Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations80 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
ADNS Records4 A records, 37 ms lookupPASS
| A | 143.204.55.110, 143.204.55.39, 143.204.55.86, 143.204.55.79 |
| AAAA | 2600:9000:2921:fe00:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:6e00:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:1800:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:9a00:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:2600:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:ba00:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:c200:4:27d8:1c40:93a1, 2600:9000:2921:3600:4:27d8:1c40:93a1 |
| CNAME | clojure.org |
| NS | ns-2034.awsdns-62.co.uk, ns-1412.awsdns-48.org, ns-234.awsdns-29.com, ns-941.awsdns-53.net |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.clojure.org
112 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.clojure.org | 200 | 112 ms | HTTP/1.1 | AmazonS3 |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (21 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 709 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /search
Disallow: /page/
Disallow: /wiki/
Disallow: /file/
Disallow: /space/
Disallow: /zone.html
Sitemap: https://clojure.org/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligenceclojure.org — via Register.com - Network Solutions, LLC, 21 years, 3 months oldPASS
265 days
April 3, 2027
80 days
Issued by Amazon
21 years, 3 months
Registered April 3, 2005
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2600:9000:2921:1800:4:27d8:1c40:93a1
Register.com - Network Solutions, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033