Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DRedirect ChainAction3 redirect(s), 509 ms totalFIX
https://jwplayer.com
345 ms · HTTP/1.1
http://jwpconnatix.com
63 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://jwpconnatix.com/
24 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://jwx.com/
76 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://jwplayer.com | 301 | 345 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 2 | http://jwpconnatix.com | 301 | 63 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 3 | https://jwpconnatix.com/ | 301 | 24 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
| 4 | https://jwx.com/ | 200 | 76 ms | HTTP/1.1 | cloudflare |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
Each redirect adds latency. Try to minimize the chain to 1 hop.
Redirect chain — each hop adds latency; combine into one redirect where possible.
Source: Google Search Central / web.dev
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations75 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records1 A records, 60 ms lookupPASS
| A | 162.159.135.42 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns-1914.awsdns-47.co.uk, ns-572.awsdns-07.net, ns-1254.awsdns-28.org, ns-444.awsdns-55.com |
| MX | 1 aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com |
| TXT | vqtrt2k94e8pggj2jld5arevm9 SPF v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com include:spf.recurly.com include:_spf.salesforce.c... google-site-verification=3EWWzApKYy5iHiUsTDhXZkpNCB-_cSkFwquPm3pmzEE google-site-verification=63778kycTZbqfqBznTs8SwETAXCkwzBsl2nKrdhylx0 google-site-verification=r-YKuG0gqaHddJ-8uSVSb8TM5tn4I_u6XeEpe2S1nsQ google-site-verification=N8eh_vqWZLXntu6Jh_VQJFfi2Gm2EEWA9PA-TCNx9r8 anthropic-domain-verification-7rwwkt=noe2OMS5PDwILoG1S0PEWhroH notion-domain-verification=tIUKdhRqotnHCsgeSZLxiDQqoL8AuZQqZSUPFoO3dTR atlassian-domain-verification=nOPswDWYxxzNV4t7EF2mZaPoEhoY2CuAwf7rvsSWawQR20eeiZ... knowbe4-site-verification=1168f280573ac8e3158c84f95629672f status-page-domain-verification=n2gcvs5fqqvz google-site-verification=WMyaSI2VUocjgWj6RLqigyWuW32RONmgV1n0DdS-u8o h1-domain-verification=DiEFYhC5iVy3imQygV6rfpf45UfP1NEEEMQJWDkJB7Us7KkJ _globalsign-domain-verification=9Nl1AxffdkeAS7PpIRWOvfM9l2-LqHbPglxwqog9Hx cursor-domain-verification-wq0f2c=V6V85FRXVBAfrkBV7NeMpGP2T |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 9 URLsPASS
# START YOAST BLOCK
# ---------------------------
User-agent: *
Disallow:
Sitemap: https://jwplayer.com/sitemap_index.xml
# ---------------------------
# END YOAST BLOCK
- https://jwplayer.com/post-sitemap.xml
- https://jwplayer.com/page-sitemap.xml
- https://jwplayer.com/resources-sitemap.x...
- https://jwplayer.com/news-room-sitemap.x...
- https://jwplayer.com/press-releases-site...
- https://jwplayer.com/category-sitemap.xm...
- https://jwplayer.com/post_tag-sitemap.xm...
- https://jwplayer.com/resource_types-site...
- https://jwplayer.com/author-sitemap.xml
A+Domain Intelligencejwplayer.com — via GoDaddy.com, LLC, 18 years, 10 months old, hosted on CloudflarePASS
93 days
September 17, 2026
75 days
Issued by Google Trust Services
18 years, 10 months
Registered September 17, 2007
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
Cloudflare
ASN AS13335
162.159.135.42
GoDaddy.com, LLC
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice