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Security

· 32 checks — HTTP headers, CSP, TLS handshake, and cookie hygiene rolled into one auditable list.
SCORE
86
GRADE
B
FIX
3
REVIEW
7
PASS
22
INFO
0
Checks
32
22 PASS 7 REVIEW 3 FIX
F
Empty Page Detection
Action
1 empty-page signal(s) detected -- page may be a placeholder or have content-rendering bugs
FIX
1 empty-page signal(s) detected -- page may be a placeholder or have content-rendering bugs
Critical::
Page body has only 77 chars of text -- likely empty / placeholder
After HTML stripping, the page body contains 77 characters of text content. Below 200 chars almost always means: (1) the page is a placeholder that was never filled in, (2) JavaScript was supposed to render content but failed, (3) the page is a redirect / interstitial / wrapper that should have a real status code other than 200, or (4) it's a legitimately small page like a single-form login (in which case this finding is a false positive that confirms 'minimal content' is intentional). Review the page in a browser. If content is missing, the most common root cause is a JS-rendering pipeline that needs prerendering or server-side rendering for crawlers / scanners to capture content.
Got: 77 chars
D
Permissions-Policy Granularity
Action
Permissions-Policy header present but parsing failed -- check syntax
FIX
Permissions-Policy header present but parsing failed -- check syntax
Warning::
Permissions-Policy header is malformed -- browsers will ignore it
The Permissions-Policy header value `geolocation=self` does not parse as a valid feature-list. Syntax: `feature=allowlist, feature=allowlist`. Allowlists are parenthesized: `()` for deny-all, `(self)` for own-origin only, `(self "https://example.com")` for own-origin plus a specific origin, or `*` for any. Browsers silently ignore unparseable headers, leaving you with the default-allow posture.
Got: geolocation=self
D
Email Security
Action
DMARC: none, SPF: ~all, DKIM
FIX
DMARC: none, SPF: ~all, DKIM
Warning::
DMARC policy is none — monitoring only
This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.
Info::
DMARC configured without rua= aggregate reporting
Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).
Info::
SPF ends in ~all (soft fail)
Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).
Info::
DKIM configured (selectors: default)
Info::
MTA-STS not configured
MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.
Info::
TLS-RPT not configured
TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.
Info::
BIMI not configured
BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.
DMARC
Policy none — monitoring only, does not block spoofing Record v=DMARC1; p=none;

This only monitors, it doesn't block spoofed emails. Change to p=quarantine or p=reject after monitoring DMARC reports.

Why this matters

DMARC p=none collects reports but doesn't actually block spoofed mail — phishing emails still reach inboxes.

Learn more ▾

DMARC's three policies are p=none (monitor only), p=quarantine (mark as spam), and p=reject (bounce). Most domains start at p=none to gather data, but stay there forever, leaving spoofers unblocked. After 30 days of clean DMARC reports, graduate to p=quarantine, then p=reject.

Source: DMARC.org / NIST

Without rua=, you have no visibility into spoof attempts or auth failures from your own legitimate senders. Add rua=mailto:dmarc@<your-domain> (or a managed inbox at a reporting service).

Why this matters

Informational: a Permissions-Policy directive showing feature -> allowed origins.

Source: MDN Permissions-Policy

Soft fail tells receivers to accept-but-mark unauthorized mail. Migrate to -all once you've confirmed all legitimate senders are listed (DMARC aggregate reports help verify).

Why this matters

Informational: a labeled value pair from the audit.

MTA-STS forces inbound mail to use TLS, preventing downgrade attacks. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> and a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt.

Why this matters

Without MTA-STS, inbound mail can be silently downgraded to plain SMTP by a network attacker.

Learn more ▾

MTA-STS (RFC 8461) tells sending mail servers to use TLS and to refuse delivery if TLS fails. Requires both a TXT record at _mta-sts.<domain> AND a policy file at https://mta-sts.<domain>/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. Without it, an active attacker on the network path can strip STARTTLS and read the email in plaintext.

Source: RFC 8461

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) lets MTAs report TLS-handshake failures, so you can detect and fix MTA-STS misconfigurations. Add a TXT record at _smtp._tls.<domain>.

Why this matters

Without TLS-RPT, you have no visibility into inbound TLS failures — MTA-STS misconfigurations stay hidden until users complain.

Learn more ▾

TLS-RPT (RFC 8460) is the feedback channel for MTA-STS: senders post aggregate reports of TLS-handshake failures to the URI in your _smtp._tls TXT record. Without it, an MTA-STS misconfiguration silently rejects mail and you find out only when someone notices missing email.

Source: RFC 8460

BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) lets supporting clients (Gmail, Apple Mail, Yahoo) display your verified logo next to your messages. Optional but raises trust signals. Requires DMARC at p=quarantine or p=reject to be honored.

Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

C
Content Security Policy
Action
2 of 10 CSP checks passed
REVIEW
2 of 10 CSP checks passed
Info::
Raw CSP policy
Got: upgrade-insecure-requests
Warning::
default-src directive is missing
default-src provides a fallback for other directives. Set it to restrict default resource loading.
Expected: default-src 'self'
Info::
No script-src or default-src to check for 'unsafe-inline'
Info::
No script-src or default-src to check for 'unsafe-eval'
Info::
No script-src or default-src to check for wildcard
Info::
object-src falls back to default-src
Warning::
base-uri directive is missing
Without base-uri, attackers can inject a <base> tag to hijack relative URLs. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.
Expected: base-uri 'self'
Warning::
frame-ancestors directive is missing
frame-ancestors controls who can embed your page, preventing clickjacking. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.
Expected: frame-ancestors 'self'
Warning::
form-action directive is missing
form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.
Expected: form-action 'self'
Info::
upgrade-insecure-requests is enabled

default-src provides a fallback for other directives. Set it to restrict default resource loading.

Expected: default-src 'self'
Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

Without base-uri, attackers can inject a <base> tag to hijack relative URLs. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.

Expected: base-uri 'self'
Why this matters

Missing base-uri in CSP leaves a base-tag injection attack path open even on otherwise strict policies.

Learn more ▾

A common omission: developers add CSP for script-src and frame-ancestors but forget base-uri. The result is a CSP that looks strict but lets an attacker rewrite every URL on the page via <base href>. Add `base-uri 'self'` to close the gap.

Source: MDN CSP

frame-ancestors controls who can embed your page, preventing clickjacking. Set it to 'self' or 'none'.

Expected: frame-ancestors 'self'
Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

form-action restricts where forms can submit data, preventing form hijacking.

Expected: form-action 'self'
Why this matters

Security gaps expose your site and users to attacks, eroding trust.

Parsed Policy

upgrade-insecure-requests
B
WAF / Bot Protection
No WAF detected via response headers
REVIEW
No WAF detected via response headers
Info::
No WAF detected
Response headers don't match any known WAF or bot-management product. Sites exposed to abuse (login, signup, payment) typically benefit from a WAF such as Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS WAF, or Imperva.
C
security.txt
Action
No security.txt file found
REVIEW
No security.txt file found
Info::
No security.txt file found
security.txt (RFC 9116) provides a standardized way for security researchers to report vulnerabilities. Create one at /.well-known/security.txt with at least a Contact field.
Expected: /.well-known/security.txt

security.txt

No security.txt found at /.well-known/security.txt

C
CSP Inline-Style Readiness
Action
47 inline style attribute(s) detected
REVIEW
47 inline style attribute(s) detected
Warning::
47 inline style attribute(s) detected
Each `style=""` attribute forces `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` in any Content-Security-Policy, which negates most of CSP's XSS-mitigation value. 47 inline style(s) is moderate. Affected element types include: span, img, p, a, div. Move styles to a stylesheet; use CSS custom properties for runtime-dynamic values; or adopt a nonce/hash CSP policy. Most teams take the stylesheet path because it's also a maintainability win.
B
Trusted Types (XSS Sink Hardening)
Trusted Types not enabled
REVIEW
Trusted Types not enabled
Info::
Trusted Types not enabled
Trusted Types (CSP3) is a Chrome 83+ defense that requires DOM-XSS sinks (innerHTML, document.write, eval, ...) to receive a typed-and-sanitized value rather than a raw string. Adding `Content-Security-Policy: require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types default` neutralizes most DOM-XSS even when a payload reaches a sink. Adoption is currently ~0.1% of pages so this is informational; a roll-out usually starts in report-only mode.
C
Permissions-Policy
Action
1 directives, 4 missing
REVIEW
1 directives, 4 missing
Info::
geolocation=self
Info::
camera not restricted
Consider adding camera=() to block camera access from embedded content.
Info::
microphone not restricted
Consider adding microphone=() to block microphone access from embedded content.
Info::
payment not restricted
Consider adding payment=() to block payment access from embedded content.
Info::
usb not restricted
Consider adding usb=() to block usb access from embedded content.

Raw Header

geolocation=self

Feature Permissions

Blocked Self Only Unrestricted Not Set
geolocation Self Only
camera Not Set
microphone Not Set
payment Not Set
usb Not Set
B
CORS Configuration
No CORS headers
REVIEW
No CORS headers
Info::
No CORS headers present — secure default
CORS Configuration ✓ Secure

No CORS headers detected.

Cross-origin requests are blocked by browser same-origin policy.

Origin reflection test

Some servers mirror the request Origin header, which can be exploited. Test manually:

curl -sI -H "Origin: https://evil.com" <url> | grep -i access-control
A
Security Headers
8 of 10 headers properly configured
PASS
8 of 10 headers properly configured
Info::
HSTS is enabled
Got: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
Info::
X-Content-Type-Options is properly configured
Got: nosniff
Info::
X-Frame-Options is properly configured
Got: SAMEORIGIN
Info::
Referrer-Policy is properly configured
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
Info::
Permissions-Policy is set
Got: geolocation=self
Info::
Content-Security-Policy is present
Got: upgrade-insecure-requests
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy header is missing
COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.
Expected: same-origin
Warning::
Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy header is missing
COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.
Expected: require-corp
Info::
X-Powered-By header is not present
Info::
Server header is not present
Info::
Domain is not in the Chrome HSTS preload list (status: unknown)
Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).
Got: unknown

COOP isolates your browsing context, preventing cross-origin side-channel attacks. Set to 'same-origin'.

Expected: same-origin
Why this matters

COOP isolates your top-level browsing context from cross-origin windows — without it, popup-based side-channel attacks remain possible.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin prevents cross-origin pages from sharing a browsing-context group with yours. This blocks cross-window references that enable Spectre-style timing attacks and tab-nabbing. Required if you want to enable SharedArrayBuffer.

Source: MDN / web.dev

COEP prevents loading cross-origin resources without explicit permission. Required for SharedArrayBuffer and high-resolution timers.

Expected: require-corp
Why this matters

COEP enforces that all embedded resources opt-in to cross-origin embedding — required for cross-origin isolation features.

Learn more ▾

Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp ensures every embedded resource (script, iframe, image) explicitly allows being loaded cross-origin. Combined with COOP, this enables the cross-origin-isolated context that unlocks SharedArrayBuffer, high-resolution timers, and other powerful APIs.

Source: MDN / web.dev

Submit your domain to hstspreload.org to close the trust-on-first-use gap. Requires a preload-ready HSTS header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload).

Why this matters

Not in the Chrome preload list — first-time visitors over plain HTTP can be downgraded by a network attacker before HSTS kicks in.

Learn more ▾

The HSTS header only protects users who have already visited the site (TOFU window). Adding your domain to the Chrome preload list closes that gap so HSTS is enforced from the very first connection. Requires a preload-ready header (max-age=31536000+, includeSubDomains, preload) then submission at hstspreload.org. Inclusion ships in the next Chrome release after acceptance.

Source: hstspreload.org

A+
TLS & Certificates
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
PASS
TLS 1.3, 8 checks passed
Info::
TLS 1.3 is used
Got: TLS 1.3
Info::
Strong cipher suite is used
Got: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
Info::
HTTP/2 is negotiated
Got: h2
Info::
OCSP stapling not enabled
Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.
Info::
Certificate is valid (expires in 74 days)
Got: 2027-02-03T19:41:29Z
Info::
Certificate chain has 3 certificates
Info::
Certificate uses modern signature algorithm
Got: SHA256-RSA
Info::
Certificate covers 2 domain(s)
Got: *.sanginpart.ir, sanginpart.ir
Info::
Certificate is issued by a trusted CA
Got: CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=US

Without stapling, the browser performs a separate OCSP roundtrip on first connection -- adding latency and leaking the visited host to the CA. Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server.

Why this matters

Without OCSP stapling, every first-time visitor pays an extra OCSP roundtrip — and the CA learns who's visiting your site.

Learn more ▾

OCSP stapling has the server fetch its own revocation status from the CA and attach the signed response to the TLS handshake. Without it, browsers contact the CA directly: extra latency for the user and a privacy leak (the CA sees who connected). Enable ssl_stapling on (nginx) / SSLUseStapling On (Apache) / OCSPStapling = on (Caddy auto-enables).

Source: RFC 6961 / Mozilla Server-Side TLS guide

Connection
Protocol
TLS 1.3
Cipher Suite
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
HTTP Version
h2 (HTTP/2)

Certificate Chain

Leaf Certificate
Subject CN=sanginpart.irIssuer CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USValid 2026-11-05T19:41:30Z → 2027-02-03T19:41:29ZExpires in 74 days SANs *.sanginpart.ir, sanginpart.irSignature SHA256-RSASerial 57bb9dacee9bf701cd1ffd606896b523115
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=YR2,O=Let's Encrypt,C=USIssuer CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USValid 2025-09-03T00:00:00Z → 2028-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 651 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial 4ebd24947e24d394802d84a52fd5b319
Intermediate (CA Certificate)
Subject CN=Root YR,O=ISRG,C=USIssuer CN=ISRG Root X1,O=Internet Security Research Group,C=USValid 2026-05-13T00:00:00Z → 2032-09-02T23:59:59ZExpires in 2112 days Signature SHA256-RSASerial f24b6d17f9d9ad7cb1c9fea78782699f
A+
Cookie Security
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
PASS
No cookies set — no cookie security risks
Info::
No cookies set — no cookie security risks

No cookies detected — no cookie security risks to report.

A+
Cross-Origin Tab Safety
No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface
PASS
No new-tab links found -- no tabnabbing surface
Info::
No new-tab links present
A+
Bot Challenge Detection
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
PASS
Scan reached real page content (no bot-protection interstitial)
Info::
No bot-protection interstitial detected -- the rest of the report reflects the real page
A+
Soft-404 Detection
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
PASS
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
Info::
No soft-404 patterns detected in page title or headings
A+
Geo-Restriction Detection
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
PASS
No geo-restriction signals detected -- scan reached the page from an allowed region
Info::
No geo-restriction detected
A+
Maintenance Mode Detection
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
PASS
No maintenance-mode signals detected -- scan reached a normal page
Info::
No maintenance-mode signals detected
A+
Subresource Integrity Adoption
Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable
PASS
Page has no third-party scripts or stylesheets -- SRI not applicable
Info::
No third-party scripts or stylesheets to protect with SRI
A+
CORS Depth
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
PASS
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
Info::
No CORS response headers -- the resource is same-origin-only by browser default
A+
Referrer-Policy Strictness
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
PASS
Referrer-Policy is `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` (modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin)
Info::
Referrer-Policy: `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` -- modern default -- full URL same-origin, origin-only cross-origin
The modern browser default (Chrome 85+, Firefox 87+, Safari 15+). Full URL Referer on same-origin; origin only on cross-origin; no Referer on HTTPS-to-HTTP downgrade. Privacy-safe and breaks no analytics. The recommended explicit value.
Got: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
A+
Source Map Exposure
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
PASS
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
Info::
Source-map probe didn't run on this scan
A+
HTML Version Disclosure
No software-version disclosures in HTML
PASS
No software-version disclosures in HTML
Info::
No software-version disclosures in HTML
A+
Open Redirect Surface
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
PASS
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
Info::
No redirect-shaped query parameters in DOM links
A+
Auth Security
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
PASS
Page is not a login form -- auth-security checks are N/A
Info::
Page does not appear to be a login form
A+
Subdomain Inventory Exposure
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
PASS
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
Info::
No risky subdomain names in certificate SANs
A+
Subresource Integrity
No external resources
PASS
No external resources
Info::
No external resources to protect
SRI Coverage No external resources — SRI not applicable
A+
JS Library Vulnerabilities
No known vulnerabilities
PASS
No known vulnerabilities
Info::
No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected

No known JavaScript library vulnerabilities detected.

A+
Information Leakage
No exposures
PASS
No exposures
Info::
No security.txt found
Consider adding a security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt.
Info::
No sensitive files exposed

No sensitive files exposed — all paths returned 404.

PathStatusCategoryRisk
/.git/HEAD✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.git/config✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.svn/entries✓ Not foundVersion Control—
/.env✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.local✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.env.production✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/wp-config.php✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/.htaccess✓ Not foundConfiguration—
/phpinfo.php✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-status✓ Not foundDebug—
/server-info✓ Not foundDebug—
/.well-known/security.txt✓ Not foundSecurity Policy—
/package.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/composer.json✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/Gemfile.lock✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/requirements.txt✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/pom.xml✓ Not founddependency-manifest—
/.gitlab-ci.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
/.travis.yml✓ Not foundci-config—
A+
API Surface
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
PASS
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 candidate path(s))
Info::
No API specs or GraphQL introspection found (probed 11 path(s))
A+
Transport Security
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
PASS
HTTP/3, HSTS, and TLS version analysis
Info::
HTTP/3 (QUIC) supported
The server advertises HTTP/3 via Alt-Svc for faster connections on mobile networks.
Info::
HSTS enabled (includeSubDomains)
Info::
TLS 1.3 in use (fastest handshake, 1-RTT)
All checks on this page are automated. Results are estimates - run targeted manual reviews when the score affects a release decision.

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