Security - https://akj.io BeaverCheck Audit

F

Empty Page Detection

Action

1 empty-page signal(s) detected -- page may be a placeholder or have content-rendering bugs

FIX

1 empty-page signal(s) detected -- page may be a placeholder or have content-rendering bugs

Page body has only 168 chars of text -- likely empty / placeholder

After HTML stripping, the page body contains 168 characters of text content. Below 200 chars almost always means: (1) the page is a placeholder that was never filled in, (2) JavaScript was supposed to render content but failed, (3) the page is a redirect / interstitial / wrapper that should have a real status code other than 200, or (4) it's a legitimately small page like a single-form login (in which case this finding is a false positive that confirms 'minimal content' is intentional). Review the page in a browser. If content is missing, the most common root cause is a JS-rendering pipeline that needs prerendering or server-side rendering for crawlers / scanners to capture content.

Got: 168 chars

D

Permissions-Policy Granularity

Action

30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)

FIX

30% high-risk feature coverage (3/10)

Permissions-Policy covers 3/10 high-risk features (30%)

The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 3/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation Not declared (default-allow): payment, usb, serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.

Got: 30% (3/10)

D

Referrer-Policy Strictness

Action

Referrer-Policy is `origin-when-cross-origin` (leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade)

FIX

Referrer-Policy is `origin-when-cross-origin` (leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade)

Referrer-Policy: `origin-when-cross-origin` -- leaky -- origin sent cross-origin even on protocol downgrade

Same-origin requests get full URL; cross-origin gets only origin. Similar shape to the modern default BUT does NOT suppress Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade -- the origin leaks even when the protocol is downgrading to HTTP. Switch to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` for the same UX with no downgrade leak.

Got: origin-when-cross-origin

D

Email Security

Action

DMARC: none, SPF: ?all, DKIM

FIX

DMARC: none, SPF: ?all, DKIM

DMARC policy is none — monitoring only

This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.

SPF ends in ?all — provides no enforcement

?all (neutral) and +all (pass-everything) make the SPF record decorative. Receivers will accept any sender. Switch to -all (hard fail) or ~all (soft fail).

DKIM configured (selectors: fm1, fm2, fm3)

MTA-STS not configured

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

TLS-RPT not configured

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

BIMI not configured

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

DMARC

Policy none — monitoring only, does not block spoofing Record v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@akj.io;

This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.

Why this matters

DMARC p=none collects reports but doesn't actually block spoofed mail — phishing emails still reach inboxes.

Learn more ▾

DMARC's three policies are p=none (monitor only), p=quarantine (mark as spam), and p=reject (bounce). Most domains start at p=none to gather data, but stay there forever, leaving spoofers unblocked. After 30 days of clean DMARC reports, graduate to p=quarantine, then p=reject.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

?all (neutral) and +all (pass-everything) make the SPF record decorative. Receivers will accept any sender. Switch to -all (hard fail) or ~all (soft fail).

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B

WAF / Bot Protection

No WAF detected via response headers

REVIEW

No WAF detected via response headers

No WAF detected

Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.

B

CSP Inline-Style Readiness

4 inline style attribute(s) detected

REVIEW

4 inline style attribute(s) detected

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 4 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: div. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

B

Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)

Trusted Types not enabled

REVIEW

Trusted Types not enabled

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

B

Permissions-Policy

4 directives, 2 missing

REVIEW

4 directives, 2 missing

camera=() — blocked for all origins

microphone=() — blocked for all origins

geolocation=() — blocked for all origins

browsing-topics=() — blocked for all origins

payment not restricted

Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.

usb not restricted

Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

camera=() microphone=() geolocation=() browsing-topics=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set

camera Blocked

microphone Blocked

geolocation Blocked

browsing-topics Blocked

payment Not Set

usb Not Set

B

CORS Configuration

No CORS headers

REVIEW

No CORS headers

No CORS headers present — secure default

CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control

A

Security Headers

8 of 10 headers properly configured

PASS

8 of 10 headers properly configured

Strict-Transport-Security is properly configured

Got: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload

X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured

Got: nosniff

X-Frame-Options is properly configured

Got: SAMEORIGIN

Referrer-Policy has a weak value

Got: origin-when-cross-origin Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Permissions-Policy is set

Got: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), browsing-topics=()

Content-Security-Policy is present

Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-MjYxZDJkMWMtMzQ3OS00ZmIzLThkOGItYjU…

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is properly configured

Got: same-origin

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy is set

Got: credentialless

X-Powered-By header reveals technology stack

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Got: Next.js

Server header is present without version info

Got: Vercel

Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: removed)

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Got: removed

Expected: strict-origin-when-cross-origin

Why this matters

Weak Referrer-Policy values leak full URLs (with query params, tokens, IDs) to every third-party resource on the page.

Learn more ▾

Default referrer behavior shares the full referring URL with images, scripts, and other resources from third-party origins. If your URLs contain tokens, session IDs, or user emails (in query strings or paths), every third-party tracker gets them. Set `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (or stricter).

Source: MDN Referrer-Policy / W3C

This header discloses server technology (e.g. Express, PHP), helping attackers target known vulnerabilities. Remove it.

Why this matters

X-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.3 advertises your stack to attackers — disable it.

Learn more ▾

X-Powered-By and similar headers (X-AspNet-Version, X-Runtime) tell attackers which versions to target. Disable in your server/framework config: PHP `expose_php=Off`, ASP.NET `<httpRuntime enableVersionHeader="false">`, Express `app.disable('x-powered-by')`.

Source: OWASP

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

A+

Content Security Policy

9 of 10 CSP checks passed

PASS

9 of 10 CSP checks passed

Raw CSP policy

Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-MjYxZDJkMWMtMzQ3OS00ZmIzLThkOGItYjU1OGFiNzg3N2Vl' 'strict-dynamic'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' blob: data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self' https://*.vercel.live; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-src https://vercel.live https://giscus.app; frame-ancestors 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests; report-to default

default-src directive is set

Got: default-src 'self'

No 'unsafe-inline' in script source

No 'unsafe-eval' in script source

No wildcard in script source

object-src is set to 'none'

Got: object-src 'none'

base-uri is properly restricted

Got: base-uri 'self'

frame-ancestors directive is set

Got: frame-ancestors 'none'

form-action directive is set

Got: form-action 'self'

upgrade-insecure-requests is enabled

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'

script-src 'self''nonce-MjYxZDJkMWMtMzQ3OS00ZmIzLThkOGItYjU1OGFiNzg3N2Vl''strict-dynamic'

style-src 'self''unsafe-inline'

img-src 'self'blob:data:

font-src 'self'

connect-src 'self'https://*.vercel.live

object-src 'none'

base-uri 'self'

form-action 'self'

frame-src https://vercel.livehttps://giscus.app

frame-ancestors 'none'

upgrade-insecure-requests

report-to default

A+

TLS & Certificates

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

PASS

TLS 1.3, 7 checks passed

TLS 1.3 is used

Got: TLS 1.3

Strong cipher suite is used

Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP/2 is not negotiated

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Got: http/1.1

OCSP stapling not enabled

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Certificate is valid (expires in 80 days)

Got: 2026-08-01T17:06:23Z

Certificate chain has 2 certificates

Certificate uses modern signature algorithm

Got: SHA256-RSA

Certificate covers 1 domain(s)

Got: akj.io

Certificate is issued by a trusted CA

Got: CN=R13,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

HTTP/2 provides multiplexing and header compression for better performance.

Why this matters

HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to make sequential requests, multiplying latency on every page.

Learn more ▾

HTTP/2 (and HTTP/3) multiplex many requests over a single connection, eliminating head-of-line blocking. HTTP/1.1 forces the browser to either queue requests or open many parallel connections — both worse. Most modern web servers support HTTP/2 with one config line.

Source: MDN Web Docs

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection

Protocol

TLS 1.3

Cipher Suite

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

HTTP Version

HTTP/1.1

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate

Subject CN=akj.ioIssuer CN=R13,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-05-03T17:06:24Z → 2026-08-01T17:06:23ZExpires in 80 days SANs akj.ioSignature SHA256-RSASerial 65e837ad776665927695d451ccca7df9d37

Intermediate (CA Certificate)

Subject CN=R13,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2024-03-13T00:00:00Z → 2027-03-12T23:59:59ZExpires in 304 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 5a00f212d8d4b480f3924157ea298305

A+

Cookie Security

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

PASS

No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+

Cookie Hygiene

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

PASS

No cookies set -- cookie-hygiene check is N/A

No cookies set

A+

security.txt

Vulnerability disclosure policy

PASS

Vulnerability disclosure policy

security.txt found

Got: https://akj.io/.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

Contact: mailto:security@akj.io, https://github.com/Saturate/AKJIO/security/advisories/new

Expires: 2027-02-07T23:59:59.000Z

Policy: https://akj.io/.well-known/security.txt

A+

Cross-Origin Tab Safety

All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

PASS

All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener

A+

Bot Challenge Detection

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

PASS

Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)

No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page

A+

Soft-404 Detection

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

PASS

No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings

A+

Geo-Restriction Detection

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

PASS

No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region

No geo-restriction detected

A+

Maintenance Mode Detection

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

PASS

No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page

No maintenance-mode signals detected

A+

Subresource Integrity Adoption

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

PASS

Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable

No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI

A+

CORS Depth

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

PASS

No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default

A+

Source Map Exposure

Source-map probe didn't run on this scan

PASS

Source-map probe didn't run on this scan

A+

HTML Version Disclosure

No software-version disclosures in HTML

PASS

No software-version disclosures in HTML

A+

Open Redirect Surface

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

PASS

No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links

A+

Auth Security

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

PASS

Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A

Page does not appear to be a login form

A+

Subdomain Inventory Exposure

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

PASS

No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs

A+

Subresource Integrity

No external resources

PASS

No external resources

No external resources to protect

SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable

A+

JS Library Vulnerabilities

No known vulnerabilities

PASS

No known vulnerabilities

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+

Information Leakage

No exposures

PASS

No exposures

security.txt is present — good practice

No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

Path	Status	Category	Risk
/.git/HEAD	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.git/config	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.svn/entries	✓ Not found	Version Control	—
/.env	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.local	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.env.production	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/wp-config.php	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/.htaccess	✓ Not found	Configuration	—
/phpinfo.php	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-status	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/server-info	✓ Not found	Debug	—
/.well-known/security.txt	✗ Exposed	Security Policy	Info
/package.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/composer.json	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/Gemfile.lock	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/requirements.txt	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/pom.xml	✓ Not found	dependency-manifest	—
/.gitlab-ci.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—
/.travis.yml	✓ Not found	ci-config	—

A+

API Surface

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

PASS

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))

No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))

A

Transport Security

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

PASS

HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis

HTTP/3 (QUIC) not advertised

HTTP/3 eliminates head-of-line blocking. If your CDN supports it, consider enabling it.

HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains, preload)

HSTS preload enabled

TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)