Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DURL VariantsActionwww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSFIX
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN (document or assets)FIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/1 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations36 days until leaf cert expires — 2 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 75 ms lookupPASS
| A | 80.250.29.42 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns.forpsi.cz, ns.forpsi.net, ns.forpsi.it |
| MX | 0 amista-cz.m-v1.mx.microsoft |
| TXT | MS=ms52071253 atlassian-domain-verification=oWyjM4WgM3rynsFNW5avLY2AGhYx7ME/Y6BkVAGtbZa7TaSbiH... SPF v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com ip4:81.0.202.54 a:mail2.wia.cz -all uber-domain-verification=b2633148-a32b-4a6c-95be-808efd329ac5 apple-domain-verification=x06F8CiCMjoQRJ8g |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+DNSSECSigned and validatingPASS
AMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 82ms across 3 resolvers (spread 26ms)PASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 311 ms totalPASS
https://amista.cz
109 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.amista.cz/
202 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://amista.cz | 301 | 109 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Apache/2.4.62 (Debian) |
| 2 | https://www.amista.cz/ | 200 | 202 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Apache/2.4.62 (Debian) |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 1 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /styleguide.html
Disallow: /admin
Sitemap: https://www.amista.cz/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligenceamista.cz — via INTERNET CZ, a.s., 20 years, 11 months old, hosted on WIA-AS - WIA spol. s.r.o., CZPASS
489 days
February 27, 2028
36 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
20 years, 11 months
Registered February 28, 2006
Enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
WIA-AS - WIA spol. s.r.o., CZ
ASN AS21430
80.250.29.42
INTERNET CZ, a.s.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice