Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
CReverse DNSAction0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations69 days until leaf cert expires — 4 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
ADNS Records2 A records, 28 ms lookupPASS
| A | 66.33.60.67, 76.76.21.98 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | cname.vercel-dns.com |
| NS | ns1.vercel-dns-3.com, ns2.vercel-dns-3.com, ns4.vercel-dns-3.com, ns3.vercel-dns-3.com |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
ACAA Recordsissue: globalsign.com, letsencrypt.org, pki.goog, sectigo.comPASS
AMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 73ms across 3 resolvers (spread 97ms)PASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 520 ms totalPASS
https://www.frannmkt.com
390 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.frannmkt.com/es/
130 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.frannmkt.com | 302 | 390 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Vercel |
| 2 | https://www.frannmkt.com/es/ | 200 | 130 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Vercel |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
If permanent, use 301 instead.
302 (Found) is for genuinely temporary redirects — if this redirect is permanent, switch to 301 to preserve SEO equity.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Search engines treat 302 as temporary, keeping the original URL indexed and not transferring full link equity to the destination. Use 301 (Moved Permanently) for permanent redirects (HTTP→HTTPS, www-vs-non-www, URL restructures).
Source: Google Search Central
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 1 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /templates
Crawl-delay: 3
Sitemap: https://www.frannmkt.com/sitemap-index.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencefrannmkt.com — via Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu, 10 months old, hosted on AWSPASS
417 days
December 30, 2027
69 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
10 months
Registered December 30, 2025
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
76.76.21.21
Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice