Infrastructure - https://www.rescueairtx.com BeaverCheck Audit

B

DNS Records

1 A records, 38 ms lookup

REVIEW

1 A records, 38 ms lookup

Resolves to 1 IPv4 address(es)

Got: 199.46.34.114

Single A record — no DNS redundancy

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

No IPv6 (AAAA) records

CNAME record at zone apex

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Got: ho009.scorphosting.com

No NS records found

No MX records — email not configured via DNS

No SPF record found in TXT records

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

DNS resolution time: 38 ms

Got: 38 ms

A	199.46.34.114
AAAA	—
CNAME	ho009.scorphosting.com
NS	—
MX	—
TXT	—
CAA	Lookup not available with standard resolver

Resolved in 38 ms

Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.

Why this matters

Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.

Learn more ▾

Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.

Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture

A CNAME at the zone apex can break MX and NS records. Use ALIAS/ANAME or A records instead.

Why this matters

CNAME at the apex (example.com) breaks every other apex record (MX, TXT, NS) — DNS-protocol violation per RFC 1034.

Learn more ▾

RFC 1034 forbids CNAME alongside other records at the same name. Some DNS providers offer ALIAS / ANAME / flattened-CNAME records that work around this — use those instead. Otherwise apex-level CNAME breaks email (no MX), domain ownership verification (no TXT), and more.

Source: RFC 1034

SPF helps prevent email spoofing. Add a TXT record starting with 'v=spf1'.

Why this matters

Without SPF, receiving servers can't validate sending IPs — your domain is easier to spoof in phishing.

Learn more ▾

SPF complements DMARC. Both should be published. SPF records list authorized sending IPs (e.g., `v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all` for Google Workspace). After publishing, verify in Google Postmaster Tools or mxtoolbox.

Source: RFC 7208 (SPF)

B

DNSSEC

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

REVIEW

Unsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)

DNSSEC is not deployed

The zone is not DNSSEC-signed. Users on validating resolvers (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Quad9 9.9.9.9, growing default in mobile resolvers) get no protection against DNS spoofing for this domain. Most registrars now offer DNSSEC at a single click; consider enabling it for sites where authenticity matters (banking, healthcare, government).

B

CAA Records

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

REVIEW

No CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)

No CAA records published

Without CAA records, any publicly-trusted CA can issue certificates for this domain. Adding a CAA record (`yourdomain. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"`) restricts issuance to CAs you authorize. Required by CAB Forum baseline since 2017; the default of 'any CA' is widely supported but is the broader attack surface for issuance fraud.

C

Reverse DNS

Action

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

REVIEW

0/1 IPs match cert SAN

PTR lookup failed for 199.46.34.114: lookup 199.46.34.114: no such host

No reverse DNS record set for this IP. Common on bare cloud-VM IPs without provider-side PTR; not a security issue.

C

IPv6 Readiness

Action

No IPv6 support

REVIEW

No IPv6 support

No IPv6 (AAAA) records found

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

No IPv6 Support

About 40% of internet users have IPv6. Consider adding AAAA records.

IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.

Why this matters

No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.

Source: Google IPv6 stats

B

HTTP Probe Timing

Total 1299 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdown

REVIEW

DNS Lookup

84 ms

TCP Connect

145 ms

TLS Handshake

628 ms

Time to First Byte

1.15 s

Total Time

1.30 s

Connection waterfall

DNS Lookup 84 ms TCP Connect 145 ms TLS Handshake 628 ms Server Processing 296 ms Content Transfer 146 ms

B

TLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations

45 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to address

REVIEW

Certificate validity

45

days left

0d 30d 60d 90d+

Recommended actions

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to be added to the Chrome preload list
Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy

C

CDN & Delivery

Action

Assets on Cloudflare (host wsv3cdn.audioeye.com, 7 assets); document served directly from origin

REVIEW

Assets on Cloudflare (host wsv3cdn.audioeye.com, 7 assets); document served directly from origin

Document not behind existing CDN (Cloudflare serves the assets)

The page's subresources are delivered by Cloudflare (wsv3cdn.audioeye.com, 7 assets), but the HTML document itself comes straight from the origin. Routing the document through the CDN already in use is the cheapest latency win available here -- the provider relationship, the certificate and the config already exist. A short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate suits HTML that changes often; if the response is genuinely per-user, edge TLS termination alone still removes a full round trip from every visitor's first byte.

Got: delegation wsv3cdn.audioeye.com.cdn.cloudflare.net

Assets on Cloudflare: wsv3cdn.audioeye.com (assets: 7), cache HIT

Got: delegation wsv3cdn.audioeye.com.cdn.cloudflare.net

Assets on Cloudflare: p.jmlp.app (assets: 4), cache HIT

Got: cf-ray: a3929e75fc9cf848-CDG

Assets on a CDN, document is not: Cloudflare

Document origin not attributed

Asset hosts on a CDN

wsv3cdn.audioeye.com — Cloudflare · assets: 7 · Cache Status: HIT
p.jmlp.app — Cloudflare · assets: 4 · Cache Status: HIT

Other asset hosts

cdn.tapad.app — assets: 4 · not attributed
connect.facebook.net — assets: 3 · not attributed
www.googletagmanager.com — assets: 3 · Google
analytics.scorpion.co — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
avoca.ai — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
c.amazon-adsystem.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
cdn01.basis.net — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
collector-52421.us.tvsquared.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
embed.scheduler.servicetitan.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
px.premion.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
searchlight.partners — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
static.speetra.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
wsmcdn.audioeye.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold
www.google-analytics.com — assets: 1 · below probe threshold

The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.

B

CDN Cache Observability

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

REVIEW

No CDN cache-status headers in the response

Without an X-Cache / CF-Cache-Status / X-Vercel-Cache / Age header, you can't tell from outside whether a request hit the cache or went to origin. Operationally important: enables debugging stale-content reports and verifying cache rules. Most managed CDN platforms emit at least one of these by default; absence often means the platform's diagnostic headers are stripped at an upstream proxy.

B

Operational Status Page

No status page link detected

REVIEW

No status page link detected

No operational status page link detected

Status pages communicate planned maintenance and incidents to users -- a hallmark of operationally-mature services. Most SaaS teams publish one via Atlassian Statuspage, Instatus, BetterUptime, or a self-hosted Cachet. Smaller sites legitimately don't need one; flagged as Info, not a failure.

B

Health Check Endpoint

No conventional health endpoint found

REVIEW

No conventional health endpoint found

Health endpoints (/health, /healthz, /status, /ping, /api/health) let uptime monitors, load balancers, and orchestration systems (Kubernetes, ECS, Fly.io) verify the service is alive. Marketing sites and small services often skip them legitimately; flagged as Info, not a failure. Probe results: /api/health: 404, /health: 404, /healthz: 404, /ping: 404, /status: 404.

A+

Subdomain Takeover

No subdomain takeover risk detected

PASS

No subdomain takeover risk detected

CNAME does not point at a known takeover-able service

A+

Multi-Resolver DNS Speed

Mean 30ms across 3 resolvers (spread 10ms)

PASS

Mean 30ms across 3 resolvers (spread 10ms)

Quad9: 26ms

Got: 26ms via 9.9.9.9:53

Cloudflare: 30ms

Got: 30ms via 1.1.1.1:53

Google: 36ms

Got: 36ms via 8.8.8.8:53

A+

Redirect Chain

No redirects — direct access

PASS

No redirects — direct access

Got: https://www.rescueairtx.com

https://www.rescueairtx.com

1486 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL

#	URL	Status	Time	Protocol	Server
1	https://www.rescueairtx.com	200	1486 ms	HTTP/1.1

A+

Crawlability

robots.txt present, sitemap with 562 URLs

PASS

robots.txt present, sitemap with 562 URLs

robots.txt is present

Got: 219 bytes

sitemap.xml is present

sitemap.xml is valid XML

sitemap.xml contains 562 entries

robots.txt references sitemap

robots.txt 200 OK

Size 219 B Sitemaps referenced 1 User-agents * Blocking No — crawling allowed

User-Agent: *


# Block access to the admin directory request per client

Disallow: /admin/


# Block access to admin area request per client

Disallow: /wp-admin/


Sitemap: https://www.rescueairtx.com/sitemap.xml

sitemap.xml 200 OK

Type URL Set URLs 562 entries Valid XML Yes

Sample URLs:

A+

URL Variants

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

PASS

www/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPS

www/non-www redirect configured correctly (preferred: www)

HTTP correctly redirects to HTTPS permanently

Got: HTTP 301

www / non-www

200https://www.rescueairtx.com/

301https://rescueairtx.com/

Preferred variant: www

HTTP → HTTPS

301http://www.rescueairtx.com/ → https://www.rescueairtx.com/

Consistent

A+

Domain Intelligence

rescueairtx.com — via NameCheap, Inc., 12 years, 11 months old, hosted on AWS

PASS

rescueairtx.com — via NameCheap, Inc., 12 years, 11 months old, hosted on AWS

Domain registered until Mar 20, 2027 (6 months remaining)

DNSSEC is not enabled

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Registrar: NameCheap, Inc.

Registrar lock is NOT enabled

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Hosting: AWS

Got: AS14618

Domain expiry

190 days

March 20, 2027

SSL certificate

45 days

Issued by Let's Encrypt

Domain age

12 years, 11 months

Registered December 12, 2013

DNSSEC

Not enabled

Protects against DNS spoofing

Hosting

AWS

ASN AS14618

34.224.10.110

Registrar

NameCheap, Inc.

Unlocked 2 NS records

Expiry timeline

Today

+1 year

Domain expiry SSL expiry Danger zone (≤30 days)

Recommended actions

Enable DNSSEC to protect visitors from DNS spoofing
Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers

Registrar NameCheap, Inc.

Created December 12, 2013 (12 years, 11 months ago)

Expires March 20, 2027 (6 months)

Last Updated March 27, 2025

Name Servers galilea.ns.cloudflare.com, kevin.ns.cloudflare.com

DNSSEC Not enabled

Hosting

IP Address 34.224.10.110

ASN AS14618 (AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com, Inc., US)

Provider AWS

Data source: rdap (0.4s)

DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing attacks. While not required, enabling DNSSEC adds an additional layer of security. Contact your DNS provider to enable it.

Why this matters

Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can poison your DNS can hijack your domain — and SSL certs alone don't stop them.

Learn more ▾

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, preventing forged responses from poisoning resolver caches. Without it, an attacker who controls the network path can redirect your domain to a malicious server before any HTTPS handshake happens. Most modern registrars (Cloudflare, Google Domains, Route 53) enable it with one toggle.

Source: ICANN / RFC 4033

The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.

Why this matters

Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.

Learn more ▾

Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.

Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice