Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BMulti-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 71ms across 3 resolvers (spread 129ms)REVIEW
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
Inconsistent — duplicate content risk
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations66 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Add includeSubDomains to the HSTS directive
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records2 A records, 39 ms lookupPASS
| A | 100.24.208.97, 35.172.94.1 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns-1593.awsdns-07.co.uk, ns-1031.awsdns-00.org, ns-94.awsdns-11.com, ns-515.awsdns-00.net |
| MX | 0 passionfish-com-au.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| TXT | SPF v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all MS=ms53494624 |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
ARedirect Chain1 redirect(s), 512 ms totalPASS
https://passionfish.com.au
312 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.passionfish.com.au/
200 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://passionfish.com.au | 301 | 312 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
| 2 | https://www.passionfish.com.au/ | 200 | 200 ms | HTTP/1.1 | nginx |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 219 URLsPASS
# Sitemap is also available on /sitemap.xml
Sitemap: https://www.passionfish.com.au/sitemap.xml
User-agent: *
A+Domain Intelligencepassionfish.com.au — via Melbourne IT, hosted on AWSPASS
Unknown
66 days
Issued by Let's Encrypt
Unknown
Not enabled
Protects against DNS spoofing
AWS
ASN AS14618
35.172.94.1
Melbourne IT
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.
Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.
Learn more ▾ ▴
DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.
Source: ICANN / RFC 4033
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice