Security

Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 67 inline style(s) is high. Affected element types include: div, header, h1, p, img. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.

Of 6 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 0 (0%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 5 examples): - https://instafeed.nfcube.com/cdn/8ee73c907f6b1a11706651545b3802db.js?shop=main-street-estate-sales.myshopify.com - https://formbuilder.hulkapps.com/skeletopapp.js?shop=main-street-estate-sales.myshopify.com - https://connect.facebook.net/signals/config/3330667760480615?v=2.9.313&r=stable&domain=mainstreetestatesales.com&hme=97937018cefade17726f0472876fc101316b2ce9008a35a6a5a7977d7436151a&ex_m=104%2C205%2C154%2C22%2C72%2C73%2C145%2C68%2C67%2C11%2C162%2C90%2C16%2C138%2C48%2C146%2C77%2C112%2C47%2C127%2C39%2C75%2C78%2C134%2C159%2C164%2C8%2C4%2C5%2C7%2C6%2C3%2C91%2C101%2C165%2C170%2C219%2C62%2C186%2C187%2C55%2C276%2C30%2C74%2C231%2C230%2C229%2C23%2C33%2C103%2C61%2C10%2C63%2C97%2C98%2C99%2C105%2C130%2C31%2C29%2C132%2C133%2C129%2C128%2C155%2C76%2C158%2C156%2C157%2C50%2C60%2C123%2C15%2C161%2C45%2C263%2C264%2C262%2C26%2C27%2C28%2C18%2C20%2C44%2C40%2C42%2C41%2C83%2C92%2C96%2C110%2C144%2C147%2C46%2C111%2C24%2C21%2C119%2C69%2C36%2C149%2C148%2C150%2C141%2C139%2C25%2C35%2C59%2C109%2C160%2C70%2C17%2C152%2C114%2C81%2C66%2C19%2C85%2C86%2C116%2C84%2C136%2C135%2C34%2C278%2C293%2C212%2C201%2C202%2C200%2C296%2C288%2C52%2C213%2C107%2C131%2C80%2C121%2C54%2C49%2C113%2C120%2C126%2C58%2C64%2C151%2C115%2C37%2C32%2C53%2C56%2C100%2C163%2C1%2C124%2C14%2C122%2C12%2C2%2C57%2C93%2C65%2C118%2C89%2C88%2C166%2C167%2C94%2C95%2C9%2C125%2C102%2C51%2C142%2C87%2C79%2C71%2C117%2C106%2C43%2C143%2C0%2C82%2C137%2C140%2C153%2C38%2C108%2C13%2C168 - https://connect.facebook.net/en_US/fbevents.js - //code.jquery.com/jquery-3.4.1.min.js Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.

Source maps (.js.map files) reveal the original source code -- variable names, comments, file structure, and sometimes secrets that were stripped from the bundled output. They're shipped to production by mistake almost universally; the standard fix is a build-tool config flag (Webpack: `devtool: false` or `'hidden-source-map'`; Vite: `build.sourcemap: false`; Next.js: `productionBrowserSourceMaps: false`). Once removed, audit your CDN/edge cache to evict any previously-cached .map URLs. Sample accessible URLs: https://mainstreetestatesales.com/cdn/shop/t/1/assets/lazysizes.js.map, https://mainstreetestatesales.com/cdn/shop/t/1/assets/theme.js.map.

Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.

Without DMARC, email receivers have no policy for handling authentication failures. Add a TXT record at _dmarc.<domain> starting with v=DMARC1.

Consider adding a Permissions-Policy header to restrict browser feature access from embedded content.

A short max-age leaves a window for downgrade attacks. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Without the Secure flag, this cookie can be sent over unencrypted HTTP, exposing it to interception.

security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.

Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.

Without a `Permissions-Policy` (or legacy `Feature-Policy`) header, every powerful browser feature defaults to its spec default policy (typically `self`). A third-party iframe injected via XSS or a misconfigured embed can still request access to the user's camera, microphone, geolocation, payment APIs, USB devices, etc. Explicitly deny features the page doesn't need: ``` Permissions-Policy: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), accelerometer=(), gyroscope=() ``` Features the page legitimately uses can stay enabled with `feature=(self)`.

Without an explicit `Referrer-Policy` header, the browser falls back to its default policy. Modern browsers (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+) default to `strict-origin-when-cross-origin`, which is privacy-safe. Legacy browsers default to the leaky `no-referrer-when-downgrade`, which sends the full URL (including path + query) on cross-origin HTTPS-to-HTTPS requests. Set an explicit header to ensure consistent behavior: ``` Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin ``` This matches the modern browser default and is privacy-safe without breaking referrer-based same-origin analytics.

Introspection lets clients query the GraphQL server for its complete schema -- every type, field, argument, and resolver name. Convenient during development; on production, an attacker uses it as a free recon tool to map the entire data graph. Disable in production unless your API is intentionally public-spec.

Detected via: cf-ray: 9f99b7f1fae6e198-CDG

Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.

The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.