Infrastructure
· 9 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.DRedirect ChainAction2 redirect(s), 3022 ms totalFIX
https://shef.ac.uk
924 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/
1111 ms · HTTP/1.1
https://sheffield.ac.uk/
987 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://shef.ac.uk | 301 | 924 ms | HTTP/1.1 | |
| 2 | https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ | 301 | 1111 ms | HTTP/1.1 | |
| 3 | https://sheffield.ac.uk/ | 200 | 987 ms | HTTP/1.1 |
See the visual redirect chain in the HTTP Probe tab →
Each redirect adds latency. Try to minimize the chain to 1 hop.
Redirect chain — each hop adds latency; combine into one redirect where possible.
Source: Google Search Central / web.dev
DCDN & DeliveryActionNo CDN detectedFIX
Consider using a CDN to improve global delivery speed and reduce origin load.
CIPv6 ReadinessActionNo IPv6 supportREVIEW
IPv6 support is increasingly important for global accessibility. About 40% of internet users have IPv6 connectivity.
No AAAA records — same impact as 'no IPv6 (AAAA) records'; IPv6-preferring clients pay extra latency falling back to IPv4.
Source: Google IPv6 stats
BHTTP Probe TimingTotal 924 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownREVIEW
Connection waterfall
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations41 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
A+DNS Records1 A records, 187 ms lookupPASS
| A | 143.167.2.102 |
| AAAA | — |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | hippo.shef.ac.uk, ns4.ja.net, acheron.shef.ac.uk |
| MX | 1 aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt2.aspmx.l.google.com 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt3.aspmx.l.google.com 10 alt4.aspmx.l.google.com |
| TXT | fastly-domain-delegation-nswth4upxeqnqveipseg-00624106-2026-03-04 apple-domain-verification=aQwUN0OnGdXEaFv7 QuoVadis=b6b1f5bd-5729-453c-9950-107c31ff576a SPF v=spf1 ip4:143.167.0.0/16 ip4:95.172.88.0/22 ip4:130.88.36.5 ip4:80.93.168.194 i... google-site-verification=xecQmyR2UQAd3OiZbAW_FJHFJPwg8p8uX30nW4o6zOY google-site-verification=isKsdLEuDlo36yj5mOEE565z5MSZ3ZToeKOK5ovSB0U |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
CAA record lookup requires a specialized DNS resolver. This check will be available in a future update.
Informational: CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) records weren't checked in this scan.
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 2 URLsPASS
#
# robots.txt
#
# This file is to prevent the crawling and indexing of certain parts
# of your site by web crawlers and spiders run by sites like Yahoo!
# and Google. By telling these "robots" where not to go on your site,
# you save bandwidth and server resources.
#
# This file will be ignored unless it is at the root of your host:
# Used: http://example.com/robots.txt
# Ignored: http://example.com/site/robots.txt
#
# For more information about the robots.txt standard, see:
# http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html
User-agent: *
# CSS, JS, Images
Allow: /core/*.css$
Allow: /core/*.css?
Allow: /core/*.js$
Allow: /core/*.js?
Allow: /core/*.gif
Allow: /core/*.jpg
Allow: /core/*.jpeg
Allow: /core/*.png
Allow: /core/*.svg
Allow: /profiles/*.css$
Allow: /profiles/*.css?
Allow: /profiles/*.js$
Allow: /profiles/*.js?
Allow: /profiles/*.gif
Allow: /profiles/*.jpg
Allow: /profiles/*.jpeg
Allow: /profiles/*.png
Allow: /profiles/*.svg
# Directories
Disallow: /core/
Disallow: /profiles/
# Files
Disallow: /README.txt
Disallow: /web.config
# Paths (clean URLs)
Disallow: /admin/
Disallow: /comment/reply/
Disallow: /filter/tips
Disallow: /node/add/
Disallow: /search/
Disallow: /find
Disallow: /user/register
Disallow: /user/password
Disallow: /user/login
Disallow: /user/logout
Disallow: /media/oembed
Disallow: /*/media/oembed
# Paths (no clean URLs)
Disallow: /index.php/admin/
Disallow: /index.php/comment/reply/
Disallow: /index.php/filter/tips
Disallow: /index.php/node/add/
Disallow: /index.php/search/
Disallow: /index.php/user/password
Disallow: /index.php/user/register
Disallow: /index.php/user/login
Disallow: /index.php/user/logout
Disallow: /index.php/media/oembed
Disallow: /index.php/*/media/oembed
# Site Maps
Sitemap: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/sitemap.xml
A+URL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSPASS
www / non-www
Preferred variant: non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
Consistent
A+Domain Intelligenceshef.ac.uk — via No registrar listed. This domain is directly registered with Nominet., hosted on JANET Jisc Services Limited, GBPASS
Unknown
41 days
Issued by Sectigo Limited
Unknown
Status unknown
Protects against DNS spoofing
JANET Jisc Services Limited, GB
ASN AS786
143.167.2.102
No registrar listed. This domain is directly registered with Nominet.
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice