Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/4 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedActionMean 163ms across 3 resolvers (spread 236ms)REVIEW
CCrawlabilityActionno robots.txt, sitemap with 0 URLsREVIEW
robots.txt is optional but recommended. It tells search engine crawlers which pages to index.
No robots.txt — crawlers fetch /robots.txt and get 404; not breaking but means default crawl behavior with no directives or sitemap reference.
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A minimal robots.txt with `User-agent: * / Allow: / / Sitemap: https://example.com/sitemap.xml` covers the basics. Without it, crawlers behave fine but lose the sitemap signal and can't be selectively blocked from crawl-traps.
Source: robotstxt.org
Search engines may not be able to parse the sitemap. Fix XML validation errors.
An unparseable sitemap is silently ignored by Google — the URLs it advertises are never queued for crawl.
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Google's sitemap parser is strict about XML validity. A single unescaped `&` or unclosed tag invalidates the whole file. Run your sitemap through a validator (Search Console's Sitemaps report flags it) and fix the offending entry. Most generators escape correctly; mistakes usually come from manually-written entries.
Source: sitemaps.org / Google Search Central
An empty sitemap provides no value. Add <url> entries for your pages.
An empty sitemap signals 'no content to index' to Google — actively harmful versus having no sitemap at all.
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Google compares URLs in the sitemap against URLs it has crawled. An empty sitemap on a site with thousands of pages signals abandonment. Either populate it correctly (most CMSes auto-generate) or delete the file and let Google crawl normally.
Source: Google Search Central / sitemaps.org
No robots.txt found
This is fine for most sites — a missing robots.txt allows all crawling by default.
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations84 days until leaf cert expires — 5 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Extend HSTS max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year) to meet the preload list criteria
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN & DeliveryCloudflareREVIEW
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
ADNS Records2 A records, 365 ms lookupPASS
| A | 104.18.32.241, 172.64.155.15 |
| AAAA | 2606:4700:440b::6812:20f1, 2606:4700:440d::ac40:9b0f |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns41.constellix.net, ns51.constellix.net, ns61.constellix.net, ns11.constellix.com, ns21.constellix.com, ns31.constellix.com |
| MX | — |
| TXT | 60ade3c16f99b467cbe10ba4c7404d52 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
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SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
Slow DNS adds latency to every page load. Consider a faster DNS provider.
DNS resolution is slow — anycast DNS providers (Cloudflare, Route 53) typically resolve <50ms globally.
Source: DNS performance benchmarks
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 560 ms totalPASS
https://agjogo5.com
152 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.agjogo5.com/
408 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://agjogo5.com | 301 | 152 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 2 | https://www.agjogo5.com/ | 200 | 408 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (2 ms)PASS
A+Domain Intelligenceagjogo5.com — via Gname.com Pte. Ltd., 3 years, 5 months oldPASS
574 days
May 17, 2028
84 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
3 years, 5 months
Registered May 17, 2023
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2606:4700:440b::6812:20f1
Gname.com Pte. Ltd.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
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DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice