Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DURL VariantsActionwww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSFIX
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations80 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records3 A records, 35 ms lookupPASS
| A | 172.67.75.230, 104.26.12.166, 104.26.13.166 |
| AAAA | 2606:4700:20::681a:ca6, 2606:4700:20::681a:da6, 2606:4700:20::ac43:4be6 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | rita.ns.cloudflare.com, jim.ns.cloudflare.com |
| MX | 1 aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 10 aspmx2.googlemail.com 10 aspmx5.googlemail.com 10 aspmx4.googlemail.com 10 aspmx3.googlemail.com |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:spf.mailjet.com include:_spf.google.com ip4:91.198.105.0/24 inclu... google-site-verification=ij0IWrbI2yWILE1O3nzhV7riEa2iwXtqHIr7kVXFvok Sendinblue-code:2c901424aa32d06ec6ed74fad279dd98 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 578 ms totalPASS
https://e-monsite.com
78 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.e-monsite.com/
500 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://e-monsite.com | 301 | 78 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 2 | https://www.e-monsite.com/ | 200 | 500 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (16 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 1370 URLsPASS
User-agent: MauiBot (crawler.feedback+wc@gmail.com)
Disallow: /
User-agent: MegaIndex.ru
Disallow: /
User-agent: Semrushbot-SA
Disallow: /
User-agent: HTTrack
Disallow: /
User-agent: BLEXBot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: MJ12bot
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: Seekport Crawler
Crawl-delay: 10
User-agent: *
Allow: /
Disallow: /storage/do_xml/id/
Sitemap: https://www.e-monsite.com/sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencee-monsite.com — via OVH sas, 22 years, 5 months oldPASS
1330 days
March 3, 2030
80 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
22 years, 5 months
Registered March 3, 2004
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2606:4700:20::681a:ca6
OVH sas
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice