Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.FIPv6 ReadinessActionIPv6 records exist but unreachableFIX
Having AAAA records but an unreachable server is worse than no AAAA — clients may experience delays before falling back to IPv4.
Advertising IPv6 (AAAA records) without a reachable server means IPv6-preferring clients silently fail every connection.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Modern browsers prefer IPv6 if AAAA exists (Happy Eyeballs algorithm). If the IPv6 server isn't reachable, browsers fall back to IPv4 — but with seconds of added latency per request. Either fix IPv6 reachability or remove the AAAA records.
Source: RFC 8305 (Happy Eyeballs)
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations77 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records3 A records, 11 ms lookupPASS
| A | 172.67.69.205, 104.26.3.244, 104.26.2.244 |
| AAAA | 2606:4700:20::ac43:45cd, 2606:4700:20::681a:3f4, 2606:4700:20::681a:2f4 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | arnold.ns.cloudflare.com, janet.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | 1 aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com |
| TXT | google-site-verification=j6o3lD4O-aaTerWixKmgUxjAA0n4I1JM3O6t82X9KVw google-site-verification=ly0UhrnFMDNJIVtu-5Bz2ABqixWAaSaWYAAVeEc1Kvg SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://bootstrapmade.com
50 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://bootstrapmade.com | 200 | 50 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 221 URLsPASS
Sitemap: https://bootstrapmade.com/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencebootstrapmade.com — via Cloudflare, Inc., 12 years, 9 months old, hosted on CloudflarePASS
439 days
August 29, 2027
77 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
12 years, 9 months
Registered August 29, 2013
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Cloudflare
ASN AS13335
104.26.3.244
Cloudflare, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
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DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice