Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BCrawlabilityrobots.txt present, no sitemapREVIEW
A sitemap helps search engines discover and index your pages more efficiently.
No sitemap.xml — Google relies on crawl-graph discovery alone, slowing indexing of deep or fresh URLs.
Learn more ▾ ▴
A sitemap accelerates Google's discovery of new and updated content. Most CMSes auto-generate one; static-site frameworks need a build-step plugin. Reference it from robots.txt and submit in Search Console to confirm Google can fetch it.
Source: sitemaps.org / Google Search Central
Add a 'Sitemap:' directive to robots.txt so search engines can discover your sitemap.
robots.txt omits Sitemap: directive — crawlers must fetch /sitemap.xml by convention; reliable but missing the explicit hint.
Source: sitemaps.org
User-agent: *
Allow: /*
Disallow: /dev/api/internal/
Disallow: /api/
Allow: /api/diary_redirect
No sitemap found
Adding a sitemap helps search engines discover your pages.
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations110 days until leaf cert expires — 5 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Extend HSTS max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year) to meet the preload list criteria
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Add the preload directive and submit to hstspreload.org once max-age + includeSubDomains are in place
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records4 A records, 11 ms lookupPASS
| A | 3.173.161.114, 3.173.161.37, 3.173.161.76, 3.173.161.99 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns-1380.awsdns-44.org, ns-1997.awsdns-57.co.uk, ns-206.awsdns-25.com, ns-562.awsdns-06.net |
| MX | 10 mailinbound.hatena.ne.jp |
| TXT | google-site-verification=3o5PJrq5BegVw-9FP9CqwT9HQB4YpYf-yh0sVhJO3rg google-site-verification=oIk95RRyl0cakm9QhNx5p7a4oU_Zay1tGKiLfEfngvc |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 479 ms totalPASS
https://hatenablog.com
240 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://hatena.blog/
238 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://hatenablog.com | 301 | 240 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
| 2 | https://hatena.blog/ | 200 | 238 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligencehatenablog.com — via Amazon Registrar, Inc., 14 years, 8 months old, hosted on AWSPASS
97 days
October 17, 2026
110 days
Issued by Amazon
14 years, 8 months
Registered October 17, 2011
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
3.173.161.37
Amazon Registrar, Inc.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice