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Security

· 32 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
90
GRADE
A
FIX
1
REVIEW
6
PASS
25
INFO
0
Checks
32
25 PASS 6 REVIEW 1 FIX
F
Email Security
Action
no DMARC, no SPF
FIX
no DMARC, no SPF
Warning::
No DMARC record found
Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.
Warning::
No SPF record found
Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.
Info::
No DKIM detected via common selectors
DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.
Info::
MTA-STS not configured
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Info::
TLS-RPT not configured
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Info::
BIMI not configured
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
DMARC

No DMARC record found

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures from your domain.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Why this matters

Without DMARC, anyone can send phishing emails using your domain name.

Learn more

DMARC tells receiving mail servers what to do with email that fails SPF/DKIM checks for your domain. With a strict 'p=reject' policy, spoofed emails get bounced; without it they reach the inbox. Domains used in phishing campaigns lose deliverability and brand trust fast.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Without SPF (Sender Policy Framework), receivers can't tell which servers are authorized to send mail for your domain. Add a TXT record at the apex starting with v=spf1, ending in -all.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

B
Content Security Policy
8 of 10 CSP checks passed
REVIEW
8 of 10 CSP checks passed
Info::
Raw CSP policy
Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self' https:; frame-src https:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; upgrade-insecure-requests
Info::
default-src directive is set
Got: default-src 'self'
Critical::
'unsafe-inline' found in script source
'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.
Got: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:
Info::
No 'unsafe-eval' in script source
Info::
No wildcard in script source
Info::
object-src is set to 'none'
Got: object-src 'none'
Info::
base-uri is properly restricted
Got: base-uri 'self'
Info::
frame-ancestors directive is set
Got: frame-ancestors 'none'
Info::
form-action directive is set
Got: form-action 'self'
Info::
upgrade-insecure-requests is enabled

'unsafe-inline' allows inline <script> tags, defeating CSP against XSS. Remove it and use nonces or hashes instead.

Why this matters

Unsafe value (unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval) in script-src defeats CSP's main protection — XSS injections can execute again.

Learn more

unsafe-inline allows inline <script> tags; unsafe-eval allows eval() and similar. Both are necessary for some legacy code but explicitly dangerous. Migrate to nonces (per-page random tokens) or hashes (per-script SHA-256) instead.

Source: OWASP CSP / MDN

Parsed Policy

default-src 'self'
script-src 'self''unsafe-inline'https:
style-src 'self''unsafe-inline'
img-src 'self'data:blob:https:
font-src 'self'data:
connect-src 'self'https:
frame-src https:
object-src 'none'
base-uri 'self'
form-action 'self'
frame-ancestors 'none'
upgrade-insecure-requests
C
security.txt
Action
No security.txt file found
REVIEW
No security.txt file found
Info::
No security.txt file found
security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.
Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B
CSP Inline-Style Readiness
5 inline style attribute(s) detected
REVIEW
5 inline style attribute(s) detected
Info::
5 inline style attribute(s) detected
Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 5 inline style(s) is low. Affected element types include: img, div. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.
B
Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)
Trusted Types not enabled
REVIEW
Trusted Types not enabled
Info::
Trusted Types not enabled
Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.
B
Permissions-Policy Granularity
50% high-risk feature coverage (5/10)
REVIEW
50% high-risk feature coverage (5/10)
Info::
Permissions-Policy covers 5/10 high-risk features (50%)
The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 5/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb Not declared (default-allow): serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.
Got: 50% (5/10)
C
CORS Configuration
Action
Origin: *
REVIEW
Origin: *
Info::
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — unrestricted
Any website can read this resource's response. Appropriate for public APIs but not for user-specific content.
Info::
Origin reflection not testable with a single request
Some servers reflect the request Origin header. This requires manual testing with a crafted Origin header.
CORS Configuration Permissive
Allow-Origin *

Any website can read responses from this resource.

HeaderValueStatus
Access-Control-Allow-Origin*

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A
Security Headers
8 of 10 headers properly configured
PASS
8 of 10 headers properly configured
Info::
Strict-Transport-Security is properly configured (consider adding preload)
Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Info::
X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured
Got: nosniff
Info::
X-Frame-Options is properly configured
Got: DENY
Info::
Referrer-Policy is properly configured
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Info::
Permissions-Policy is set
Got: camera=(), geolocation=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()
Info::
Content-Security-Policy is present
Got: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https:; style-src 'self' '…
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing
COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.
Expected: same-origin
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
Expected: require-corp
Info::
X-Powered-By header is not present
Info::
Server header is present without version info
Got: cloudflare
Info::
Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Got: unknown

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin
Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp
Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

A+
TLS & Certificates
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
PASS
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
Info::
TLS 1.3 is used
Got: TLS 1.3
Info::
Strong cipher suite is used
Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Info::
HTTP/2 is negotiated
Got: h2
Info::
OCSP stapling not enabled
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Info::
Certificate is valid (expires in 86 days)
Got: 2026-11-26T12:56:51Z
Info::
Certificate chain has 3 certificates
Info::
Certificate uses modern signature algorithm
Got: ECDSA-SHA256
Info::
Certificate covers 1 domain(s)
Got: karinderya.org
Info::
Certificate is issued by a trusted CA
Got: CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Cipher Suite
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
HTTP Version
h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate
Subject CN=karinderya.orgIssuer CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USValid 2026-08-28T11:56:55Z → 2026-11-26T12:56:51ZExpires in 86 days SANs karinderya.orgSignature ECDSA-SHA256Serial c6b06b04421a39a313b0a5790b2cdd27
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USIssuer CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USValid 2023-12-13T09:00:00Z → 2029-02-20T14:00:00ZExpires in 903 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USIssuer CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEValid 2023-11-15T03:43:21Z → 2028-01-28T00:00:42ZExpires in 513 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b
A+
Cookie Security
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
PASS
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
Info::
No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A
WAF / Bot Protection
Cloudflare
PASS
Cloudflare
Info::
Cloudflare detected
Detected via: cf-ray: a34355aeac8cbb21-CDG
Got: Cloudflare
A+
Cross-Origin Tab Safety
All 4 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
PASS
All 4 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
Info::
All 4 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
A+
Bot Challenge Detection
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
PASS
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
Info::
No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page
A+
Soft-404 Detection
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
PASS
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
Info::
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
A+
Empty Page Detection
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
PASS
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
Info::
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
A+
Geo-Restriction Detection
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
PASS
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
Info::
No geo-restriction detected
A+
Maintenance Mode Detection
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
PASS
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
Info::
No maintenance-mode signals detected
A+
Subresource Integrity Adoption
Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable
PASS
Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable
Info::
No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI
A
CORS Depth
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
PASS
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
Info::
CORS allows any origin (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
Any website can fetch this URL via JavaScript and read the response body. Acceptable for genuinely public APIs (e.g. CDN-served static assets). Risky if the URL returns user-specific or session-derived data, since other origins can scrape it via the user's browser without needing credentials. Narrow Allow-Origin to a specific origin allow-list when the response is sensitive.
Got: Allow-Origin: *
A+
Referrer-Policy Strictness
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
PASS
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
Info::
Referrer-Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` -- modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin
The modern browser default (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+). Full URL Referer on same-origin; origin only on cross-origin; no Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. Privacy-safe and breaks no analytics. The recommended explicit value.
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
A+
Source Map Exposure
No source maps accessible (probed 9 candidate URL(s))
PASS
No source maps accessible (probed 9 candidate URL(s))
Info::
No source maps accessible across 9 probed candidate(s)
A+
HTML Version Disclosure
No software-version disclosures in HTML
PASS
No software-version disclosures in HTML
Info::
No software-version disclosures in HTML
A+
Open Redirect Surface
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
PASS
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
Info::
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
A+
Auth Security
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
PASS
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
Info::
Page does not appear to be a login form
A+
Subdomain Inventory Exposure
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
PASS
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
Info::
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
A+
Subresource Integrity
No external resources
PASS
No external resources
Info::
No external resources to protect
SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable
A+
JS Library Vulnerabilities
No known vulnerabilities
PASS
No known vulnerabilities
Info::
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+
Information Leakage
No exposures
PASS
No exposures
Info::
No security.txt found
Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.
Info::
No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

PathStatusCategoryRisk
/.git/HEAD Not foundVersion Control
/.git/config Not foundVersion Control
/.svn/entries Not foundVersion Control
/.env Not foundConfiguration
/.env.local Not foundConfiguration
/.env.production Not foundConfiguration
/wp-config.php Not foundConfiguration
/.htaccess Not foundConfiguration
/phpinfo.php Not foundDebug
/server-status Not foundDebug
/server-info Not foundDebug
/.well-known/security.txt Not foundSecurity Policy
/package.json Not founddependency-manifest
/composer.json Not founddependency-manifest
/Gemfile Not founddependency-manifest
/Gemfile.lock Not founddependency-manifest
/requirements.txt Not founddependency-manifest
/pom.xml Not founddependency-manifest
/.gitlab-ci.yml Not foundci-config
/.travis.yml Not foundci-config
A+
API Surface
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
PASS
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
Info::
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))
A
Permissions-Policy
5 directives, 0 missing
PASS
5 directives, 0 missing
Info::
camera=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
geolocation=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
microphone=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
payment=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
usb=() — blocked for all origins

Raw Header

camera=() geolocation=() microphone=() payment=() usb=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set
camera Blocked
geolocation Blocked
microphone Blocked
payment Blocked
usb Blocked
A+
Transport Security
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
PASS
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
Info::
HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported
The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.
Info::
HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains)
Info::
TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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