Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations49 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN & DeliveryCloudflare (BYPASS)REVIEW
A+DNS Records2 A records, 31 ms lookupPASS
| A | 104.18.14.58, 104.18.15.58 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | tina.ns.cloudflare.com, seamus.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | 10 mx1.basecamp.com 10 mx2.basecamp.com |
| TXT | atlassian-domain-verification=jDcnbDUp4Eqr8vcG6rwzJC/AiL4ryyQCoTDiAKjKnP7rzlvnA4... 1password-site-verification=KFPOHERRZBGW7L3YPQHGBWHYGA SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.basecamp.com include:servers.mcsv.net -all google-site-verification=w-WUrrtkx2vDc--zrb0hxs4rDolhvqkW1Fj-muAr-YM ZOOM_verify_m3iG61YFQ6WjpVxQFErO5w google-site-verification=hpEwalR-8wi_nPf7uplZO5rjptEVj6gENHyy58ULIz4 MS=3DB9BFF0E232F4C87086BE490FC2D6A8337B46C8 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://basecamp.com
177 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://basecamp.com | 200 | 177 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 199 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Disallow: /demos/
Disallow: /humans.txt
Sitemap: https://basecamp.com/sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencebasecamp.com — via Cloudflare, Inc., 32 years, 2 months old, hosted on CloudflarePASS
11 days
July 29, 2026
49 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
32 years, 2 months
Registered July 30, 1994
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Cloudflare
ASN AS13335
104.18.14.58
Cloudflare, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Renew the domain or enable auto-renewal to prevent accidental expiry
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice