Infrastructure - https://www.daraz.pk/#? BeaverCheck Audit

D

Multi-Resolver DNS Speed

Action

Mean 405ms across 3 resolvers (spread 1197ms)

FIX

Mean 405ms across 3 resolvers (spread 1197ms)

Quad9: 1ms

Got: 1ms via 9.9.9.9:53

Cloudflare: 17ms

Got: 17ms via 1.1.1.1:53

Google: 1198ms

Got: 1198ms via 8.8.8.8:53

High latency spread between resolvers: 1197ms (min 1ms / max 1198ms)

Wide gap between the fastest and slowest public resolver suggests a geographic anycast issue or an authoritative-server cache problem. Users in different regions will see materially different DNS times.

F

HTTP Probe Timing

Action

Total 4526 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown

FIX

DNS Lookup

1.99 s

TCP Connect

265 ms

TLS Handshake

531 ms

Time to First Byte

3.20 s

Total Time

4.53 s

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 1.99 s TCP Connect 265 ms TLS Handshake 531 ms Server Processing 414 ms Content Transfer 1.32 s

B

DNS Records

1 A records, 165 ms lookup

REVIEW

1 A records, 165 ms lookup

Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)

Got: 47.246.167.152

Single A record — no DNS redundancy

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

No IPv6 (AAAA) records

CNAME record at zone apex

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Got: daraz.wagbridge.alibaba-inc.com

No NS records found

No MX records — email not configured via DNS

No SPF record found in TXT records

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

DNS resolution time: 165 ms

Got: 165 ms

A	47.246.167.152
AAAA	—
CNAME	daraz.wagbridge.alibaba-inc.com
NS	—
MX	—
TXT	—
CAA	Lookup not available with standard resolver

Resolved in 165 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Why this matters

CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.

Learn more ▾

RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.

Source: RFC 1034

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

Why this matters

Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.

Learn more ▾

SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.

Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)

B

DNSSEC

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

REVIEW

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

DNSSEC is not deployed

The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).

B

CAA Records

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

REVIEW

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

No CAA records published

Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.

C

Reverse DNS

Action

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

REVIEW

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

PTR lookup failed for 47.246.167.152: lookup 47.246.167.152: no such host

No reverse DNS record set for this IP. Common on bare cloud-VM IPs without provider-side PTR; not a security issue.

C

IPv6 Readiness

Action

No IPv6 support

REVIEW

No IPv6 support

No IPv6 (AAAA) records found

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

No IPv6 Support

About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B

TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations

149 days until leaf cert expires — 5 issues to address

REVIEW

Certificate validity

149

days left

0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

Prefer TLS 1.3 — TLS 1.2 is acceptable but TLS 1.3 removes RSA key exchange and improves latency
Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy

C

CDN & Delivery

Action

Assets on Akamai (host g.alicdn.com, 4 assets); document served directly from origin

REVIEW

Assets on Akamai (host g.alicdn.com, 4 assets); document served directly from origin

Document not behind existing CDN (Akamai serves the assets)

The page's subresources are delivered by Akamai (g.alicdn.com, 4 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin. Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.

Got: 2a02:26f0:980:f::214:fd46 in 2a02:26f0:980::/48 (Akamai)

Assets on Akamai: g.alicdn.com (assets: 4)

Got: 2a02:26f0:980:f::214:fd46 in 2a02:26f0:980::/48 (Akamai)

Assets on a CDN, document is not: Akamai

Document origin not attributed

Asset hosts on a CDN

g.alicdn.com — Akamai · assets: 4

Other asset hosts

img.drz.lazcdn.com — assets: 72 · not attributed
img.lazcdn.com — assets: 46 · not attributed
g.lazcdn.com — assets: 33 · not attributed
sg.mmstat.com — assets: 7 · not attributed
fourier.taobao.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
gw.alicdn.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
laz-img-cdn.alicdn.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
lzd-img-global.slatic.net — assets: 1 · below probe threshold

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B

CDN Cache Observability

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

REVIEW

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.

B

Operational Status Page

No status page link detected

REVIEW

No status page link detected

No operational status page link detected

Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.

A+

Subdomain Takeover

No subdomain takeover risk detected

PASS

No subdomain takeover risk detected

CNAME does not point at a known takeover-able service

A+

Redirect Chain

No redirects — direct access

PASS

No redirects — direct access

Got: https://www.daraz.pk/#?

https://www.daraz.pk/#?

1219 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#	URL	Status	Time	Protocol	Server
1	https://www.daraz.pk/#?	200	1219 ms	HTTP/1.1	Tengine/Aserver

A+

Crawlability

robots.txt present, sitemap with 6 URLs

PASS

robots.txt present, sitemap with 6 URLs

robots.txt is present

Got: 567 bytes

sitemap.xml is present

sitemap.xml is valid XML

sitemap.xml contains 6 entries

Sitemap index with 6 child sitemaps

robots.txt does not reference a sitemap

Add a 'Sitemap:' directive to robots.txt so search engines can discover your sitemap.

Why this matters

robots.txt omits Sitemap: directive — crawlers must fetch /sitemap.xml by convention; reliable but missing the explicit hint.

Source: sitemaps.org

robots.txt 200 OK

Size 567 B Sitemaps referenced 0 User-agents * Blocking No — crawling allowed

User-agent: *
Disallow: /checkout/
Disallow: /customer/
Disallow: /cart/
Disallow: /*index.scss
Disallow: /*reqwest/index
Disallow: /catalog/
Disallow: /wangpu/
Disallow: /shop/*.htm
Disallow: /wow/gcp/daraz/megascenario/pk/12_12_2020/12-12-coming-soon/
Disallow: /12-12-sale-2020/
Disallow: /wow/gcp/daraz/megascenario/pk/12_12_2020/12-12-2020-Live/
Disallow: /*from=
Disallow: /wow/gcp/daraz/megascenario/pk/pakistanday2021/pakistan-day-sale-2021-coming-soon/
Disallow: /wow/gcp/daraz/megascenario/pk/pakistanday2021/pakistan-day-sale-2021-live/
Disallow: /wow/gcp/

sitemap.xml 200 OK

Type Sitemap Index URLs 6 entries Valid XML Yes

Child Sitemaps:

A+

URL Variants

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

PASS

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: www)

HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently

Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

200https://www.daraz.pk/

301https://daraz.pk/

Preferred variant: www

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://www.daraz.pk/ → https://www.daraz.pk/

Consistent

A+

Domain Intelligence

daraz.pk — 14 years, 8 months old, hosted on Alibaba Cloud

PASS

daraz.pk — 14 years, 8 months old, hosted on Alibaba Cloud

Domain registered until May 14, 2028 (1 years, 6 months remaining)

Registrar lock is NOT enabled

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Hosting: Alibaba Cloud

Got: AS45102

Domain expiry

546 days

May 14, 2028

SSL certificate

149 days

Issued by GlobalSign nv-sa

Domain age

14 years, 8 months

Registered May 14, 2012

DNSSEC

Status unknown

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

Alibaba Cloud

ASN AS45102

47.246.167.152

Registrar

Registrar unknown

Unlocked 4 NS records

Expiry timeline

Today

+1 year

Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)

Recommended actions

Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers

Registrar

Created May 14, 2012 (14 years, 8 months ago)

Expires May 14, 2028 (1 years, 6 months)

Name Servers ns1.alibabadns.cn, ns1.alibabadns.com, ns2.alibabadns.cn, ns2.alibabadns.com

Hosting

IP Address 47.246.167.152

ASN AS45102 (ALIBABA-CN-NET - Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd., CN)

Provider Alibaba Cloud

Data source: whois (0.8s)

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice

A+

Health Check Endpoint

Health endpoint at https://www.daraz.pk/health (HTTP 200)

PASS

Health endpoint at https://www.daraz.pk/health (HTTP 200)

Public health endpoint at https://www.daraz.pk/health

Got: https://www.daraz.pk/health