Infrastructure
· 17 checks — DNS, redirects, IPv6, crawlability, URL variants, and domain intelligence rolled into one auditable list.FHTTP Probe TimingActionTotal 3374 ms — DNS, TCP, TLS, TTFB, content transfer breakdownFIX
Connection waterfall
BDNSSECUnsigned (DNSSEC not deployed)REVIEW
BCAA RecordsNo CAA records (any CA may issue certificates)REVIEW
BReverse DNS0/2 IPs match cert SANREVIEW
BURL Variantswww/non-www, trailing slash, HTTP→HTTPSREVIEW
www / non-www
HTTP → HTTPS
HTTP version does not redirect to HTTPS
BTLS Certificate Expiry & Recommendations170 days until leaf cert expires — 3 issues to addressREVIEW
Certificate validity
Recommended actions
- Enable HSTS: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains
- Enable DNSSEC on your domain for DNS spoofing protection
- Enable OCSP stapling on your TLS server to remove a CA roundtrip and protect user privacy
CCDN & DeliveryActionAssets on AWS CloudFront (host mytools.aleno.me, 3 assets); document served directly from originREVIEW
Asset hosts on a CDN
- mytools.aleno.me — AWS CloudFront · assets: 3 · Cache Status: Hit from cloudfront
Other asset hosts
- hugos-weinbar.de — assets: 6 · not attributed
The heavy static files already ride an edge network, but every visitor still waits on the origin for the HTML itself. Routing the document through the same CDN is usually a config change rather than a migration: a short edge TTL with stale-while-revalidate for cacheable HTML, or edge TLS termination alone when the response is per-user.
BCDN Cache ObservabilityNo CDN cache-status headers in the responseREVIEW
BOperational Status PageNo status page link detectedREVIEW
BHealth Check EndpointNo conventional health endpoint foundREVIEW
A+DNS Records1 A records, 32 ms lookupPASS
| A | 178.77.111.118 |
| AAAA | 2a01:488:42:1000:b24d:6f76:ff67:f281 |
| CNAME | — |
| NS | ns70.domaincontrol.com, ns69.domaincontrol.com |
| MX | 999 tambosiodeonsplatz-de01i.mail.protection.outlook.com |
| TXT | MS=ms17115803 SPF v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com -all google-site-verification=vh-q-Nskar516o005HX79C6TJ0BN_PdxOupjED5-awM |
| CAA | Lookup not available with standard resolver |
Multiple A records provide failover if one server goes down.
Single A record means a single point of failure — if that IP goes down, your site is unreachable until DNS TTL expires.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Add multiple A records for round-robin failover, or use a managed DNS provider with health-checked failover (Route 53, Cloudflare, NS1). Short TTL (60-300s) lets clients recover faster on outages.
Source: SRE practice / DNS architecture
A+Subdomain TakeoverNo subdomain takeover risk detectedPASS
A+Multi-Resolver DNS SpeedMean 34ms across 3 resolvers (spread 17ms)PASS
A+Redirect ChainNo redirects — direct accessPASS
https://tambosi-odeonsplatz.de
3322 ms · HTTP/1.1 FINAL
| # | URL | Status | Time | Protocol | Server |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | https://tambosi-odeonsplatz.de | 200 | 3322 ms | HTTP/1.1 | Apache |
A+IPv6 ReadinessIPv6 reachable (25 ms)PASS
A+Crawlabilityrobots.txt present, sitemap with 1 URLsPASS
# START YOAST BLOCK
# ---------------------------
User-agent: *
Disallow:
Sitemap: https://tambosi-odeonsplatz.de/sitemap_index.xml
# ---------------------------
# END YOAST BLOCK
A+Domain Intelligencetambosi-odeonsplatz.dePASS
Unknown
170 days
Issued by Starfield Technologies, Inc.
Unknown
Status unknown
Protects against DNS spoofing
Unknown
2a01:488:42:1000:b24d:6f76:ff67:f281
Registrar unknown
Expiry timeline
Recommended actions
- Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) to block unauthorized domain transfers
The domain can be transferred without an unlock step. Enable registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited) in your registrar's control panel to protect against unauthorized or accidental transfers.
Without registrar lock, an attacker who phishes your registrar credentials can transfer the domain in minutes — total brand hijack.
Learn more ▾ ▴
Registrar lock (clientTransferProhibited, clientUpdateProhibited, clientDeleteProhibited) requires extra verification before any transfer/update/delete. Every major registrar offers it free. Combined with 2FA on your registrar account, it's the strongest defense against domain hijacking.
Source: ICANN / domain-security best practice