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Security

· 32 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
87
GRADE
B
FIX
2
REVIEW
6
PASS
24
INFO
0
Checks
32
24 PASS 6 REVIEW 2 FIX
F
Content Security Policy
Action
No enforcing CSP policy found
FIX
No enforcing CSP policy found
Critical::
No Content-Security-Policy header found
CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.
Expected: default-src 'self'

CSP is the most effective defense against XSS attacks. Add a Content-Security-Policy header to restrict resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'
Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything users type — credentials, payment data, session tokens.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever. Start in Report-Only mode, fix violations, then graduate to enforcing.

Source: OWASP / MDN

D
Email Security
Action
DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all
FIX
DMARC: quarantine, SPF: ~all
Info::
DMARC policy is quarantine — good protection
Info::
SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)
Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).
Info::
No DKIM detected via common selectors
DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.
Info::
MTA-STS not configured
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Info::
TLS-RPT not configured
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Info::
BIMI not configured
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
DMARC
Policy quarantine — good protection Record v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@marrakechatlas.site

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

DKIM signs outbound mail to prove origin. We probed common selectors (default, google, selector1, etc.) without finding a record. If you use a non-standard selector, this is a false negative.

Why this matters

No DKIM signature on outbound mail — receivers can't cryptographically prove the message came from your domain.

Learn more ▾

DKIM signs outbound mail with a private key whose public half lives in DNS at <selector>._domainkey.<domain>. Without DKIM, DMARC alone can't tell legitimate mail from spoofs, and large mailbox providers (Gmail, Yahoo) increasingly require DKIM for inbox placement. Note: this check probes a curated list of common selectors; non-standard selectors produce a false negative.

Source: RFC 6376 / Google + Yahoo 2024 sender requirements

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

C
Security Headers
Action
6 of 10 headers properly configured
REVIEW
6 of 10 headers properly configured
Warning::
HSTS is enabled but max-age is short (15552000s, should be >= 31536000s)
The header is present and enforced, so first-visit protection is already in place; a short max-age just means the browser forgets it sooner. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).
Got: max-age=15552000 Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Info::
X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured
Got: nosniff
Info::
X-Frame-Options is properly configured
Got: SAMEORIGIN
Info::
Referrer-Policy is properly configured
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Info::
Permissions-Policy is set
Got: camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=(), interest-cohort=()
Critical::
Content-Security-Policy header is missing
CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.
Expected: default-src 'self'
Info::
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy is set but not 'same-origin'
Got: same-origin-allow-popups Expected: same-origin
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
Expected: require-corp
Info::
X-Powered-By header is not present
Info::
Server header is present without version info
Got: cloudflare
Info::
Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Got: unknown

CSP is the most important header for preventing XSS attacks. See the CSP section for detailed analysis.

Expected: default-src 'self'
Why this matters

Without a CSP, a single XSS bug can exfiltrate everything your users type — including credentials.

Learn more ▾

Content-Security-Policy is the browser-enforced firewall against XSS. With a strict CSP, a script injection that would otherwise steal session cookies or rewrite the page is silently blocked. Without it, your only defense is hoping every input on every form is escaped correctly forever.

Source: OWASP / MDN

The header is present and enforced, so first-visit protection is already in place; a short max-age just means the browser forgets it sooner. Set max-age to at least 31536000 (1 year).

Expected: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Why this matters

HSTS is on, but a short max-age means browsers forget the policy sooner than recommended — set >= 1 year.

Learn more ▾

max-age below 31536000 (1 year) is below industry recommendation. The browser forgets the HSTS policy and re-exposes first-visit downgrade attacks. Set to 63072000 (2 years) and add `includeSubDomains; preload` to qualify for the HSTS preload list.

Source: RFC 6797 / hstspreload.org

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp
Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Expected: same-origin
Why this matters

COOP is set to a less-restrictive value (same-origin-allow-popups or unsafe-none) — partial isolation only.

Learn more ▾

COOP: same-origin is the strictest level. same-origin-allow-popups allows authenticated popup windows back to your origin. unsafe-none is the legacy default (effectively off). Pick the strictest level your app's popup flows tolerate.

Source: MDN COOP

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

C
security.txt
Action
No security.txt file found
REVIEW
No security.txt file found
Info::
No security.txt file found
security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.
Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

B
Subresource Integrity Adoption
50% SRI adoption (1/2 third-party resources)
REVIEW
50% SRI adoption (1/2 third-party resources)
Info::
SRI adoption: 1/2 third-party resources protected (50%)
Of 2 third-party `<script>` / `<link rel=stylesheet>` resources, 1 (50%) declare a Subresource Integrity hash via the `integrity=` attribute. SRI binds the page to the exact bytes of the third-party resource: if the CDN is compromised, attacker-modified bytes won't match the declared hash and the browser refuses to execute the resource. Missing SRI on (first 1 examples): - https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Cormorant+Garamond:ital,wght@0,400;0,500;0,600;1,400;1,500&family=Jost:wght@300;400;500;600&display=swap Fix: add `integrity="sha384-..."` and `crossorigin="anonymous"` attributes. Generators: srihash.org, or in-browser via `await crypto.subtle.digest('SHA-384', bytes)`. Cache-bust the resource URL when you change versions, since the integrity hash will mismatch with old cached bytes.
Got: 50% (1/2)
B
Permissions-Policy Granularity
50% high-risk feature coverage (5/10)
REVIEW
50% high-risk feature coverage (5/10)
Info::
Permissions-Policy covers 5/10 high-risk features (50%)
The Permissions-Policy header explicitly declares policies for 5/10 high-risk features. Covered: camera, microphone, geolocation, payment, usb Not declared (default-allow): serial, midi, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer The non-declared features fall back to their spec-default policy (usually `self`), which means an XSS-injected or compromised iframe could request them. For features the page genuinely doesn't use, declare `feature=()` to fully close them.
Got: 50% (5/10)
C
Subresource Integrity
Action
1 of 2 external resources have SRI
REVIEW
1 of 2 external resources have SRI
Warning::
External link from fonts.googleapis.com lacks integrity attribute
Without SRI, if this CDN is compromised, attackers could inject malicious code.
Got: https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Cormorant+Garamond:ital,wght@0,400;0,500;0,600;1,400;1,500&family=Jost:wght@300;400;500;600&display=swap
Info::
script from static.cloudflareinsights.com has SRI protection
SRI Coverage 1 / 2 of external resources have integrity hashes
TagDomainIntegrity
<link>fonts.googleapis.com✗ Missing
<script>static.cloudflareinsights.com✓ Protected
C
CORS Configuration
Action
Origin: *
REVIEW
Origin: *
Info::
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * — unrestricted
Any website can read this resource's response. Appropriate for public APIs but not for user-specific content.
Info::
Origin reflection not testable with a single request
Some servers reflect the request Origin header. This requires manual testing with a crafted Origin header.
CORS Configuration Permissive
Allow-Origin *

Any website can read responses from this resource.

HeaderValueStatus
Access-Control-Allow-Origin*⚠

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A+
TLS & Certificates
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
PASS
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
Info::
TLS 1.3 is used
Got: TLS 1.3
Info::
Strong cipher suite is used
Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Info::
HTTP/2 is negotiated
Got: h2
Info::
OCSP stapling not enabled
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Info::
Certificate is valid (expires in 89 days)
Got: 2027-01-31T15:59:33Z
Info::
Certificate chain has 3 certificates
Info::
Certificate uses modern signature algorithm
Got: ECDSA-SHA256
Info::
Certificate covers 1 domain(s)
Got: marrakechatlas.site
Info::
Certificate is issued by a trusted CA
Got: CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Cipher Suite
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
HTTP Version
h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate
Subject CN=marrakechatlas.siteIssuer CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USValid 2026-11-02T14:59:34Z → 2027-01-31T15:59:33ZExpires in 89 days SANs marrakechatlas.siteSignature ECDSA-SHA256Serial afc99813e9f8799713f3699f3c8e8d35
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=WE1,O=Google Trust Services,C=USIssuer CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USValid 2023-12-13T09:00:00Z → 2029-02-20T14:00:00ZExpires in 840 days Signature ECDSA-SHA384Serial 7ff31977972c224a76155d13b6d685e3
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=GTS Root R4,O=Google Trust Services LLC,C=USIssuer CN=GlobalSign Root CA,OU=Root CA,O=GlobalSign nv-sa,C=BEValid 2023-11-15T03:43:21Z → 2028-01-28T00:00:42ZExpires in 451 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 7fe530bf331343bedd821610493d8a1b
A+
Cookie Security
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
PASS
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
Info::
No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A
WAF / Bot Protection
Cloudflare
PASS
Cloudflare
Info::
Cloudflare detected
Detected via: cf-ray: a54640fbfe297cb6-CDG
Got: Cloudflare
A+
Cross-Origin Tab Safety
All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
PASS
All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
Info::
All 1 new-tab link(s) carry rel=noopener
A+
CSP Inline-Style Readiness
No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible
PASS
No inline style attributes -- strict CSP is feasible
Info::
No inline style attributes detected
A+
Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)
No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A
PASS
No CSP header -- Trusted Types check is N/A
Info::
No CSP header found -- Trusted Types check is N/A
A+
Bot Challenge Detection
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
PASS
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
Info::
No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page
A+
Soft-404 Detection
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
PASS
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
Info::
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
A+
Empty Page Detection
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
PASS
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
Info::
Page has substantive body text and no placeholder / template-leak signals
A+
Geo-Restriction Detection
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
PASS
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
Info::
No geo-restriction detected
A+
Maintenance Mode Detection
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
PASS
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
Info::
No maintenance-mode signals detected
A
CORS Depth
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
PASS
1 CORS depth signal(s) detected
Info::
CORS allows any origin (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
Any website can fetch this URL via JavaScript and read the response body. Acceptable for genuinely public APIs (e.g. CDN-served static assets). Risky if the URL returns user-specific or session-derived data, since other origins can scrape it via the user's browser without needing credentials. Narrow Allow-Origin to a specific origin allow-list when the response is sensitive.
Got: Allow-Origin: *
A+
Referrer-Policy Strictness
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
PASS
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
Info::
Referrer-Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` -- modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin
The modern browser default (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+). Full URL Referer on same-origin; origin only on cross-origin; no Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. Privacy-safe and breaks no analytics. The recommended explicit value.
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
A+
Source Map Exposure
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
PASS
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
Info::
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
A+
HTML Version Disclosure
No software-version disclosures in HTML
PASS
No software-version disclosures in HTML
Info::
No software-version disclosures in HTML
A+
Open Redirect Surface
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
PASS
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
Info::
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
A+
Auth Security
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
PASS
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
Info::
Page does not appear to be a login form
A+
Subdomain Inventory Exposure
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
PASS
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
Info::
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
A+
JS Library Vulnerabilities
No known vulnerabilities
PASS
No known vulnerabilities
Info::
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+
Information Leakage
No exposures
PASS
No exposures
Info::
No security.txt found
Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.
Info::
No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

PathStatusCategoryRisk
/.git/HEAD✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.git/config✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.svn/entries✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.env✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.local✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.production✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/wp-config.php✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.htaccess✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/phpinfo.php✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-status✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-info✓ Not foundDebug—
/.well-known/security.txt✓ Not foundSecurity Policy—
/package.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/composer.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile.lock✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/requirements.txt✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/pom.xml✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/.gitlab-ci.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
/.travis.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
A+
API Surface
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
PASS
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
Info::
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))
A
Permissions-Policy
6 directives, 0 missing
PASS
6 directives, 0 missing
Info::
camera=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
microphone=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
geolocation=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
payment=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
usb=() — blocked for all origins
Info::
interest-cohort=() — blocked for all origins

Raw Header

camera=() microphone=() geolocation=() payment=() usb=() interest-cohort=()

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set
camera Blocked
microphone Blocked
geolocation Blocked
payment Blocked
usb Blocked
interest-cohort Blocked
A
Transport Security
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
PASS
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
Info::
HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported
The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.
Warning::
HSTS max-age is short: 180 days
HSTS max-age should be at least 1 year (31536000 seconds).
Got: max-age=15552000 (expected 31536000)
Info::
HSTS missing includeSubDomains
Without includeSubDomains, HSTS only protects the exact domain.
Info::
TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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