Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/4 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations61 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN & DeliveryDocument and assets on CloudflareREVIEW
Asset hosts on a CDN
- www.all4lace.com — Cloudflare · assets: 200 · Cache Status: HIT
Other asset hosts
- static.cloudflareinsights.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records2 A records, 39 ms lookupPASS
| A | 188.114.96.2, 188.114.97.2 |
| AAAA | 2a06:98c1:3120::2, 2a06:98c1:3121::2 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | tiffany.ns.cloudflare.com, sam.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | — |
| TXT | pinterest-site-verification=e4b8941c1a8f515f098b6389b1a5ba43 google-site-verification=UZuK8Tr5jUNYZMAV4bwH6yIC8GjJ9kPRX3vFWrsQZSI google-site-verification=HsmJWvdnaeLt4WUICy_1crRqne6SATygO6ELi5RBe28 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 30ms across 3 resolvers (spread 12ms)PASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 265 ms totalPASS
https://all4lace.com
68 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.all4lace.com/
197 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://all4lace.com | 301 | 68 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 2 | https://www.all4lace.com/ | 200 | 197 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (17 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 3515 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Sitemap: https://www.all4lace.com/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligenceall4lace.com — via DNSPod, Inc., 11 months oldPASS
377 days
November 21, 2027
61 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
11 months
Registered November 21, 2025
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2a06:98c1:3121::2
DNSPod, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice