Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/12 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 119ms across 3 resolvers (spread 77ms)REVIEW
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations97 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to be added to the Chrome preload list
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
ADNS Records4 A records, 37 ms lookupPASS
| A | 13.33.153.24, 13.33.153.29, 13.33.153.97, 13.33.153.123 |
| AAAA | 2600:9000:2021:2c00:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:a800:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:a000:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:5400:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:7000:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:7a00:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:fc00:15:fa36:9e80:93a1, 2600:9000:2021:c200:15:fa36:9e80:93a1 |
| CNAME | p25554.my.plentysystems.com |
| NS | ns-1397.awsdns-46.org, ns-337.awsdns-42.com, ns-564.awsdns-06.net, ns-1743.awsdns-25.co.uk |
| MX | — |
| TXT | — |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.
CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.
Learn more ▾ ▴
RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.
Source: RFC 1034
SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.
Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.
Learn more ▾ ▴
SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.
Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://www.party-schlaudt.de
144 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://www.party-schlaudt.de | 200 | 144 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (25 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 3 URLsPASS
User-agent: *
Disallow: /plenty/
Allow: /plenty/api/external.php
Disallow: /xml/
Sitemap: https://www.party-schlaudt.de/sitemap.xml
User-agent: meta-externalagent
Disallow: /
User-agent: meta-webindexer
Disallow: /
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceparty-schlaudt.de — hosted on AWSPASS
Unknown
97 days
Issued by Amazon
Unknown
Status unknown
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS16509
3.67.203.118
Registrar unknown
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice