
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records1 A records, 17 ms lookupPASS
| A | 170.146.93.56 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | dns1.p01.nsone.net, a14-65.akam.net, dns2.p01.nsone.net, dns3.p01.nsone.net, a5-66.akam.net, a18-66.akam.net, a9-67.akam.net, a28-64.akam.net, a1-199.akam.net, dns4.p01.nsone.net |
| MX | 10 mxa-0006eb01.gslb.pphosted.com 10 mxb-0006eb01.gslb.pphosted.com |
| TXT | spf2.0/pra SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.adp.com -all adobe-idp-site-verification=66d2781a-ef29-4f4d-90c0-afc63c79812c MS=2775208C7CB7A7CB2F3EC8B102A34261B806CE82 MS=ms96397460 5tcxttk3zph8pynrs6cp50z3kc11jdnm 4422381c3a1a3618880b3b9aae77148ace83d28c20286b93fab9d1abbf905c7c Dynatrace-site-verification=58724df8-4dce-48d6-ae03-c98b15092e43__bamf2l9mme9m7p... pushupdate gdrptlggv0cb5qlf29mn1xssng673vxq google-site-verification=Iax_5W4O9-l_NOp54CZXMVAB03PXnCgk_F5NShNg-8I amazonses:oFR0mp6LQGAFQXt0ltDYVZGRvAYY0rzvDVSNxhAhvXo= amazonses:LXQZLj3lxKodkCBFmqV2JQOutxMqYZ1YYMNminWuaZY= google-site-verification=1Ci-ObBPGZlxDcZO_8v1PfDY_diLM2WioEk5c72PrGM miro-verification=64dc31688e02326525402fc3b986e77752e0a3d6 m2z6dv9ml1xgmr8fkcr29zyhgzkyy5mm apple-domain-verification=iYLpohyIEUeWdAbD apple-domain-verification=SeIEuziXUXodaJM8 gpk1tctm8r9c3td48rl5sj6flkxbcq1l drift-domain-verification=1b5bae112060b149825ff5a9031e0206f141728626a8975b0c8e46... 65v41kj0vd975ptxv7ldzsfmhqt7syxb box-domain-verification=dc7bbd87480cd3cfb25076af73c96c5eaec9c9130b2bd1d1dfc0c374... ZOOM_verify_krrsWYRE56S7q05G0eePY8 atlassian-domain-verification=ANiLig3RBrl7g2pUxFNLUeMYagL9whdXruCpz2LQW7yTbrQmHD... meltwater-domain-verification=meltwater_sso_20230802_TRITON-15440 segment-site-verification=z61g6f2yePUO1nZdg9SCu1ME6EhDoaEZ docusign=666e8165-507f-4281-bb64-9e0516b4aafd docusign=daac5bd5-420e-4e1d-b58f-ba7b98758f42 4ttm8hfyqrptjvsq00b639lssdxl8hhl google-site-verification=udcN5bDaRiVD8I-INhvVADH8V2FmslUz13LVZ-_Qvqg zl77q79z97shdg3yfc1njgzrg8836qfy google-site-verification=BbBDFETvvOYpn7iKP_cLfUQCZtoQaWSAsH410D1na_A openai-domain-verification=dv-fAr4IGQlZH1Bq4VJ4aNtIAoC paloaltonetworks-site-verification=783934bda0516fe4f83ed8e50e289ac695bd0e9661dbd... duo_sso_verification=t6pzbR1KutMwJMHi3e84igTULYkgq1xo4nIUg8D4AYfvNgNWyosEobZo6Vd... liveramp-site-verification=dBkr_-i0Js4prHYoK6gPSdgRNbkm_R4XP6VlrXP1MEo smartsheet-site-validation=snXF2UnPYzQwvpoY720v932hLA6a_7o8 canva-site-verification=Sz14Ts0A5jbZLUeoVUPvXA mongodb-site-verification=Qj3do2Vs759OrVnYZSE4uQiVwqCnxOvP _vx307xn2fqtdicvl4gx402hku56283t docker-verification=75de1586-f7df-4cc1-b43a-02c848d41340 mandrill_verify.EBqUqvv0dLspDYF-0hDF5A mongodb-site-verification=Tw5ONVA6j0RMQcufUUmLWp5Po99LEV02 onetrust-domain-verification=7a6c57673aaa4efc8d1b36b475492344 onetrust-domain-verification=8170bd3876e348abb728e4b34bd902a6 hcp-domain-verification=dcc567ea43bbef1763da7184bd6bff0af8618eacf81d823bf3d0df5f... cloudflare_dashboard_sso=ba154e0d794773793ae7a2c4847cd24e zywave-domain-verification=t/nbhwj3vO+75hlek2Z+UvR7FyS+rREqOAADO7r7RSY= figma-domain-verification=cd7b1d77dfb663484206e386b90873db1f68b7ed7f5fc996b38327... slack-domain-verification=OxdHz8aJ2ToEWtWKmi1qM3rPZUf8JWwylCeMKhQd _nq1qul56src6ahsy0vz94os3sglg2by anthropic-domain-verification-zmhegp=r4pBT0GI5JQKI8gQtWMTQuweH _pki-validation.adp.com.=o/whhB3rJZTvQG8ypu5htA== |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 403 ms totalPASS
https://adp.com
84 ms · HTTP/1.0
https://www.adp.com/
319 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://adp.com | 301 | 84 ms | HTTP/1.0 | BigIP |
| 2 | https://www.adp.com/ | 200 | 319 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
ACrawlabilityno robots.txt, sitemap with 4577 URLsPASS
robots.txt is optional but recommended. It tells search engine crawlers which pages to index.
No robots.txt — crawlers fetch /robots.txt and get 404; not breaking but means default crawl behavior with no directives or sitemap reference.
Learn more ▾ ▴
A minimal robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Allow: / / Sitemap: https://example.com/sitemap.xml` covers the basics. Without it, crawlers behave fine but lose the sitemap signal and can't be selectively blocked from crawl-traps.
Source: robotstxt.org
No robots.txt found
This is fine for most sites — a missing robots.txt allows all crawling by default.
ADomain Intelligenceadp.com — via MarkMonitor Inc., 35 years, 4 months old, hosted on ADP1 - Automatic Data Processing, Inc., USPASS
15 days
June 30, 2026
73 days
Issued by DigiCert Inc
35 years, 4 months
Registered June 24, 1991
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
ADP1 - Automatic Data Processing, Inc., US
ASN AS14299
170.146.93.56
MarkMonitor Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Renew the domain or enable auto-renewal to prevent accidental expiry
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
Consider enabling auto-renewal to prevent accidental expiration.
Domain expiry approaching — renew immediately and ensure auto-renew + alerting are configured.
Source: ICANN renewal policy
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice