Security
· 32 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.DPermissions-Policy GranularityAction30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)FIX
FEmail SecurityActionno DMARC, SPF: ~allFIX
No DMARC record found
Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.
Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.
Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.
Source: DMARC.org / NIST
Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).
Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.
DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.
No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.
Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.
Learn more ▾ ▴
MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.
Source: RFC 8461
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.
Learn more ▾ ▴
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.
Source: RFC 8460
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.
CSecurity HeadersAction4 of 10 headers properly configuredREVIEW
nosniffAnything other than 'nosniff' is silently ignored — the header looks present but provides zero MIME-sniffing protection.
Learn more ▾ ▴
X-Content-Type-Options has exactly one valid value: `nosniff`. Common typos (no-sniff, none, off) are ignored by every browser. The header appears in your security audit but doesn't actually block MIME sniffing. Fix to literal `nosniff`.
Source: MDN X-Content-Type-Options
DENY or SAMEORIGINAn unrecognized X-Frame-Options value falls back to browser default behavior — clickjacking protection silently disabled.
Learn more ▾ ▴
X-Frame-Options accepts only DENY, SAMEORIGIN, or ALLOW-FROM (deprecated). Anything else (including typos like SAMEORIGN, or modern CSP-style frame-ancestors values shoved in by mistake) is ignored. The header LOOKS protective but isn't. Use `X-Frame-Options: DENY` plus `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` for defense in depth.
Source: MDN X-Frame-Options
strict-origin-when-cross-originWeak Referrer-Policy values leak full URLs (with query params, tokens, IDs) to every third-party resource on the page.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Default referrer behavior shares the full referring URL with images, scripts, and other resources from third-party origins. If your URLs contain tokens, session IDs, or user emails (in query strings or paths), every third-party tracker gets them. Set `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).
Source: MDN Referrer-Policy / W3C
COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.
same-originCOOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.
Source: MDN / web.dev
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
require-corpCOEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.
Source: MDN / web.dev
This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.3 advertises your stack to attackers — disable it.
Learn more ▾ ▴
X-Powered-By and similar headers (X-AspNet-Version, X-Runtime) tell attackers which versions to target. Disable in your server/framework config: PHP `expose_php=Off`, ASP.NET `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false">`, Express `app.disable('x-powered-by')`.
Source: OWASP
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.
Learn more ▾ ▴
The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.
Source: hstspreload.org
BContent Security Policy8 of 10 CSP checks passedREVIEW
'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.
Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.
Learn more ▾ ▴
unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.
Source: OWASP CSP / MDN
Parsed Policy
Csecurity.txtActionNo security.txt file foundREVIEW
security.txt
No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt
CCSP Inline-Style ReadinessAction18 inline style attribute(s) detectedREVIEW
BTrusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)Trusted Types not enabledREVIEW
BCORS ConfigurationNo CORS headersREVIEW
No CORS headers detected.
Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.
Origin reflection test
Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:
curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A+TLS & CertificatesTLS 1.3, 8 checks passedPASS
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.
Learn more ▾ ▴
OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).
Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide
Certificate Chain
AWAF / Bot ProtectionCloudflarePASS
A+Cross-Origin Tab SafetyAll 3 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopenerPASS
A+Bot Challenge DetectionScan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)PASS
A+Soft-404 DetectionNo soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headingsPASS
A+Empty Page DetectionPage has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signalsPASS
A+Geo-Restriction DetectionNo geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed regionPASS
A+Maintenance Mode DetectionNo maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal pagePASS
A+Subresource Integrity AdoptionPage has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicablePASS
A+CORS DepthNo CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser defaultPASS
A+Referrer-Policy StrictnessReferrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)PASS
A+Source Map ExposureNo source maps accessible (probed 10 candidate URL(s))PASS
A+HTML Version DisclosureNo software-version disclosures in HTMLPASS
A+Open Redirect SurfaceNo redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM linksPASS
A+Auth SecurityPage is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/APASS
A+Subdomain Inventory ExposureNo risky subdomain names in certificate SANsPASS
A+Subresource IntegrityNo external resourcesPASS
A+JS Library VulnerabilitiesNo known vulnerabilitiesPASS
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.
A+Information LeakageNo exposuresPASS
No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.
| Path | Status | Category | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| /.git/HEAD | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.git/config | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.svn/entries | ✓ Not found | Version Control | — |
| /.env | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.local | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.env.production | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /wp-config.php | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /.htaccess | ✓ Not found | Configuration | — |
| /phpinfo.php | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-status | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /server-info | ✓ Not found | Debug | — |
| /.well-known/security.txt | ✓ Not found | Security Policy | — |
| /package.json | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /composer.json | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /Gemfile | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /Gemfile.lock | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /requirements.txt | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /pom.xml | ✓ Not found | dependency-manifest | — |
| /.gitlab-ci.yml | ✓ Not found | ci-config | — |
| /.travis.yml | ✓ Not found | ci-config | — |